Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions*

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Abstract

We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. Under a set of plausible assumptions, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition amongst producers. Decreasing the number of charlatans turns a lower quality buyers market into a higher quality sellers market. Producers strictly benefit from this reduction, likely explaining the regulation we observe. We derive the factors that drive the cross-sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.

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“We write today to ask what specific steps FINRA will take to address the pervasive misconduct among its financial advisers and to protect families looking to invest their hard-earned savings.” U.S. Senators E. Warren and T. Cotton, Letter to FINRA May 11th 2016.

An important role for government in the modern economy concerns the regulation of standards and information disclosure for goods and services. As the introductory quote from Senators Warren and Cotton illustrates, the justification legislators use for this role is generally the protection of consumers. Indeed, the assumption that regulation is in consumers’ interest is often taken for granted. In this paper we argue that this assumption requires more rigorous justification. In fact, under a set of plausible conditions we demonstrate that for professions that are in great demand and require a skill in short supply, disclosure requirements or standards reduce consumer surplus. Instead, the primary effect of regulation is to make producers better off, providing an explanation for why trade groups often lobby for and are in favor of high standards.

We study the role of regulation in a parsimonious equilibrium model that features charlatans — agents that know that they do not possess the skill to provide a particular service, but nevertheless may choose to enter that profession and offer the service. In the model, skilled agents are in inelastic short supply and consumers learn about the skillfulness of the professional through a signal. The main intuition for why regulation reduces consumer surplus is that, in expectation, consumers get what they pay for. That is, before any government intervention, the probability that the consumer could be dealing with a charlatan is reflected in a lower price for the service. If the government imposes a standard by requiring a lower bound on the providers’ signal or mandates information disclosure, the price of the service or good increases to reflect the lower probability of consumers having to deal with a charlatan. If this were the only effect, consumers would be left indifferent: the increase in their expected benefit is perfectly offset by the higher price. However, there is an additional effect. The minimum standard or disclosure reduces the number of providers, thereby reducing competition in the market. This reduced competition increases prices further, and thus lowers consumer surplus.

One may wonder why, in the absence of a government imposed standard, the market is not flooded with charlatans. The reason is that even without government regulation a market standard exists – consumers only hire producers that satisfy the market clearing level of quality. So the question regulators face is whether it is in consumer interests to impose a higher standard than the one already imposed by the market. Under our assumptions, the answer to this question is no.
Although the equilibrium mechanism underlying our results is quite general, it is premature to conclude, based on the arguments in this paper alone, that all regulation that has been put in place in the name of protecting consumers should be removed. Good reasons may exist that justify the regulation of standards and information. Instead, what is needed is a change in the status quo. Rather than take for granted that the regulation of information and standards necessarily benefits consumers, the onus should be on regulators to justify the need for such regulation. What our model does is provide a set of conditions under which regulation hurts consumers. Given this benchmark, any argument in favor of regulation requires, at a minimum, identifying which of these conditions is not satisfied and moreover, that the effect of the violation is important enough to reverse the conclusion.

Perhaps most surprisingly, our results extend to information disclosure requirements. It is often argued that informing consumers better about the products they buy leaves them better off, because they can make better choices. However, this logic ignores the equilibrium effect on prices that such information revelation has. Consider the case where the government is perfectly informed about who the charlatans are, and instead of setting standards, simply communicates this information to consumers. Even though the information fully drives charlatans out of the market, consumers are left worse off because the revelation of this information comes at a high cost. Prices go up to reflect this information and increase further because competition is reduced.

Although overall welfare within a sector (that is the total welfare of all producers and consumers within the sector) is rarely cited by policy makers as the reason to regulate, one might argue that maximizing overall welfare within the sector should be the policy objective. However, even under this objective, it is difficult to justify regulation. Information disclosure, because it allows for better matching of producers and consumers increases overall welfare. But disclosure also increases producer welfare through higher wages. Thus, producer interests are aligned with overall welfare, so one would not expect there to be much need to require information disclosure. Producers should credibly disclose themselves. Standards, however, have the opposite effect. Introducing a government imposed minimum standard reduces overall welfare because it reduces the supply of skill. So regulation in this case is undesirable from an overall welfare perspective. Thus, in both cases, if the objective is to maximize overall welfare within the sector, there appears little need to regulate.

\footnote{Examples that come to mind are the regulation of accounting standards and derivatives markets.}
1 Background

Our insights contribute to the economics literature on certification and licensing.\textsuperscript{2} The difference between these two types of regulation is that a professional cannot practice without a license, but can practice without being certified. Consequently, we can interpret a licensing requirement as a minimum standard and certification as information disclosure. The existing literature comes down in favor of certification because it provides consumers with information they otherwise do not have without reducing competition by inadvertently denying licenses to skilled professionals. However this argument does not imply that certification does not reduce competition. We show under our assumptions that certification does reduce competition and as a result leaves consumers worse off. In contrast, if the objective of the regulation is to help skilled professionals by increasing their wages, then licensing is preferred over certification because it both discloses information and further decreases competition by not allowing some skilled workers to practice. In summary, in our setting, certification is never preferred, not by producers nor by consumers.

There has been a dramatic increase in the level of licensing (and certification) in the modern economy.\textsuperscript{3} For example, Hogan (1983) documents that the second half of the 20th century has seen an explosive growth in licensing. As of 1950, 73 occupations were licensed in one or more states, with 13 occupations requiring a license in every jurisdiction (Council of State Governments, 1952). Twenty years later (according to a 1969 Department of Labor study (USDOL)), for all professional and occupational groups almost 5,000 different licenses are granted across the country, covering more than 500 occupations and averaging out to almost 100 per state. Because licensing requirements are only rarely removed, these requirements remain in place today, although the growth in new requirements appears to have stalled. There remains large cross-sectional variation in the requirements across states, both in the number and the type of professions that require a license. In terms of numbers, California is the leading regulator, licensing more than 175 job categories. At the other extreme, Missouri only licenses 41 job categories.

Licensing and certification require enforcement. Another important feature of the data is that there is large variation across professions in the number of professionals convicted of violating the standards imposed. For example, Egan, Matvos and Seru

\textsuperscript{2}See Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and Kleiner (2000) and the references therein.

\textsuperscript{3}Even homeopaths and psychic readers have certification boards. One Chief Examiner of The National Certifying and Testing Board of the American Federation of Certified Psychics and Mediums Inc. is specialized in pet communication. On a more existential note, one wonders why a psychic examiner would even need to administer an examination to determine whether a candidate is qualified.
document that in the financial services sector, 7% of active financial advisors have a misconduct conviction or settlement on their record. That paper also documents that about half of those advisors are fired, and about half of the ones fired find a new job in financial services. In most states to become a financial advisor requires little more than a high school education and the ability to pass an exam. To practice medicine, on the other hand, requires at least 10 years of post high school education and usually two different sets of board examinations. Curiously, the anecdotal evidence suggests that in both professions the exam itself does not appear to test the required skills directly — even highly skilled practitioners cannot pass the exams without studying for them. Our model provides insight into why the differences between medicine and finance exist by showing that these differences are consistent with regulators regulating in the interests of producers.

An insight from our analysis is that skilled producers benefit from information disclosure. Consequently, as Grossman (1981) pointed out, because skilled producers will voluntarily disclose, there is no reason to require disclosure. What is not obvious from Grossman (1981) is that even though disclosure increases overall surplus, it reduces consumer surplus. Because standards also reduce both consumer surplus as well as overall surplus, one way to try to understand the cross-sectional variation in standards is to investigate the tradeoffs that skilled professionals face in lobbying for such standards. They trade off the benefit of reducing the number of charlatans against the cost of a standard that catches some unlucky skilled workers. The entry decision of charlatans (as well as the resulting equilibrium wage in the profession), depends on (1) the opportunity cost required to enter the profession, (2) the amount of uncertainty surrounding the professional’s ability to offer the service or not, and (3) the degree to which the skill is in short supply. As such, when regulation reflects the interest of skilled producers, the model provides a simple characterization of the parameters that describe which professions are likely to have charlatans in equilibrium. Professions with weak trade groups, skills in larger supply, shorter training periods and less informative signals regarding the professional’s skill, are more likely to feature charlatans.

In addition, our paper is related to several papers on the importance of occupational licensing. The first paper to argue that licensing could hurt consumers through higher prices, lower quantity and lower quality is an empirical study of wages in independent professional practices by Friedman and Kuznets (1945). Another related contribution is Arrow (2001) who discusses several aspects of the health care industry, including product

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uncertainty, supply conditions and the organization of insurance. He notes that licensing requirements are usually defended to guarantee a minimum level of quality, though he does not offer a formal model of licensing requirements or certification. Our model sheds light on the conditions under which a minimum level of quality can be achieved but it also shows that under quite general conditions this makes consumers worse off on average. Stigler (1971) argues that licensing is an effective barrier to entry because occupational practice without the license is a criminal offense. He also argues that since much occupational licensing is performed at the state level, licensing can be used to study the characteristics of an occupation which give it political power. He considers several different explanatory variables for licensing including the size of the occupation, whether there is a national market for the professions, and what the income per capita in the profession is. The paper does not provide a formal model of licensing and certification with charlatans.

Shapiro (1986) does provide a formal model that analyses occupational licensing that requires minimum levels of human capital investment by professionals. Consequently he does not focus on professions that require skills in short supply. Instead focuses on the employee’s investment decisions and thus assumes that there is a perfectly elastic supply of identical potential producers. By raising training levels, licensing helps alleviate the moral hazard problem associated with underinvestment in human capital. He shows that licensing and certification tend to benefit consumers who value quality highly at the expense of those who do not and that licensing may raise total surplus if sellers’ investments are not observable, but is Pareto-worsening if training levels are observable. In contrast, Leland (1979) ignores moral hazard and instead, like us, focuses on the effect of asymmetric information. His model features a continuum of goods of different quality in which the government is fully informed while consumers have no information on the quality of the good. Like Shapiro (1986) the good is in perfectly elastic supply, implying that when standards are introduced, the resulting price rise spurs the entry of higher quality goods, something that does not happen in our model. In our model price rises spur the entry of charlatans, but that does not raise quality. This key difference provides Leland’s main result, that standards can sometimes benefit consumers. Another difference is that we study a homogeneous good that is bought by heterogeneous consumers, whereas Leland (1979) studies heterogenous goods that are bought by homogeneous (uninformed) consumers. As a consequence, Leland (1979) studies how the supply of actual product quality changes with regulation, not how the entry of charlatans is affected by regulation.

Fuchs and Garicano (2010), like us, model a setting in which agents who lack skill can pose as experts. However the focus of that paper is different. In their setting, even after providing the service, consumers cannot verify that they were in fact served by an expert.
They show that this difference has important implications on when expertise is shared in markets and when it is shared in firms. They argue that the trade-off between firms and markets is between utilization (the market allows for better utilization of knowledge than firms) and the quality of matching problems to problem solvers (the market provides less information about experts quality).

2 Data

We begin by providing empirical evidence substantiating the claim in the previous section that there is wide variation in standards and conviction rates across professions. Table 1 presents data for five professions: financial advisors, medical doctors, lawyers, real estate agents and accountants. Our main data sources are as follows. For financial advisors, we rely on the work by Egan et al. (2016). For medical doctors we rely on the data presented in Studdert, Bismark, Mello, Singh and Spittal (2016) as well the data presented by the Federation of State Medical Boards. For lawyers we use data presented by Kritzer and Vidmar (2015). For real estate agents, we rely on data provided by Nguyen-Chyung and Shelef (2016) and for accountants we use data from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CPA).

