This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owing blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly, but we show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark, the blockholder governs through exit, selling her stake if and only if the firm is underperforming. With multiple firms, the blockholder disguises the sale of one underperforming firm as being motivated by a liquidity shock, by either selling the second firm even if it is value-maximizing, or not selling the second firm even if it is underperforming. This effect weakens governance. On the other hand, governance can be stronger, because selling one firm and not the other is a powerful signal of underperformance. Common ownership creates strategic complements in managerial effort and has asset pricing implications: stock prices can be correlated even if firms' cash flows are independent. While liquidity shocks may cause the blockholder to sell both stakes simultaneously, the correlation can surprisingly be negative. In general, the severity of the agency problem, the frequency and magnitude of liquidity shocks, and the manager's stock price concerns all affect both the correlation and whether governance is stronger or weaker with multiple firms.