The second column of Panel A lists the amount of training required to practice as a professional (measured as the number of years of post high school training). To become a financial advisor a college education is not formally required. Obtaining a license is relatively easy, and in many cases only requires product knowledge. For medical doctors on the other hand, it requires four years of college, four years of medical school, a residency and several more years to become a specialist. For lawyers, it requires a college education and three years of law school. For real estate agents very little formal education is required, and for accountants a college education and in some cases a master’s degree suffices. Next, we compare standards that are imposed through various exams in the third column of Panel A. The table lists the passing rates of these exams. For financial advisors, the passing rates of the Series 7 and Series 66 exam were 65% and 72% respectively in 2015. These rates are low relative to the passing rates of the medical board exams. These board exams consist of three steps (S1, S2 and S3), and the national passing rates are close to 100% for all three steps. The standard for lawyers is imposed through the bar exam, which had a national average passing rate of 58% in 2015. To become a real estate agent, states impose a real estate license examination, which have passing rates of around 60%. Finally, for accountants, the passing rate of the CPA exam is the lowest of these professions and on average (across the four subject areas) equals 49%.
Panel A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Passing Rate</th>
<th>With settle/convict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Advisors</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>65% (Series 7) 72% (Series 66)</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Doctors</td>
<td>&gt;8</td>
<td>96% (S1), 96% (S2), 98% (S3)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>No Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agents</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>No Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>&gt;4</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>No Data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>License revoked/disbarred</th>
<th>Fired after settle/convict</th>
<th>Damages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Advisors</td>
<td>≈ 0%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Doctors</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>$204,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>$30,000-$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agents</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>No Data</td>
<td>No Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>$50,000-$100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cross-Sectional Variation Across Professions: The table presents data for five professions: financial advisors, medical doctors, lawyers, real estate agents and accountants. The first column of Panels A and B lists the profession. Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A list training characteristics. Column 2 lists the number of years since high school required to work in the profession. Column 3 lists the passing rate of the licensing exams required to work in the profession. Column 2 of Panel B lists the number of professionals whose licenses are revoked or are disbarred in 2015 as a fraction of the total number of professionals. Column 3 lists the number of professionals whose licenses were revoked or were disbarred in 2015 as a fraction of the total number of active professionals. The last column of Panel B lists the median damages after settlement or conviction.

The fourth column of Panel A lists the number of professionals in a given profession that have a settlement or conviction for malpractice/misconduct on their record. The number is similar for financial advisors (7%) and medical doctors (6%). While anecdotal evidence suggests that for lawyers the number is as high or higher, very little data is available as insurance companies of lawyers do not release data and many settlements are kept confidential (Kritzer and Vidmar (2015)). The second column in Panel B lists the number of professionals whose licenses were revoked or were disbarred in 2015 as a fraction of the total number of active professionals. The number is the lowest for medical doctors and the highest for real estate agents.

The third column in Panel B summarizes the action of employers when their employees settle or are convicted for misconduct or malpractice. For financial advisors the number of employees who are fired is high and equal to 48%. For the other professions we have data on, this number is low. In medicine, Studdert et al (2016) find that a very small fraction of doctors (1%) are responsible for most malpractice settlements (32%), yet very few of those doctors lose their license to practice. In 2015 out of 931,921 licensed doctors in the US, only 90 doctors (0.03%) had their license revoked, and even temporary suspensions...
(706) are rare (0.075%). These facts are surprising given what is at stake. A total of 32% of the 66,426 paid claims in the authors’ data set involved the death of the patient (21,509 patients) and an additional 53% involved either a major physical injury (15%) or a significant (but not major) physical injury (38%). Further, the financial implications are also very large: the median settlement amount was over $200,000. Contrast this to the financial profession where the median settlement amount for misconduct is $40,000. Anecdotal evidence for lawyers suggests that settlements for malpractice cases are viewed as a cost of doing business and therefore do not often result in the firing of the lawyer. In addition, lawyers at large law firms are insured for such events. The last column of Panel B lists the median damages for settlements/convictions. The number is by far the largest for medicine, which is not surprising given what is at stake in many malpractice cases.

It is difficult to make any definitive claims on the prevalence of charlatans from the evidence in Table 1. Yet, the evidence that is there, is at least consistent with the medical profession having far fewer charlatans than the finance profession. First note that the vast majority of doctors are allowed to keep practicing even after multiple malpractice convictions, suggesting that a malpractice conviction might have more to do with the difficulty of the procedure than the doctor being a charlatan. In addition, the pass rates on the medical boards is extremely high, suggesting that very few charlatans make it through 11 years of medical school. In contrast, in finance about a quarter of financial advisors leave the profession after a conviction. The required time to train is much shorter and the training does not appear to prepare candidates for the required examinations. The pass rate on the required examinations is much lower than medicine, suggesting that many unqualified people attempt the exam. In short, the circumstantial evidence is that medicine is a profession of high standards and few charlatans, while finance is a profession of lower standards and more charlatans.

Notice that the fraction of doctors and financial advisors with a malpractice or misconduct record is quite similar, suggesting that conviction rates are not a reliable measure of the prevalence of charlatans. Lawyers have a much shorter training period than doctors and the bar exam for lawyers is much tougher to pass given the training, which suggests that the profession should have a significant number of charlatans, yet like medicine, few lawyers are disbarred. So it is unclear what the prevalence of charlatans in the legal profession is.

If indeed, as the circumstantial evidence suggests, there are many more charlatans in finance than in medicine, it is worth asking why standards in finance are not raised

5Source: Federation of State Medical Boards: U.S. Medical Regulatory Trends and Actions.
to eliminate the charlatans as appears to be the case in medicine. That is, is it in the
interests of consumers, as Senators Warren and Cotton assume, to eliminate charlatans
by raising standards or disclosing information? In the next section, we develop a model
to help answer this important policy question.

3 The Model

Our objective in this paper is to study a labor market that features professionals who
have a skill that is in short supply and large demand. Because the resulting wages are so
high, the profession is very attractive to producers. Thus, all agents who have this skill
choose to produce and, in addition, agents who do not have the skill also choose to offer
the service. Formally, our world consists of a unit measure of unskilled agents, \( c \in C \),
where \( C = [0, 1] \), who consume a product or service that requires a skill in short supply.
In addition, a measure \( \lambda \) of agents exist who have a skill that allows them to produce
this product or service. The unskilled agents can pose as skilled agents, what we term
“charlatans.” A charlatan cannot produce the product or service so he or she confers no
benefit. If an agent chooses to provide the product of the skill (whether skilled or not) he
earns a wage that is paid by consumers which will be determined in equilibrium. If the
agent chooses not to provide the service, she earns a reservation wage which we normalize
to zero. All agents know whether they are skilled or not.

The unskilled agents in our model are also consumers, so the measure of potential
consumers is 1 (we assume, for simplicity that skilled agents can provide the service to
themselves at no cost). That there are more potential producers than potential consumers
captures the idea that charlatans have the potential to “flood” the market. If enough of
them enter, they change a high quality seller’s market to a low-quality buyer’s market. If
an agent chooses to consume, then she must find a single producer who will provide the
product or service. A producer can only service one consumer.

Consumers value the service or product differently. Let \( b(c) : [0, 1] \to [0, 1] \) be the
value each consumer assigns to the service. That is, \( b(c) \) is consumer \( c \)'s willingness to
pay (the maximum amount she is willing to pay). Consumers are ordered such that
\( b'(c) \geq 0 \). Our focus is a market for a skill that is valued by many consumers but is in
very short supply. Therefore, we assume throughout that \( \lambda \) is small and \( b''(c) \leq 0 \). The
concavity of the \( b \) function reflects that the skill in short supply is highly valued by a
large number of consumers. Consumers maximize their expected utility from consuming
the product or service that results from the skill, that is, they choose which producer to
use by maximizing the expected benefits minus the costs (the wage paid).
To fix ideas, it is worth briefly describing what happens in the equilibrium when consumers can observe whether a producer is skilled. In this case there are only $\lambda$ producers (all of which are equally skilled), so only $\lambda$ consumers can consume. Wages must therefore equilibrate to clear the market. Thus, the equilibrium wage that all (identically) skilled workers make, is $b(1 - \lambda)$. Clearly, no producer has an incentive to lower the wage. Any producer that raises the wage will find no customers. Only $\lambda$ measure of consumers (those that have $b(c) \geq b(1 - \lambda)$) will choose to consume, so markets clear. Notice that even though the skill is in short supply, most customers who actually consume the service have positive consumer surplus, that is, they pay less than their willingness to pay. As the supply of skill decreases, consumer surplus decreases.

When skill is unobservable, it is straightforward to show that unless agents have some information about whether a producer is actually skilled, an extreme lemon’s problem exists. More accurately, when consumers have no information on the skill level of producers, the resulting equilibrium features a wage of zero. The reason is that for any positive wage, all agents choose to produce (offer the service), implying that the supply of the skill is $1 + \lambda$, which is strictly larger than the demand of 1, implying that wages cannot be positive. With zero wages, both skilled workers and charlatans are indifferent about producing, so a continuum of equilibria exists. In the equilibrium where skilled workers choose not to provide the service, charlatans are the providers of the skill, so consumers who choose to “consume” get what they pay for — they pay nothing and get nothing. In equilibria that feature skilled producers, consumers pay nothing but get something, implying that consumer surplus is positive.

To allow for a market that features charlatans and positive wages in equilibrium, we provide consumers with information. Specifically, we assume that every producer can choose to generate a signal $\eta$, that is observable to all agents, and is given by

$$\eta = q + \tilde{u}$$

where $q$ is equal to 1 if the agent is skilled and zero otherwise, and $u$ is a normally distributed mean zero random variable with standard deviation $\sigma$. Denote the c.d.f. of the signal produced by skilled and unskilled agents as $F_s(\eta)$ and $F_u(\eta)$ respectively, with associated density functions $f_s(\eta)$ and $f_u(\eta)$. Note that $\frac{f_s}{f_u}$ is strictly increasing, that is, the monotone likelihood ratio property holds.

We will say an unskilled agent chooses to become a charlatan if she chooses to generate a signal. Let $y$ be the fraction of unskilled agents that choose to become charlatans. Given
\[ y, \text{ the probability that the agent is skilled given a signal } \eta \text{ is,} \]
\[
\pi(\eta) \equiv P[\text{skilled}|\eta] = P[\eta|\text{skilled}] P[\text{skilled}] / P[\eta] \\
= f_s(\eta) \frac{\lambda}{y+\lambda} + f_u(\eta) \frac{y}{y+\lambda} \\
= \frac{f_s(\eta)}{f_s(\eta) + f_u(\eta) \left( \frac{y}{\lambda} \right)}. \tag{1}
\]

Because we will need it repeatedly, it makes sense to compute \( \pi'(\eta) \) explicitly and note that it is positive (\( \pi(\eta) \) is strictly increasing):
\[
\pi'(\eta) = \left( \frac{y}{\lambda} \right) \frac{f_u(\eta) f_s'(\eta) - f'_u(\eta) f_s(\eta)}{(f_s(\eta) + f_u(\eta) \left( \frac{y}{\lambda} \right))^2} > 0, \tag{2}
\]
because the fact that \( \frac{f_s(\eta)}{f_u(\eta)} \) is strictly increasing implies \( f_u(\eta) f_s'(\eta) - f'_u(\eta) f_s(\eta) > 0 \).

The timing is as follows. Agents first decide if they are going to generate a signal by comparing the expected wage of producing to their reservation wage. Because their reservation wage at this point is zero, they will generate a signal so long as expected wages are positive. One can think of the signal as the product of an apprenticeship program (like a medical residency) or a grade on a required examination. Given a signal, agents then decide if they still want to produce. Because attending university or undertaking an apprenticeship program might require permanently giving up other opportunities, we allow for the possibility that agents face an opportunity cost. Specifically, if, after generating the signal, the agent chooses not to produce, his reservation wage drops by \( A \geq 0 \). That is, because the reservation wage is normalized to zero initially, it is \(-A\) once the signal is generated. Thus agents will choose to produce so long as their wage, given their signal realization, exceeds their reservation wage, \(-A\).\(^6\)

Agents decide if they want to consume based on the signal realization and the market wage by finding the producer with the signal that maximizes their payoff. For simplicity, we will maintain the assumption throughout this article that agents get no utility from consuming the services of a charlatan. Thus, consumers solve
\[
\max_{\eta} \ b(c)\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \tag{3}
\]
\[
s.t. \ b(c)\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \geq 0.
\]

\(^6\)One could also add a cost of the initial signal to the model. The results remain qualitatively the same with no additional economic insights, but at the cost of increased complexity.
Of course, in reality a charlatan might actually hurt consumers (by, for example, a surgeon undertaking a needless operation). The introduction of harm in the model substantially complicates the analysis and we therefore address it in Section 7.1 as well as in a separate Addendum to this paper.

For simplicity we will adopt a short-hand formulation and will say that consumer \( c \) consumes signal \( \eta \) when we mean consumer \( c \) chooses to use the product or service produced by the producer that generated signal \( \eta \). Let \( \eta(c) : [0,1] \to [\infty, -\infty] \) be the solution to this problem, that is, the signal \( \eta \) that consumer \( c \) chooses to consume. Then define the inverse function \( c(\eta) \equiv \eta^{-1}(\eta) \), that is, the consumer \( c \) who chooses to consume a signal \( \eta \).

An equilibrium (which we more formally define in Appendix A) is a wage function, \( w(\eta) \) and a consumption function, \( c(\eta) \), such that

- all skilled agents choose to obtain a signal, and \( 0 \leq y \leq 1 \) fraction of unskilled agents choose to obtain a signal (become charlatans),
- agents with signals that exceed \( \bar{\eta} \) choose to produce (the market imposed standard),
- consumers choose which signal to consume by maximizing the benefit of consuming (i.e., solve the maximization problem (3)) and
- markets clear — every producer who chooses to produce given their signal realization has a consumer willing to consume from her.

We restrict attention to equilibria in which the wage function, \( w(\eta) \), is known with certainty at the time agents decide whether to produce a signal. Proposition 7 in Appendix A derives the conditions under which such an equilibrium of the model exists and characterizes the equilibrium. So long as the opportunity cost \( A \) is not too large, an equilibrium in which at least some unskilled agents and all skilled agents choose to produce, exists. All equilibria feature a strictly positive fraction of producers who are charlatans. Once the signal is revealed, only producers with a signal that exceeds \( \bar{\eta} \) choose to produce.\(^8\)

To understand, intuitively, how the equilibrium consumption and wage functions are derived, note that the market clearing condition requires that the number of consumers

\(^7\)If \( b'(c) > 0 \), then \( \eta'(c) > 0 \), and so \( c(\eta) \) is well-defined and also strictly increasing.
\(^8\)If the conditions in Proposition 7 are not met, then the equilibrium will feature sunspots. The wage function is uncertain at the time the agents decide whether to produce a signal. After the signal is revealed, it can take on one of two functional forms. These equilibria are analyzed in Berk and van Binsbergen (2019).
consuming signals below \( \eta \) equals the number of producers with signals below \( \eta \) who choose to produce, that is,

\[
\int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} \lambda f_s(x) + y f_u(x) \, dx = \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} dc(x). 
\]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Taking derivatives in (4) gives:

\[
c'(\eta) = \lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta).
\]

Integrating provides the function

\[
c(\eta) = \lambda F_s(\eta) + y F_u(\eta) - \lambda + 1 - y
\]

\[= 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\eta)) - y(1 - F_u(\eta))
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where the constant of integration is determined by the boundary condition that the consumer with the largest \( b \) chooses to consume the largest signal, that is, that \( c(\infty) = 1 \). There are measure \( 1 + \lambda \) potential producers but only measure 1 consumers, so \( \bar{\eta} \) (the market imposed standard) is determined in equilibrium to ensure that demand equals supply. That is, the measure of potential producers who choose not to produce equals \( \lambda \):

\[
\lambda F_s(\bar{\eta}) + y F_u(\bar{\eta}) = \lambda.
\]

Equilibrium wages are determined from the consumer choice problem, that is, (3). The solution, \( \eta(c) \), to this problem, assuming it exists, solves the first order condition

\[
w'(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\sigma'(\eta).
\]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Recall that \( c(\cdot) = \eta^{-1}(\cdot) \), so (6) can be rewritten as:

\[
w'(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\sigma'(\eta).
\]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Integrating (7) gives

\[
w(\eta) = \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\sigma'(v)dv - A
\]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where the constant of integration is determined by the condition that \( w(\bar{\eta}) = -A \), that is, a producer with signal \( \bar{\eta} \) must be indifferent between supplying the skill or working for the reservation wage. Producers who get a signal that is less than \( \bar{\eta} \) earn less than \(-A\) and thus choose not to produce and instead work for the reservation wage of \(-A \) (i.e., \( \bar{\eta} \)).
is the market imposed minimum standard).

To explore how competition sets wages, integrate (8) by parts to give

\[ w(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - \int_{\eta}^{\eta_0} b'(c(v))c'(v)\pi(v)dv - A \]  

(9)

because \( b(c(\eta)) = b(0) = 0 \). Simplifying using (1) and (5) provides

\[ w(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\eta_0} b'(c(v))f_s(v)dv - A. \]  

(10)

The first term in (10) is the expected benefit derived from consuming the skill. If the skill provider with signal \( \eta \) was a monopolist she would capture all the rents and this would be her wage. Because there is competition in this model, wages are lowered by the next two terms. The second term is the total marginal benefit delivered by all skilled producers with a lower signal than \( \eta \). Because producers with higher signals than \( \eta \) earn higher wages, they have no incentive to undercut a producer with signal \( \eta \). So a producer with signal \( \eta \) only faces competition from producers with lower signals. By lowering wages by this term, a producer with signal \( \eta \) ensures that other producers with lower signals will not undercut her. This term therefore captures the effect on wages of competition from other producers. The last term ensures that agents with signals below \( \bar{\eta} \) will choose not to produce, so it captures the effect of potential competition from producers that are not in the market. That is, wages are lower by \( A \) to prevent too many producers from entering, thereby ensuring that demand and supply are equilibrated.

All equilibria feature charlatans. For most parameter values that satisfy the existence conditions, all unskilled agents choose to become charlatans \((y = 1)\), but there are cases in which the unskilled agents are indifferent between becoming a charlatan or not, so in these cases they mix and so a fraction \( 1 - \lambda \leq y < 1 \) of unskilled agents choose to become charlatans.

4 Regulation of Information

It is often taken for granted by regulators (and consumer protection groups) that disclosure benefits consumers. The reason regulators make this assumption is that disclosure increases the information consumers have allowing them to make better choices. Unfortunately, in our context, this argument is not enough to conclude the consumers benefit from disclosure because it ignores the concomitant change in the competitive structure of the market. In fact, the opposite result is true. Disclosure decreases consumer surplus.
The total consumer surplus in the economy is
\[ \int_0^1 b(c) \pi(\eta(c)) - w(\eta(c)) \, dc = \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta)) \pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \, dc(\eta). \]

Before we formally prove that disclosure decreases this surplus, it is worth first understanding the intuition. What the above reasoning ignores is how equilibrium prices react to the disclosure of information. To make things transparent, assume that all consumers have the same willingness to pay, \( b(c) = 1 \), and the opportunity cost is zero, \( A = 0 \). Take an equilibrium that features charlatans. Now assume a government entity exists that can perfectly identify who the charlatans are. If such a government entity wished to maximize consumer surplus, would it reveal this information? To see why the answer is no, note that if the government revealed the information, the equilibrium would collapse to the equilibrium that features no charlatans. As we have already seen, in that equilibrium the wage is \( b(1 - \lambda) = 1 \), implying that all consumers earn zero surplus:
\[ b(c) - w = b(c) - b(1 - \lambda) = 0. \]

However, if the government does not reveal the information, consumer surplus is positive. To see why, notice from (8) that
\[
\begin{align*}
    w(\eta) &= \int_{\eta}^{\eta} b(c(v)) \pi'(v) dv - A \\
    &= \int_{\eta}^{\eta} \pi'(v) dv \\
    &= \pi(\eta) - \pi(\bar{\eta}).
\end{align*}
\]

Thus consumer \( c \)'s surplus is
\[
\begin{align*}
    \pi(\eta(c))b(c) - w(\eta(c)) &= \pi(\eta(c)) - \pi(\eta(c)) + \pi(\bar{\eta}) \\
    &= \pi(\bar{\eta}) > 0.
\end{align*}
\]

implying that the total consumer surplus in the economy is positive. Consequently, revealing who the charlatans are makes consumers worse off.

In this example, all consumers are made worse off by the disclosure of information. However, when consumers do not value the service equally, it is possible that the revelation of information can make some consumers better off. Even so, if the skill is in short enough supply, the following proposition (proved in Appendix C) states that if a market exists in which the service is provided, any disclosure of information lowers total consumer surplus:
Proposition 1 There exists a \( \hat{\lambda} > 0 \) such that in an equilibrium of any economy in which \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \), consumer surplus is strictly increasing in \( \sigma \).

What this proposition implies is that, subject to one exception, a government that wishes to maximize consumer surplus and has better information than consumers, will never choose to reveal that information. The sole exception occurs if the condition for the existence of the equilibrium specified in Proposition 7 is not satisfied implying that a sunspot equilibrium exists in which wages are uncertain. We extend the model to include this case in the addendum to this paper (Berk and van Binsbergen (2019)).

As we have already said, the reason that the usual “disclosure allows consumers to make better choices” argument fails to imply that consumer surplus increases, is that it ignores the equilibrium price response. To see why explicitly, recall, from (10) how wages are determined:

\[
w(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b'(c(v))f_{s}(v)dv - A,
\]

implying that consumer surplus in this case is

\[
b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) = \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b'(c(v))f_{s}(v)dv + A.
\]

Note that as \( \sigma \) increases, the fraction of signals that fall below \( \bar{\eta} \) increases. Thus, for markets to clear, \( \bar{\eta} \) must be decreasing in \( \sigma \). When information is revealed, \( \bar{\eta} \) therefore increases, which decreases consumer surplus. There is, however, a possible countervailing effect because of the dependance of \( c(\eta) \) and \( f_{s}(\eta) \) on \( \sigma \). For some consumers, in particular, those consumers with very high willingness to pay, this dependence can dominate the effect of the reduced competition. Intuitively, when there is a lot of noise in the signal, it is difficult to differentiate producers. Consumers with a high willingness to pay have to compete with other high willingness-to-pay consumers for the very few producers with high signals. Thus, they get little surplus when the signal is uninformative. While this is true for some consumers, for most consumers, surplus is increasing when the signal is less informative because with very informative signals they essentially pay nothing and get nothing. What the proposition proves is that the aggregate effect leaves consumers as a whole worse off.

To assess the magnitude of the reduction in total consumer surplus, we can compare an equilibrium with and without uncertainty under a range of different parameters. To do this, assume that \( b(x) = x \). As we have already seen, the equilibrium wage under perfect information is \( b(1 - \lambda) = 1 - \lambda \). Total consumer surplus in an economy with perfect
Figure 1: **Percent Difference in Consumer Surplus**: Each plot is (13), the difference between consumer surplus in an equilibrium with uncertainty and an equilibrium with perfect information as a fraction of the surplus in the full information equilibrium, quoted in percent, as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($0.2 \leq \sigma \leq 2$) and the opportunity cost ($0 \leq A \leq 0.04$). Each plot represents a different measure of skilled producers, that is, $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2$. Whitespace in the plots corresponds to regions in which the existence condition in Proposition 7 is not satisfied.
information is therefore
\[
\int_0^1 b(c)\pi(\eta(c)) - w(\eta(c)) \, dc = \int_{1-\lambda}^1 c - (1 - \lambda) \, dc = \frac{\lambda^2}{2}.
\]

In an economy with uncertainty, consumer surplus is given by
\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \, dc(\eta) = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} f_s(v)dv \, dc(\eta) + A.
\]

Thus, the difference in consumer surplus between the two equilibria, expressed as a fraction of consumer surplus in the economy with perfect information, is
\[
\frac{\lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} f_s(v)dv \, dc(\eta) + A - \frac{\lambda^2}{2}}{\lambda^2} = \frac{2}{\lambda} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} f_s(v)dv \, dc(\eta) + \frac{2A}{\lambda^2} - 1. \tag{13}
\]

Figure 1 plots this difference as a percentage of the surplus in the full information equilibrium, over a range of parameter values. The effect is large. Even when \( \lambda \) is as high as 0.2 and \( A = 0 \), the percentage difference is well over 100%. For small values of \( \lambda \) the percentage difference explodes. As the signal becomes informative and the equilibrium converges to the perfect information equilibrium, the percentage difference shrinks to zero.

Charlatans impose costs because they are paid positive wages yet produce nothing. Because, in expectation, consumers do not bear these costs, they can only be borne by skilled producers. Consequently, skilled producers benefit from disclosure because disclosure reduces the cost imposed by charlatans and consequently increases skilled workers' expected wages. To formally demonstrate this, first note that the (ex-ante) expected wage of a skilled agent is
\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_s(\eta) \, d\eta - AF_s(\hat{\eta}) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_s(\eta) \, dv \, d\eta - A.
\]

The next proposition (proved in Appendix D) states that the expected wage of a skilled worker is increased when information is disclosed:

**Proposition 2** There exists a \( \hat{\lambda} > 0 \) such that in an equilibrium of any economy in which \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \), the expected wage of skilled workers is strictly decreasing in \( \sigma \).

The main implication of this proposition is that it is always in the interest of skilled workers to credibly disclose information. As a consequence, one would expect skilled workers to form trade groups to credibly reveal quality. This insight likely explains the source of the data used in Egan et al. (2016) — data made publicly available by the trade
group that represents financial analysts, FINRA. Since skilled workers can always choose to disclose information, the only reason why uncertainty about quality can remain, is if either no mechanism exists that allows skilled workers to credibly disclose, or if it is too costly for skilled workers to implement such a mechanism.

One last question one can ask is how the disclosure of information affects overall welfare within the high skill sector. Overall welfare might be affected in two ways. First, information disclosure will affect the total supply of skill in the sector because it affects $\bar{\eta}$, which in turn affects the supply of skilled workers who meet the standard. Second, workers who choose to obtain a signal but then choose not to provide the service suffer an opportunity cost. Thus overall welfare is total supply of skill minus the overall opportunity cost incurred:

$$(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - A(F_s(\bar{\eta}) + F_u(\bar{\eta})).$$

The following proposition (proved in Appendix E) states that the disclosure of information increases overall welfare.

**Proposition 3** There exists a $\hat{\lambda} > 0$ such that in an equilibrium of any economy in which $\lambda < \hat{\lambda}$, overall welfare in the sector is strictly decreasing in $\sigma$.

The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward. By disclosing information skill can be better measured, which means that in equilibrium less skilled workers fail to make the market imposed minimum standard $\bar{\eta}$. That implies the supply of skill is increased in equilibrium. Because consumer surplus decreases, what this means is that producers capture all marginal welfare gains. In that sense, producer interests are aligned with overall welfare in the sector.

When skilled workers do not have the means to disclose information about quality, the equilibrium will contain charlatans. So a natural question to ask is whether in this setting exogenously imposed standards can be beneficial. The literature that studies this question does so in the context of certification and licensing. It has generally favored certification because certification does not constrain consumer access to uncertified professionals. In fact what the first proposition implies is that under our assumptions certification hurts consumers. Proposition 2 implies that the release of information that accompanies certification benefits skilled producers. If, after certification requirements have been implemented, residual uncertainty remains, what we will show in the next section is that implementing a licensing requirement further benefits skilled workers at the cost of consumers. However, since licensing and certification convey the same information, what that means is that skilled workers always prefer licensing to certification. That is, in this setting certification is never the preferred outcome for either producers or consumers.
5 Regulation of Standards

A defining characteristic of the equilibrium in the previous section is that it always features charlatans. This immediately raises the question of whether a minimum standard might increase welfare by limiting the entry of charlatans. The literature that has studied standards has focused on two methods to implement a standard. As we pointed out in the introduction, under the certification standard, a trade group certifies that a producer has met its requirements, but producers that have not met the requirements are still allowed to practice. Under the licensing standard, producers who do not meet the standard are not allowed to work. Thus the role of certification is only the communication of information, which is what we studied in the previous section. But the question remains, how does a licensing requirement affect the utility of consumers and producers?

To investigate the effect of licensing, we introduce the requirement that a producer may only produce if her signal exceeds a lower bound $\hat{\eta}$. Obviously, in any equilibrium without a minimum standard, introducing a minimum standard below $\bar{\eta}$ has no effect. So we only consider the case when the exogenously imposed minimum standard exceeds the market imposed standard, that is, $\hat{\eta} \geq \bar{\eta}$.

In Appendix B we derive the conditions for existence of an equilibrium with a minimum standard. Proposition 8 shows that for any minimum standard $\hat{\eta} \geq \Delta$, where $\Delta$ solves $\lambda F_s(\Delta)+F_u(\Delta) = \lambda$ an equilibrium always exists. The intuition is similar to the derivation of the equilibrium without a standard. The main difference is that the minimum standard is now exogenously set rather than determined in equilibrium. Because the standard is higher than $\Delta$, not all consumers can consume. The constant of integration in the wage function is therefore set such that the marginal consumer is indifferent between consuming or not, rather than before where it was set to ensure that the marginal producer was indifferent between producing or not.\(^9\)

In equilibrium, there are three possibilities depending on the initial parameters: a unskilled agent choose to become charlatans ($y = 1$), no unskilled agent chooses to become a charlatan ($y = 0$) or a fraction of unskilled agents chooses to become charlatans ($0 < y < 1$). In all cases $c(\eta)$ and $w(\eta)$ are given by:

\[
c(\eta) = 1 - \lambda (1 - F_s(\eta)) - y (1 - F_u(\eta)),
\]

\(^9\)Proposition 9 in Appendix B derives the existence condition when $\hat{\eta} < \Delta$. This is a mixing case when all unskilled producers are indifferent to becoming charlatans (so all consumers can consume). That indifference condition now determines the constant of integration in the wage function. As before, existence when this condition is not met requires sunspots and that equilibrium is derived in the addendum paper (Berk and van Binsbergen (2019)).
and

\[ w(\eta) = \begin{cases} 
  b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b'(c(v))f_s(v)dv & \text{if } y > 0 \\
  b(c(\hat{\eta})) & \text{if } y = 0,
\end{cases} \tag{15} \]

where we have rewritten the expression for wages in Proposition 8 by integrating by parts and substituting.

There are two crucial differences between this equilibrium and the equilibrium without a minimum standard. First, a no charlatan equilibrium exists — it is possible to set the standard high enough so that the equilibrium will feature no charlatan entry. Second, so long as the opportunity cost is positive, when a standard is introduced, wages strictly increase. The reason wages are higher is that they no longer need to perform the role of keeping charlatans out. The minimum signal has that role. What that implies is that when \( y > 0 \), wages are equal to the expected benefit minus a term that only takes into account the degree of competition from other skilled producers currently in the market, but not potential producers (currently not in the market), as in the case without a minimum standard. Notice that when the minimum standard is set so high that no unskilled worker chooses to be a charlatan, then all producers earn the same wage (because they are identical). Competition between them lowers the wage to the benefit conferred by the producer with the lowest allowable signal.

The fact that, by imposing a minimum standard, it is possible to have an equilibrium that contains no charlatans raises the question of whether such an equilibrium is desirable. To investigate this question we again consider the effect from the perspective of consumers and skilled producers. We will assume that one of two entities can impose a minimum signal, \( \hat{\eta} \), that must be attained for a producer to be allowed to produce. The first entity is an organization like a government that represents the interests of consumers. This entity’s objective is to pick a minimum standard that maximizes consumer surplus. The second entity is a trade group that represents skilled agents. This trade group maximizes the ex-ante expected wage of skilled agents.

We begin by deriving the government’s optimal policy. The next proposition (with proof in Appendix F) states that a government would never introduce a minimum standard.

**Proposition 4** There exists a \( \hat{\lambda} > 0 \) such that in an equilibrium of any economy in which \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \), introducing a minimum standard reduces consumer surplus.

The main implication of this proposition is that a government maximizing the interests
of consumers within the industry would never impose a licensing requirement.\textsuperscript{10} The explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive result is the same as the explanation for why divulging information is bad for consumers. Wages in the equilibrium without a standard fully take into account the probability that a producer is skilled. Put differently, nobody is fooled in the economy, consumers in expectation get what they pay for. So the only effect of introducing a minimum standard is to reduce the entry of producers, thereby reducing competition, and thus increasing wages. There are two independent forces that drive up wages. First, as we have already pointed out, wages are not reduced by the term required to keep out charlatans (that is, A). In addition, because the equilibrium features fewer producers, the term that accounts for the competition between producers is also lower. Because wages are higher, consumer surplus is lower.

One might wonder how any government-imposed minimum standard in a market for professional services in a field like medicine (which has high costs when disease is left untreated) always results in a loss of consumer surplus. Surely, a minimum standard that prevents the worst diseases from being untreated would be beneficial to consumers? But the point to realize is that labor markets without government-imposed minimum standards have \textit{market} imposed standards. Wages adjust so that no producer with a signal below the market standard chooses to produce. Those that do clear the bar by a small margin, earn very low wages. For a profession like medicine, most consumers highly value successful treatment. So, in such cases the market imposed minimum standard is already very high. Without a government-imposed minimum standard receiving quality treatment has a high price because many potential producers fail to make the market standard reducing supply. The insight is that with a government-imposed minimum standard, that price is even higher because there is even less supply. By allowing the market, rather than the government, to sort out skilled producers from charlatans, consumers benefit.

Given that government imposed licensing requirements are ubiquitous in highly skilled professions, a natural question to ask is why they exist in light of the above proposition. We believe the answer is that skilled producers benefit from licensing, and so when trade groups are powerful enough, they are able to lobby government legislatures to act in their interest rather than consumers\textsuperscript{'}s. The next proposition (with proof in Appendix G) states that a trade group will always favor introducing a licensing requirement into an equilibrium that does not have such a requirement (including economies that already have certification requirements).

**Proposition 5** There exists a \( \hat{\lambda} > 0 \) such that in an equilibrium of any economy in

\textsuperscript{10}In the addendum paper we show formally that this results extends to the case when wages are uncertain (the sunspot case).
which $\lambda < \hat{\lambda}$, introducing a minimum standard always strictly increases the expected wage of skilled workers.

The proof of this proposition relies on two insights. First, because wages reflect the information in the signal, consumers do not bear the cost of charlatans. Instead, the cost is borne by skilled workers. Therefore, anything that reduces the number of charlatans benefits skilled workers. A minimum standard does this, but with a cost — some skilled workers will be caught by the standard and will be unable to work. But because $F_s$ stochastically dominates $F_u$, the minimum standard hits charlatans harder then skilled workers. In cases where the cost to skilled workers is small, it is optimal to set the standard high enough so no unskilled workers choose to become charlatans.

Second, imposing a minimum standard fundamentally changes the terms of trade. Without a minimum standard, wages have to adjust to limit charlatan entry. When there is a minimum standard, wages adjust to limit consumers, implying that wages are no longer needed to be reduced by the opportunity cost of providing the service. It thus turns a lower quality buyer’s market into a higher quality seller’s market.

How do standards affect overall welfare within the high skill sector? The following proposition states that introducing a standard decreases welfare.

Proposition 6 Any minimum standard that exceeds $\bar{\eta}$ strictly decreases overall welfare in the sector.

The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Increasing the minimum standard decreases the supply of skill in the economy and increases the number of producers who have to bear the opportunity cost. In this case, consumers bear all the welfare losses so consumer interests are aligned with overall welfare.

If one takes the perspective that the licensing standard we see reflects the interests of trade groups, then the wide variation in standards across professions documented in Section 2 must reflect cross sectional differences in the tradeoffs faced by trade groups in these professions. With that in mind, in the next section we investigate how cross sectional differences in professions affect the licensing standards that trade groups favor.

6 Factors Driving Variation in Licensing Standards

In this section we characterize the equilibrium that results when the trade group picks the standard that maximizes the expected wage of skilled workers. For simplicity, we assume that $b(x) = x$, that is, consumer willingness to pay for the service linearly increases.
Under this assumption, we solve for the optimal standard given the fraction of skilled agents, \( \lambda \), the informativeness of the signal, \( \sigma \), and the opportunity cost, \( A \).

### 6.1 Equilibria With and Without Charlatans

As we have already pointed out, when the trade group sets standards, it does so by trading off the benefit of reducing the number of charlatans against the cost that some unlucky skilled workers will be denied the opportunity to work. So the question is, when is it optimal for the trade group to set a standard so high that it discourages all charlatan entry? Notice that when \( A = 0 \), there is no standard that will accomplish this goal. Because unskilled workers face no cost to become charlatans, it is impossible to discourage them. At the other extreme, when \( A \) is very large and \( \sigma \) is low, it will be possible to pick a standard that is low enough so most skilled workers are able to meet the standard, but most unskilled workers will not. Given the high opportunity cost, the unskilled workers will find it suboptimal to become charlatans and the equilibrium will feature only skilled workers. Consequently, when the trade group is allowed to pick a standard that maximizes the expected wages of skilled workers, there will exist a set of parameters under which equilibria will feature charlatans and a complimentary set where equilibria will not feature charlatans.

Figure 2 plots these two sets for different values of \( \lambda \) (the supply of skilled producers). Points to the left of the curve are values of \( A \) and \( \sigma \) that result in equilibria that feature charlatans. Points to the right are equilibria that do not feature charlatans. As we already pointed out, when \( A = 0 \), there is no cost to becoming a charlatan, so all equilibria feature charlatans. Counterintuitively, when \( \lambda \) is small, it does not take much of an increase in \( A \) for the trade group to choose a standard high enough to discourage charlatan entry. When skill is in short supply one would expect very high wages, and so at first glance one might suppose that it would be very difficult to keep charlatans out. But, in fact, the equilibrium effect goes the other way. Because the skill is in such short supply, without a minimum standard the equilibrium is dominated by charlatans and thus features very low wages. Setting a standard high enough to keep charlatans out is, in fact, not that costly in this case, because the skilled workers that are denied work would have earned low wages anyway in the equilibrium with no minimum standard. So, from the trade group’s perspective, the optimal policy is to set a very high standard (see, Figure 3, top left) which implies that even for a small opportunity costs, the no charlatan equilibrium (albeit with very small supply of skilled workers) prevails.

When the number of skilled workers is larger (purple curve in Figure 2), the difference
Figure 2: **Charlatans in Equilibrium**: The blue, red, yellow and purple lines represent equilibria with $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10$ and 0.20 respectively. Each curve plots the boundary between equilibria that feature charlatans and equilibria that do not, when a trade group picks the optimal minimum standard as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). Points to the left of the curve are values of $A$ and $\sigma$ that result in equilibria that feature charlatans. Points to the right are equilibria that do not feature charlatans.
Figure 3: Minimum Standard Imposed by the Trade Group: Each plot is the minimum standard imposed by the trade group as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20$ and 0.10. The “cliff” in the plots corresponds to the demarcation (plotted in Figure 2) between equilibria that feature charlatans and ones that do not.
in wages between the charlatan and no-charlatan equilibrium is lower, so the cost to skilled workers of setting a high standard is high. Consequently, it is optimal for the trade group to set a lower standard (see, Figure 3, bottom right), which implies that a higher $A$ is required to produce the no-charlatan equilibrium.

Next we study the importance of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$). Large heterogeneity in informativeness may persist across professions, even after the skilled workers have revealed as much information as they credibly can. As the residual uncertainty ($\sigma$) is larger, it is easier for charlatans to pose as skilled workers. Consequently, a very high standard is required to keep them out. When the supply of skill is high, it is too costly to impose such a high standard, so in this case the trade group favors a lower standard that results in an equilibrium that features charlatans. Figure 2 demonstrates this trade-off. When the number of skilled workers is low, most equilibria have high standards (see Figure 3, top left) and no charlatans. But when the supply of skill is high, the trade group opts for low standards (see Figure 3, bottom right), and accepts the presence of charlatans.

These results are informative about the data presented in Section 2. Note that for professions with skill in short supply and high opportunity costs, the equilibrium does not feature charlatans (blue and red curves in Figure 2). To get that equilibrium, the trade group has to set very high standards (Figure 3, upper plots). Both facts are consistent with the evidence in the medical profession. On the other hand, when the opportunity cost is low, the equilibrium features charlatans and low standards, which is consistent with the finance industry. When the supply of skill is higher, the quality of the information matters more. When there is high uncertainty, charlatan equilibria dominate (purple curve in Figure 2), which is at least consistent with the short training period and low standards in the real estate industry, suggesting that the industry has a high fraction of charlatans. Finally, accountants have higher opportunity costs, but high standards, suggesting that the profession is likely to feature fewer charlatans.

6.2 Consumer Surplus

When the trade group chooses to set a high standard and the result is an equilibrium that does not feature charlatans, the lack of competition translates into very low consumer surplus, see Figure 4. Competition is reduced for two reasons. First, there are no charlatans. Second, because high standards are required, the standard reduces the supply of skilled agents, further reducing competition. This is particularly true when the signal is uninformative because very high standards are needed to keep charlatans out. When the
Figure 4: **Consumer Surplus**: Each plot is the equilibrium level of consumer surplus given a minimum standard imposed by the trade group as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20$ and 0.10.
Figure 5: Equilibrium Supply of Skilled Agents: Each plot is the equilibrium supply of skilled agents (that is, the supply once the standard is imposed) as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20$ and 0.10.
signal is informative, standards can be set to discourage charlatans without significantly reducing the supply of skilled workers. Thus, for low \( \sigma \), consumer surplus is higher. The effect on the supply of skilled workers of the minimum standard can be seen in Figure 5. When the standard is set very high and the signal is not very informative, the supply of skilled workers who make the standard is small, leading to the low consumer surplus results in Figure 4.

6.3 Wages

Figure 6 plots the expected wage of skilled workers. That is, the expected value of either being hired at the equilibrium wage or not making the standard (and thus earning the reservation wage). What the plots make clear is that the first order determinant of the expected wage is the informativeness of the signal. As the signal becomes less informative, the presence of charlatans decreases expected wages. This is true even in the equilibria that feature no charlatans. In that case, the minimum standard is set so high that most skilled workers cannot make the standard and so earn the reservation wage. That is, either the equilibrium features charlatans and the inability of consumers to separate them lowers wages, or it does not feature charlatans, but the cost to keep them out implies that many skilled workers are denied work and thus earn the reservation wage.

In contrast, realized wages, that is the wages of agents who make the standard look quite different. As Figure 7 shows, in equilibria that do not feature charlatans, the average realized wage is very high, implying that the skilled workers who do make the standard extract almost all the rents. This is particularly true in cases with low \( \lambda \) and low \( A \), where the minimum standard is very high. In contrast, when the equilibrium has charlatans, wages are low, reflecting the inability of consumers to separate skilled workers from charlatans and the fact that consumers obtain some of the rents.

The last figure, Figure 8, plots the cross-sectional standard deviation of wages. Clearly, in equilibria with no charlatans, since all agents earn the same wage, the standard deviation is zero. What is interesting is that for most parameter values even equilibria that feature charlatans have a very low cross sectional standard deviation in wages. The reason is that when the signal is uninformative, wages do not vary much. The only cases where wages feature large cross sectional variation, is equilibria where the opportunity cost is low enough so that even when the signal is informative, the equilibrium features charlatans. As the figures make clear, this case is most common when \( \lambda \) is high. These results are once again, consistent, at least anecdotally with the evidence. For a given specialty and location, the medical profession with its high opportunity costs features
Figure 6: Expected Wage of Skilled Agents: Each plot is the expected wage of skilled agents when the minimum standard is imposed by the trade group as a function of the informativeness of the signal (σ) and the opportunity cost (A). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise λ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20 and 0.10.
lower cross sectional variation in wages than the finance profession, which has much lower opportunity costs.

7 Discussion

The explanation we explore in this paper for the explosive growth in the last 50 years of licensing requirements is that trade groups are successful in lobbying governments to act in their interests. If this is not the explanation, then one of the assumptions of our model that leads to this conclusion has to be violated. In this section we identify the assumptions that we believe are most critical for our results and discuss the likelihood that they do not hold in reality.

7.1 Harm

Thus far we have assumed that when a consumer purchases the service from a charlatan he or she gets nothing. But in some cases the possibility exists that the charlatan might actually do harm. One might suppose that our results are sensitive to this assumption, that is, in professions in which charlatans can harm consumers it might be in consumers’ interests to regulate. In fact, as we show in the addendum paper (Berk and van Binsbergen (2019)), even when charlatans can harm consumers, it is never in consumers’ interests to impose a standard. In short, the possibility that charlatans might harm consumers does not justify a licensing requirement.

Where the presence of harm can make a difference to our results is the effect of information revelation (certification). To understand under what conditions consumers can be made better off with information revelation, take an extreme case when a charlatan inflicts extensive harm but bears no opportunity cost. In this case, without information revelation, the market almost breaks down. Only consumers who value the service most would take the risk of being serviced by a charlatan, and even then, they only pick producers with very high signals. That is, the market imposed standard is very high, so very few consumers are serviced leading to low overall surplus. Now assume that a government fully reveals who the charlatans are. In this case there is no longer any possibility of incurring harm, so all consumers would like to consume. Although the equilibrating wage results in little surplus for the consumers who do get to consume, overall consumer surplus is still higher because many more consumers are serviced. Notice that even in this extreme case, introducing a standard does not lead to greater consumer surplus. By introducing a standard into the equilibrium even fewer consumers are serviced, leading to even lower consumer surplus.
Figure 7: **Realized Mean Wages**: Each plot is the realized mean wage when the minimum standard is imposed by the trade group as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20$ and 0.10.
Figure 8: **Standard Deviation of Realized Wages**: Each plot is the equilibrium standard deviation of realized wages when the minimum standard is imposed by the trade group as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). The plots vary the supply of skill in the economy, that is, starting with the top left plot and moving clockwise $\lambda = 0.01, 0.05, 0.20$ and 0.10.
In the addendum paper we formally model the case where charlatans harm consumers. In that model, let \( h > 0 \) be the disutility consumers experience when they hire a charlatan, that is, consumers solve

\[
\max_{\eta} \quad b(c)\pi(\eta) - h (1 - \pi(\eta)) - w(\eta)
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad b(c)\pi(\eta) - h (1 - \pi(\eta)) - w(\eta) \geq 0.
\]

To understand when revealing information makes consumers better off, we repeat the analysis in Section 4 where we compare consumer surplus in the full information case to the case with partial information (since there are no charlatans in the full information case, the equilibrium is identical to the case without harm). Figure 9 plots this case for different levels of harm when \( \lambda = 0.1 \). Clearly, the presence of harm mitigates the benefit of not revealing who the charlatans are. However, for most parameter values revealing who the charlatans are continues to leave consumers worse off.

Consumers are only better off with information revelation when the harm is high, and even then, only if two further conditions hold: the opportunity cost and the informativeness of the signal must both be low. The reason consumers are better off with full information is that when the signal is uninformative and the opportunity cost is low, the probability of encountering a charlatan, and therefore being subject to extreme harm is high.

We view the presence of harm as an unlikely explanation for the regulation we see in high skill professions. First, our results imply that if the motivation for the regulation was consumer welfare, then we would expect to see certification requirements, not licensing. In fact, almost all the high skill professions in the economy feature licensing requirements, not certification requirements. Certification appears limited to lower skill professions where it is hard to see how charlatans can inflict substantial harm. Second, for certification to increase consumer welfare, the introduction of the regulation should be accompanied by a large increase in market demand for the service. We know of no evidence supporting this implication of our theory. Finally, the profession most readers point to when they consider harm is medicine. Yet that profession also has very high opportunity costs. As Figure 9 shows, when the opportunity costs are high, consumers are better off without certification even when the harm inflicted is high. Thus we do not view the fact that charlatan doctors have the potential to inflict substantial harm as the explanation for the regulation in that industry.
Figure 9: Percent Difference in Consumer Surplus with Harm when $\lambda = 0.1$:
Each plot is the difference between consumer surplus in an equilibrium with uncertainty and an equilibrium with perfect information as a fraction of the surplus in the full information equilibrium, quoted in percent, as a function of the informativeness of the signal ($\sigma$) and the opportunity cost ($A$). Each plot varies the amount of harm charlatans inflict, that is, $h = 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1$. 


7.2 Supply

Our model provides benchmark results for a labor market where skill is in very short supply (and high demand). The extent to which our model applies to professions where the skill is in larger supply depends on the elasticity of the supply of skilled professionals to wages. In labor markets that require an extensive training period, this elasticity is likely to be low in the short term. For such labor markets, our model applies in the short term.

In the long term, the spurring of skilled entry into such professions could make consumers potentially better off (Leland (1979)). If indeed this is the correct explanation for the increased trend in regulation, we should see cross-sectional variation across professions in the amount of regulation: professions, like finance and medicine, with skills in very short supply should have little regulation and professions with a skill in higher supply like real estate agents should be more heavily regulated. Anecdotally, at least, the evidence appears to go the other way — medical doctors are clearly more regulated than real estate agents. Future empirical work could focus on clarifying these relationships.

7.3 Rationality

Another assumption in our model is that all participants are fully rational. In particular, consumers appropriately take into account the probability of dealing with a charlatan. If, instead, prices of services do not accurately reflect that probability, for example, because consumers are naive, government intervention to protect consumers from themselves, could be beneficial.\textsuperscript{11} Effective government policy in such cases requires that the government be more rational than consumers and well informed about consumer preferences.

7.4 Overall Welfare

We chose to focus on the narrow question of whether regulation on disclosure and standards helps consumers largely because policy makers use the interests of consumers as justification for the regulation we see. We also address the question of how regulation affects overall welfare within the industry. But our paper does not address the wider question of how regulation affects the overall welfare of all participants across all industries in the economy. It is possible that regulation on disclosure and standards in all industries

\textsuperscript{11}See Spiegler (2006) for a model of charlatans with bounded rational consumers.
is welfare enhancing for the economy as a whole. We leave that unanswered question to future theoretical and empirical research.

8 Conclusion

Under a set of reasonable assumptions, we have shown that for professions with a skill in short supply that is in high demand, regulation does not improve consumer welfare. Instead regulation helps producers. This raises the question why we observe so much government regulation in practice and whether, in light of our results, the government should adopt a different policy.

It is important to keep in mind that economic models are primarily a means to make a sound argument. This paper should be viewed in this light. It makes the argument that if a government wants to regulate in the interests of consumers, then the implicit assumption made by policy makers, that disclosure and standards help consumers, needs more rigorous justification. What is needed is some economic evidence that the factors we have not modeled in this paper are important enough to overcome the main conclusion of our model, that regulation hurts consumers. In the end, disclosure and standards might indeed be beneficial to consumers, but without supporting evidence, policy makers cannot simply assume that this fact is prima facie true.

To justify regulation, the implication of our model is that policy makers need to make one of the following arguments. They can justify regulating based on Leland (1979), by arguing that the subsequent increase in prices that follows regulation attracts enough new talent to justify the drop in consumer surplus. Not only would this mean better understanding the wage elasticity in a sector (that is likely to be quite different in the short term and long term), but also showing that the benefit of the rise in quality outweighs the loss in consumer surplus. Given current government policy and how large this consumer surplus loss can be, we feel that resolving this issue is of first order importance.

A second reason why it might make sense to regulate despite the arguments in this paper is if one believes that consumers do not adequately price the cost of dealing with a charlatan. Here again, evidence should be brought to bear to justify current government policy. As an illustrative example, there has been an increasing number of calls, based on the argument that charlatan money managers take advantage of naive investors, for more regulation of the money management industry, with some people suggesting that individuals should be barred from putting their retirement money into active mutual funds. But, in point of fact, there is very little evidence to suggest that mutual fund investors are naive. Quite the contrary, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) find that investors
rationally allocate their capital in this industry. Mutual fund managers that appear to destroy value control very little money. Most of the capital in this industry is allocated to high skilled professionals. So, in that industry at least, there is little evidence that investor naivete is enough of an issue to warrant regulation.

Another reason many people cite for regulation is that charlatans might inflict significant harm. But here again, without evidence supporting this claim, it is hard to justify regulation. In this case, licensing continues to hurt consumers, yet that is the form the regulation of professions like medicine, that have the potential to inflict significant harm, takes. More to the point, to justify certification regulation, regulators would need to show that both consumers were uninformed and the opportunity cost to enter the industry is low.

Finally there is the wider question of how regulation affects overall welfare in the economy. Obviously, such a question is very difficult to answer, and we make no claims in this paper to provide insight on it. While consumers make up a large part of economic welfare, we have made no attempt to answer the question of how standards affect the overall supply of skill across sectors in the economy, or how the supply of producers (including charlatans) across sectors affects overall welfare. But with that said, it is premature to simply assume that regulation is welfare enhancing. To justify regulating because it increases overall welfare one would need to provide evidence that other benefits are large enough to outweigh the potentially significant losses to within sector welfare that standards impose.
References


_ and _, “Addendum to Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions: The Case when Charlatans do Harm,” May 2019.


Appendix

A Equilibrium

An equilibrium is a \( \{w(\eta), c(\eta), y, \bar{\eta}\} \) with the property that \( c(\eta) \) is strictly increasing and thus has a well defined inverse function \( \eta(c) \equiv c^{-1}(\cdot) \), such that for every consumer \( 0 \leq c \leq 1 \), \( \eta(c) \) solves the consumer choice problem (3), all skilled agents choose to obtain a signal so that

\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_s(\eta)d\eta - AF_s(\bar{\eta}) > 0,
\]

\( y > 0 \) fraction of unskilled agents choose to become charlatans (get a signal) so that

\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - AF_u(\bar{\eta}) \geq 0
\]

and markets clear when agents with signals greater than \( \bar{\eta} \) choose to provide the service, that is, for every \( \eta \),

\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} \lambda f_s(x) + y f_u(x)dx = \int_{\eta}^{\infty} dc(x),
\]

and for \( \eta < \bar{\eta} \), \( w(\eta) < -A \).

The following proposition derives the conditions under which an equilibrium exists.

Proposition 7 An unique equilibrium exists whenever

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\eta} \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} b(\lambda F_s(v) + (1 - \lambda) F_u(v)) \left( \frac{f_u(v)f_s(v) - f_u'(v)f_s(v)}{f_s(v) + f_u(v) \left( \frac{1-\lambda}{\lambda} \right)^2} \right) f_u(\eta)dvd\eta
\]

\[
\geq A \left( \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right)
\]

with the following properties

\[
w(\eta) = \int_{\eta}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv - A
\]

\[
c(\eta) = 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\eta)) - y(1 - F_u(\eta))
\]

and \( y = 1 \) when

\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta \geq A
\]

and \( \bar{\eta} \) solves

\[
\lambda F_s(\bar{\eta}) + F_u(\bar{\eta}) = \lambda
\]

otherwise

\[
y = \frac{1 - \lambda (1 - F_s(\bar{\eta}))}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})}
\]
and \( \bar{\eta} \) solves
\[
\int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta = A. \tag{20}
\]

**Proof.** We begin by first solving the consumer choice problem, (3). As we will demonstrate presently, the constraint never binds, so each consumer \( c \) picks her provider based on the provider's signal, \( \eta \), by maximizing the benefit of consuming, that is,
\[
\max_{\eta} (b(c)\pi(\eta) - w(\eta)).
\]
The solution, \( \eta^* \) to this problem, assuming it exists, solves
\[
w'(\eta^*) = b(c)\pi'(\eta^*). \tag{21}
\]
Define the function \( \eta(c) : [0, 1] \rightarrow (-\infty, \infty) \) as the solution to this equation for each consumer \( c \). As we show shortly, \( \eta(c) \) is strictly increasing, so we can define the inverse function, \( c(\cdot) = \eta^{-1}(\cdot) \), that is, for each signal realization the consumer who chooses to consume at that realization. Using this inverse function, (21) can be written as
\[
w'(\eta) = b(c(\eta))\pi'(\eta). \tag{22}
\]
Integrating (22) gives
\[
w(\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv + C \tag{23}
\]
where \( C \) is the constant of integration which is determined to ensure that markets clear. Let \( \bar{\eta} \) be the critical signal such that, if a producer will only choose to provide the service if he gets a signal greater than \( \bar{\eta} \) and consumer only choose to consume the skill if the signal exceeds \( \bar{\eta} \). This condition implies that a producer with signal \( \bar{\eta} \) must be indifferent between supplying the skill or working for the reservation wage:
\[
w(\bar{\eta}) = \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv + C = -A
\]
so
\[
C = -\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v)du - A \tag{24}
\]
So substituting (24) into (23) gives an explicit expression for the wage:
\[
w(\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv - \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v)du - A = \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)du - A \tag{25}
\]
For markets to clear, for every \( \eta \) the supply of people providing the skill must equal the demand:
\[
\int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} \lambda f_s(x) + yf_u(x)dx = \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} dc(x). \tag{26}
\]
where \( y \) is the fraction of unskilled agents that choose to become charlatans (i.e., choose to enter the market as a producer and get a signal). Taking derivatives in (26) gives:

\[
c'(\eta) = \lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta).
\]

Integrating provides the function

\[
c(\eta) = \lambda F_s(\eta) + y F_u(\eta) - \lambda + 1 - y,
\]

where the final term, the constant of integration, is determined by the boundary condition that the consumer with the largest \( b \) chooses to consume the largest signal, \( c(\infty) = 1 \). The function \( c(\eta) \) (and therefore \( \eta(c) \)) is strictly increasing because \( F_s(\eta) \) and \( F_u(\eta) \) are strictly increasing. Notice that \( w(\bar{\eta}) = -A \leq 0 \), implying \( b(c)\pi(\bar{\eta}) - w(\bar{\eta}) \geq 0 \) for every \( c \), so the constraint in (3) never binds and every (unskilled) agent will choose to consume implying, \( c(\bar{\eta}) = 0 \). Substituting this condition into (27) gives:

\[
\lambda F_s(\bar{\eta}) + y F_u(\bar{\eta}) = \lambda - 1 + y.
\]

When \( y = 1 \) we have (18). Otherwise,

\[
y = \frac{1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta}))}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})}
\]

Note that (29) implies that \( y \geq 1 - \lambda \).

Next we need to prove existence and uniqueness of the solution to the consumer choice problem. Our first order of business is to show that consumers second order condition is satisfied, that is, that

\[
w''(\eta) - b(s)\pi''(\eta) > 0.
\]

From (22)

\[
w''(\eta) = b'(c(\eta))\pi'(\eta)c'(\eta) + b(c(\eta))\pi''(\eta).
\]

so

\[
w''(\eta) - b(s)\pi''(\eta) = b'(c(\eta))\pi'(\eta)c'(\eta) + b(c(\eta))\pi''(\eta) - b(s)\pi''(\eta).
\]

Evaluating this expression at the optimal, \( \eta(s) \) gives

\[
w''(\eta(s)) - b(s)\pi''(\eta(s)) = b'(s)\pi'(\eta(s))c'(\eta(s)) > 0
\]

because all three functions are strictly increasing and so have strictly positive derivatives, so the condition is always satisfied at \( \eta(s) \). In fact, the solution is unique, that is, \( \eta(s) \) is also a global maximum. To see why note that the slope of \( b(s)\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \) is given by

\[
b(s)\pi'(\eta) - w'(\eta) = (b(s) - b(c(\eta)))\pi'(\eta)
\]

so the sign is the sign of the first term. Because both \( b(s) \) and \( c(\eta) \) are increasing functions, the slope is negative for all \( \eta > \eta(s) \) and positive for all \( \eta < \eta(s) \), which implies that \( \eta^* \) is the global maximum and so is the unique solution.

Finally we need to show that all skilled agents and \( y \) fraction of unskilled agents will
choose to produce. The expected benefit for an unskilled agent to produce is
\[
\int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - A F_u(\bar{\eta}) = \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta - A(1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})) - AF_u(\bar{\eta})
\]
\[
= \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta - A
\]
(30)

There are two cases we need to consider, the case when the equilibrium has \(y = 1\) and when \(y < 1\). Let \(\bar{\eta}^*\) solve (28) with \(y = 1\). Note that a unique solution exists because the left hand side of (28) is continuous, strictly increasing, and is strictly larger than \(\lambda\) when \(\bar{\eta} = \infty\) and less than \(\lambda\) when \(\bar{\eta} = -\infty\). If (30) is positive at \(\bar{\eta}^*\), then all unskilled agents will choose to produce and \(\bar{\eta} = \bar{\eta}^*\). If (30) is not positive with \(y = 1\) and \(\bar{\eta} = \bar{\eta}^*\), then an equilibrium, if it exists, features \(y < 1\). Let \(\bar{\eta} = -\infty\) so that, from (29),
\[
y = 1 - \lambda.
\]

Using this expression for \(y\) and substituting \(\bar{\eta} = -\infty\) into (30) gives
\[
\left(\frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda}\right) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} b(\lambda F_s(\eta) + (1 - \lambda) F_u(\eta)) \left(\frac{f_u(v)f'_s(v) - f'_u(v)f_s(v)}{(f_s(v) + f_u(v)(1-\lambda))^2}\right) f_u(\eta)dvd\eta - A \geq 0
\]
where the inequality follows from (17). Because (30) is a continuous function and is smaller than or equal to zero when \(\bar{\eta} = \bar{\eta}^*\) and equal to or greater than zero when \(\bar{\eta} = -\infty\), there must exist a \(-\infty \leq \bar{\eta} < \bar{\eta}^*\) such that (30) equals zero (i.e., (20) is satisfied), implying that an equilibrium exists with \(y < 1\). We have shown that if (17) holds, a \(\bar{\eta}\) always exists such that
\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - A F_u(\bar{\eta}) \geq 0,
\]
implying that a fraction \(y\) of unskilled agents will choose to produce. Because \(F_s\) stochastically dominates \(F_u\), at this \(\bar{\eta}\),
\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_s(\eta)dvd\eta > \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta
\]
implying that all skilled agents will also produce. □

B Equilibrium with a Minimum Standard

Let \(\Delta\) solve
\[
\lambda F_s(\Delta) + F_u(\Delta) = \lambda.
\]
(31)

An equilibrium in an economy with a minimum standard \(\bar{\eta} \geq \Delta\) is a \(\{w(\eta), c(\eta), y\}\) with the property that \(c(\eta)\) is strictly increasing and thus has a well defined inverse function \(\eta(c) \equiv c^{-1}(\cdot)\), such that for every consumer \(0 \leq c \leq 1\), \(\eta(c)\) solves the consumer choice

45
problem (3), all skilled agents choose to obtain a signal so that
\[ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_s(\eta)d\eta - AF_s(\hat{\eta}) > 0, \]
either \( y > 0 \) fraction of unskilled agents choose to become charlatans (get a signal) so that
\[ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - AF_u(\bar{\eta}) \geq 0 \]
or no unskilled agent chooses to become a charlatan \( (y = 0) \) so that
\[ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - AF_u(\bar{\eta}) < 0 \]
and markets clear with agents with signals greater than \( \hat{\eta} \) always choosing to provide the service, that is, for every \( \eta \),
\[ \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} \lambda f_s(x) + y(1-\lambda) f_u(x)dx = (1-\lambda) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} dc(x). \]

The following proposition shows that when a minimum standard is introduced such that \( \hat{\eta} \geq \Delta \), an equilibrium always exists. The equilibrium is characterized by three regions corresponding to the fraction of unskilled agents who choose to become charlatans.

**Proposition 8** When a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} \geq \Delta \) is imposed such that only producers who get a signal \( \eta \geq \hat{\eta} \) are allowed to produce, an equilibrium always exists with the following properties:

\[
c(\eta) = 1 - \lambda (1 - F_s(\eta)) - y(1 - F_u(\eta)) \quad (32)
\]
\[
w(\eta) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) dv + b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta})
\]
\[
= \left( \frac{y}{\lambda} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v)) \left( \frac{f_u(v)f'_s(v) - f'_u(v)f_s(v)}{(f_s(v) + f_u(v)(\frac{y}{\lambda}))^2} \right) du
\]
\[
+ b(c(\hat{\eta})) \left( \frac{f_s(\hat{\eta})}{f_s(\hat{\eta}) + f_u(\hat{\eta})(\frac{y}{\lambda})} \right) . \quad (33)
\]

and

\[
y = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(\lambda F_u(v) + F_s(v) - \lambda) \pi'(v)f_u(\eta) d\eta dv + b(\lambda F_u(\hat{\eta}) + F_s(\hat{\eta}) - \lambda) \pi(\hat{\eta})(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) - AF_u(\hat{\eta}) > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } b(1-\lambda(1-F_s(\hat{\eta}))) (1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) - AF_u(\hat{\eta}) < 0 \\
y(\hat{\eta}) & \text{o.w.}
\end{cases} \quad (34)
\]
where \( y(\hat{\eta}) \) solves the following equation

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} b \left( 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(v)) - y(\hat{\eta})(1 - F_u(v)) \right) \left( \frac{y(\hat{\eta})}{\lambda} \right) f_u(v) f'_s(v) - f'_u(v) f_s(v) \left( f_s(v) + f_u(v) \left( \frac{y(\hat{\eta})}{\lambda} \right) \right)^2 f_u(\eta) d\eta d\eta
- AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + b \left( 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\hat{\eta})) - y(\hat{\eta})(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) \right) \left( \frac{f_s(\hat{\eta})}{f_s(\hat{\eta}) + f_u(\hat{\eta}) \left( \frac{y(\hat{\eta})}{\lambda} \right)} \right) (1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) = 0.
\]  

(35)

**Proof.** We begin by deriving \( c(\eta) \) from the market clearing condition. Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 7, we get

\[
c(\eta) = \lambda F_s(\eta) + y F_u(\eta) - \lambda + 1 - y.
\]  

(36)

Note that (using 31)

\[
c(\Delta) = \lambda F_s(\Delta) + y F_u(\Delta) - \lambda + 1 - y
= 1 - y - F_u(\Delta)(1 - y)
= (1 - y)(1 - F_u(\Delta)) 
\geq 0
\]

so \( c(\eta) > 0 \) so long as \( \eta > \Delta \). When \( y > 0 \) the wage function is also derived using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 7 providing

\[
w(\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\eta} b(c(v)) \pi'(v) dv + C.
\]  

(37)

The constant \( C \) is now determined by the condition that \( c(\hat{\eta}) \) must be indifferent between consuming or not consuming (so that all consumers \( c < c(\hat{\eta}) \) choose not to consume):

\[
b(c(\hat{\eta})) \pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta}) = 0.
\]

Substituting for wages using (37) and rearranging terms gives,

\[
C = b(c(\hat{\eta})) \pi(\hat{\eta}) - \int_{-\infty}^{\hat{\eta}} b(c(v)) \pi'(v) dv
\]

Substituting this into (37) gives the wage function

\[
w(\eta) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v)) \pi'(v) dv + b(c(\hat{\eta})) \pi(\hat{\eta})
\]  

(38)

An unskilled worker will choose to produce (become a charlatan) if the expected wage is greater then zero:

\[
- AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta) f_u(\eta) d\eta \geq 0
\]  

(39)
If this condition holds strictly, \( y = 1 \). Substituting (38) into (39) provides the condition in (34) for \( y = 1 \) in the statement of the proposition. So we have derived the first condition in (34).

Next consider the case when \( y = 0 \). In this case there are no charlatans so the signal becomes relevant only in that it must exceed \( \hat{\eta} \). All signals that exceed \( \hat{\eta} \) are uninformative because all workers are skilled and therefore earn the same wage. The wage is determined by the condition that \( c(\hat{\eta}) \) is indifferent between consuming or not:

\[
w(\eta) = b(c(\hat{\eta})), \tag{40}
\]

which is what (33) reduces to when \( y = 0 \). In this case unskilled workers prefer not to produce, so

\[
-AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta) f_u(\eta) d\eta < 0. \tag{41}
\]

Substituting (40) into (41) provides the condition in (34) for \( y = 0 \) in the statement of the proposition. So we have derived the second condition in (34).

Finally, \( 0 < y < 1 \) can only occur when

\[
-AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w(\eta) f_u(\eta) d\eta = 0 \tag{42}
\]

Substituting (38) into this expression gives

\[
-AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) f_u(\eta) d\eta dv d\eta + b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta})(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) = 0 \tag{43}
\]

which is (35).

To establish existence we need to show that if the first two conditions in (34) are not satisfied, (35) will always have a solution. Notice that if the condition in (34) for \( y = 1 \) fails the left hand side of (35) with \( y(\hat{\eta}) = 1 \) is less than or equal to zero. Similarly, if the condition in (34) for \( y = 0 \) fails the left hand side of (35) with \( y(\hat{\eta}) = 0 \) is greater than or equal to zero. Since the left hand side of (35) is a continuous function, by the intermediate value theorem, there must be a value of \( y(\hat{\eta}) \) that sets the left hand side equal to zero. ■

**Proposition 9** In an economy in which a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} < \Delta \) is imposed such that only producers who get a signal \( \eta \geq \hat{\eta} \) are allowed to produce, if

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) f_u(\eta) dv d\eta \leq A \leq \left( \frac{1}{F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) f_u(\eta) dv d\eta \tag{44}
\]

where

\[
c(\eta) = 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\eta)) - y(1 - F_u(\eta))
\]

and

\[
y = \frac{1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\hat{\eta}))}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \tag{45}
\]
then an equilibrium exists with

\[ w(\eta) = \int_\hat{\eta}^\eta b(c(v))\pi'(v)du - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_\eta^x b(c(v))\pi'(v)dvf_u(x)dx + A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right). \]

**Proof.** We begin by deriving \( c(\eta) \) from market clearing condition. Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 7, we get

\[ c(\eta) = 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\eta)) - y(1 - F_u(\eta)). \]  

(46)

Notice that \( \hat{\eta} < \Delta \) implies that if \( y = 1 \) then supply would exceed demand (because the left hand side of (31) is mass of producers who choose not to supply and the right hand side is the total excess supply). That implies that \( y < 1 \). We will show that at the equilibrium \( y, c(\hat{\eta}) = 0 \). Using this condition to solve (46) for \( y \) gives:

\[ y = \frac{1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\hat{\eta}))}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} < 1. \]  

(47)

Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 7, the wage function is

\[ w(\eta) = \int_\hat{\eta}^\eta b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv + C. \]  

(48)

Because \( c(\hat{\eta}) = 0 \), all consumers must either be indifferent or strictly prefer to consume, so wages are not determined by the consumer’s indifference condition. Instead, the constant \( C \) is now determined by the condition that because \( y < 1 \), unskilled producers must be indifferent about deciding whether to produce:

\[ -AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty w(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta = 0. \]  

(49)

Substituting for wages using (48) and rearranging terms gives,

\[ -AF_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_\eta^\infty b(c(v))\pi'(v)dvf_u(\eta)d\eta + C(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) = 0 \]

\[ C = A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_\eta^\infty b(c(v))\pi'(v)dvf_u(\eta)d\eta. \]

Substituting this into (48) gives the wage function

\[ w(\eta) = \int_\hat{\eta}^\eta b(c(v))\pi'(v)du - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_\eta^x b(c(v))\pi'(v)dvf_u(x)dx + A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right). \]

Now

\[ w(\hat{\eta}) = A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_\hat{\eta}^x b(c(v))\pi'(v)dvf_u(x)dx \leq 0 \]

by (44). This implies that \( b(c)\pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta}) \geq 0 \) for every \( c \), verifying that \( c(\hat{\eta}) = 0 \). Finally,
producers must be willing to produce. Using (44)

\[ w(\hat{\eta}) = A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{x} b(c(v))\pi'(v)dv f_u(x)dx \]

\[ \geq A \left( \frac{F_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) A \]

\[ = -A \]

so all producers are better off producing rather than earning the reservation wage.

C Proof of Proposition 1

Consumer surplus in the equilibrium without a standard is

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) + \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b'(c(v))f_s(v)dv + A dc(\eta)
\]

\[ = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b'(c(v))f_s(v)dv \ dc(\eta) + A \]

\[ = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b'(c(v))f_s(v)dv (\lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta))d\eta + A \]

\[ = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{(\hat{\eta} - 1)/\sigma}^{(\eta - 1)/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u)du \ (\lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta))d\eta + A \]

\[ = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\hat{\eta} - 1)/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u)du \ (\lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + y n(v))dv + A \]  \hspace{1cm} (50)

where \( n(x) \) is a standard normal density function. Define \( N(x) \) to be the standard normal distribution function. We first consider the case where \( y = 1 \) so \( y \) does not depend on \( \sigma \).
Taking the derivative of (50) w.r.t. $\sigma$ gives

$$
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \lambda \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} \int_{\frac{(\bar{\eta}-1)}{\sigma}}^{v-1/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u)du \left( \lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + y n(v) \right)dv + A \right)
$$

$$
= \lambda \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} \frac{d}{d\sigma} \int_{\frac{(\bar{\eta}-1)}{\sigma}}^{v-1/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u)du \left( \lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + y n(v) \right)dv
$$

$$
= \lambda \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma))n(v - 1/\sigma)(\lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + y n(v))dv
$$

$$
- \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} b'(c(\bar{\eta}))\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \right)
$$

$$
+ \lambda \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} \frac{d}{d\sigma} \int_{\frac{(\bar{\eta}-1)}{\sigma}}^{v-1/\sigma} b''(c(u\sigma + 1)) \frac{d}{d\sigma} (c(u\sigma + 1)) n(u)du \left( \lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + y n(v) \right)dv
$$

$$
- \frac{\lambda^2}{\sigma^2} \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} \int_{\frac{(\bar{\eta}-1)}{\sigma}}^{v-1/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1)) n(u)du (v - 1/\sigma) n(v - 1/\sigma)dv
$$

$$
= \frac{\lambda y}{\sigma^2} \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma))n(v - 1/\sigma)n(v)dv
$$

$$
- \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} b'(c(\bar{\eta}))\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \right)
$$

$$
- \frac{\lambda y^2}{\sigma^2} \int_{\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}}^{\infty} \int_{\frac{(\bar{\eta}-1)}{\sigma}}^{v-1/\sigma} b''(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u + 1/\sigma) n(u)du n(v)dv + O(\lambda^2)
$$

(51)

because from (27) we have

$$
c(u\sigma + 1) = 1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(u\sigma + 1)) - y(1 - F_u(u\sigma + 1)) = 1 - \lambda(1 - N(u)) - y(1 - N(u + 1/\sigma))
$$

so

$$
\frac{d}{d\sigma} c(u\sigma + 1) = - \frac{y}{\sigma^2} n(u + 1/\sigma).
$$

(52)

Now because $c(\bar{\eta}) = 0$ we have

$$
1 - \lambda(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - y(1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})) = 0
$$

(53)

Taking derivatives gives

$$
\lambda \frac{d}{d\sigma} F_s(\bar{\eta}) + y \frac{d}{d\sigma} F_u(\bar{\eta}) = 0
$$

$$
\lambda \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} F_s(\bar{\eta}) + y \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} F_u(\bar{\eta}) + \lambda f_s(\bar{\eta}) \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} + y f_u(\bar{\eta}) \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} = 0
$$

$$
\frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} = - \frac{\lambda \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} F_s(\bar{\eta}) + y \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} F_u(\bar{\eta})}{\lambda f_s(\bar{\eta}) + y f_u(\bar{\eta})}.
$$

(54)
Note that $\bar{\eta} \leq 0$ because from (53),

\[
0 = 1 - \lambda (1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - y (1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})) \\
\geq 1 - \frac{1}{2} (1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - (1 - F_u(\bar{\eta}))
\]

implying

\[
\frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{1}{2} F_s(\bar{\eta}) + F_u(\bar{\eta}) \geq F_u(\bar{\eta}).
\]

Under the normal assumption, (54) becomes

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} = -\frac{\lambda^2 \sigma}{\lambda f_u(\bar{\eta}) + y f_u(\bar{\eta})} \bar{\eta} - \pi(\bar{\eta}) < 0.
\]

Substituting this expression into (51) and using the fact that $b''(\cdot) < 0$ gives,

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \lambda \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{v-1/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1)) u(n(u) du (\lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + yn(v)) dv + A \right) > \frac{\lambda y}{\sigma^2} \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma)) n(v - 1/\sigma) n(v) dv
\]

\[
- \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} + 1 \right) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda y}{\sigma^2} \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma)) n(v - 1/\sigma) n(v) dv
\]

\[
- \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
> \frac{\lambda y}{\sigma^2} \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma)) n(v - 1/\sigma) n(v) dv - \frac{\lambda}{\sigma} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\sigma} \right) + O(\lambda^2). \quad (55)
\]

Note, from Proposition 7 that $y \geq 1 - \lambda$. Substituting this, and integrating the first term in (55) gives

\[
\frac{\lambda y}{\sigma^2} \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma)) n(v - 1/\sigma) n(v) dv - \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
\geq \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} e^{-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}} \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{\infty} b'(c(v\sigma)) n \left( \sqrt{2} \left( v - \frac{1}{2\sigma} \right) \right) dv - \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
> \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} e^{-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}} b'(1) \left( 1 - \frac{2\bar{\eta}}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right) - \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} b'(c(\bar{\eta})) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2} \left( e^{-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}} b'(1) \left( 1 - \frac{2\bar{\eta}}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right) - b'(0) n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} - 1) \right) + O(\lambda^2). \quad (56)
\]
For small enough $\lambda$, this expression is positive so long as

\[
e^{-\frac{1}{2\pi^2}} \left( \frac{b'(1)}{b'(0)} \right) \left( 1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right) \right) > e^{-\frac{1}{2\pi^2}} \frac{(\bar{\eta} - 1)^2}{2\sigma^2}
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{4\sigma^2} + \log \left( \frac{\left( \frac{b'(1)}{b'(0)} \right)}{1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right)} \right) > -\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \right)^2
\]

\[
2 - 2\sigma^2 \log \left( \frac{\left( \frac{b'(1)}{b'(0)} \right)}{1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right)} \right) < (\bar{\eta} - 1)^2
\]

\[
\sqrt{2 - 2\sigma^2 \log \left( \frac{\left( \frac{b'(1)}{b'(0)} \right)}{1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right)} \right)} < \bar{\eta} - 1
\]

or

\[
\sqrt{2 - 2\sigma^2 \log \left( \frac{\left( \frac{b'(1)}{b'(0)} \right)}{1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right)} \right)} < -\bar{\eta} + 1
\]

Using the second inequality gives

\[
\bar{\eta} < 1 - \sqrt{2 + 2\sigma^2 \log \left( \frac{\left( \frac{b'(0)}{b'(1)} \right)}{1 - N \left( \frac{2\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sqrt{2\sigma}} \right)} \right)} < 1 - \sqrt{2 + 2\sigma^2 \log \left( \frac{b'(0)}{b'(1)} \right)}
\]

From (53) we have

\[
\lambda = \frac{1 - y(1 - N(\frac{\eta}{\sigma}))}{1 - N(\frac{\eta}{\sigma})} \geq \frac{N(\frac{\eta}{\sigma})}{1 - N(\frac{\eta}{\sigma})}
\]

which implies that there exists a $\lambda^*$ such that for all $\lambda < \lambda^*$, (57) is satisfied. That implies that there exists a $\hat{\lambda} \leq \lambda^*$ such that for all $\lambda < \hat{\lambda}$ where an equilibrium exists,

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \lambda \int_{\bar{\eta}/\sigma}^{v / \sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1))n(u)du \left( \lambda n(v - 1/\sigma) + yn(v) \right)dv + A \right) > 0.
\]

The last step of the proof accounts for the case when $y \neq 1$, that is, $y = \frac{1 - \lambda(1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma}))}{1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})}$. In this case

\[
\frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} \left( 1 - \lambda(1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})) \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda n(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})}{1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\lambda n(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})}{1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{\lambda(1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma}))}{(1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma}))^2} \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \right)
\]

\[
= -\frac{\lambda n(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})}{1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})} \frac{1 - \pi(\bar{\eta})}{\sigma^2} - \frac{\lambda n(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})}{1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma})} \frac{\eta(\bar{\eta})}{(1 - N(\frac{\eta - 1}{\sigma}))^2} \frac{\pi(\bar{\eta})}{\sigma^2} = o(\lambda)
\]

(59)
The expected wage of skilled workers (using Proposition 7) is

\[ D \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left( \lambda \int_{\eta/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v-1/\sigma} b'(c(u\sigma + 1)n(u)du \ (\lambda(n - 1/\sigma) + yu(n))dv + A \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = O(\lambda^2) \]

so there exists a \( \hat{\lambda} \) such that for all \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \), (58) holds in this case as well.

### D Proof of Proposition 2

The expected wage of skilled workers (using Proposition 7) is

\[ \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_s(\eta) \ d\eta - AF_s(\hat{\eta}) = \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_s(\eta) \ dv d\eta - A \]

\[ = \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)f_s(\eta)dv d\eta + A \]

\[ = \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dv d\eta + A \]  

(60)

As before, we first consider the case where \( y = 1 \) so \( y \) does not depend on \( \sigma \). Taking the derivative of (60) w.r.t. \( \sigma \) gives

\[ \frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dv d\eta + A \right) \]

\[ = \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} \frac{d}{d\sigma} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dv d\eta + A \]

\[ + \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \frac{d}{d\sigma} (\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v))dv d\eta \]

\[ = -\lambda \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{2u+1}{2u+1} (\lambda e^{2u+1}{2u+1} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{2u+1}{2u+1} + y)^3} \right) n(v)dv d\eta \]

\[ < -\lambda \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{2u+1}{2u+1} (\lambda e^{2u+1}{2u+1} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{2u+1}{2u+1} + y)^3} \right) n(v)dv d\eta \]

(61)

Let \( \eta^* \) be the negative value of \( u \) that solves

\[ \lambda e^{2u+1}{2u+1} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y = 0. \]  

(62)
Notice that if we ignore terms of order $\lambda^2$, (61) is less than zero if $\bar{\eta} > \sigma\eta^* + 1$ which means for small enough $\lambda$, expected wages are decreasing in $\sigma$. So to complete the proof we need to show that for small enough $\lambda$, (61) is also less than zero when

$$\bar{\eta} \leq \sigma\eta^* + 1$$  \hspace{1cm} (63)$$

Switching the order of integration in (61) and then integrating the inner integral gives

$$\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{v}^{u} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma' (u\sigma + 1)n(v) dudv + A \right)$$

$$< -\lambda \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{u}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} + y)^3} \right) n(v) dvdu$$

$$= -\lambda \int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} + y)^3} \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) du$$

$$- \lambda \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\eta^*} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} + y)^3} \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) du$$

$$- \lambda \int_{\eta^*}^{0} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} (\sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1) + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y)}{\sigma^4 (\lambda e^{\frac{2u+1}{2\sigma^2}} + y)^3} \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) du$$  \hspace{1cm} (64)$$

where the final step just splits the remaining integral over the three regions. Because $b(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and $0 < N(x) \leq 1/2$ in the region $x < 0$, we can bound (64) as
follows:
\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\infty} \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{v} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma \pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)\,dudv + A \right) = -\lambda \int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) (1 - N(u)) \, du \\
-\lambda b(c(\eta^*\sigma + 1)) \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\eta^*} \left( \frac{ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) \, du \\
-\frac{\lambda}{2} b(c(\eta^*\sigma + 1)) \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{0} \left( \frac{ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) \, du \\
= -\int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{\lambda ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) (1 - N(u)) \, du \\
-\frac{1}{2} b(c(\eta^*\sigma + 1)) \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{0} \left( \frac{\lambda ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) \, du \\
-\frac{1}{2} b(c(\eta^*\sigma + 1)) \int_{(\eta-1)/\sigma}^{\eta^*} \left( \frac{\lambda ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \right) \, du \quad (65)
\]

To integrate these integrals, recall that the integrand is
\[
\frac{\lambda ye^{2\pi u + 1}}{2\pi^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y(\sigma + u) + y \right) \right) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma^4 \left( \lambda e^{2\pi u + 1} + y \right)^3} \\
= \frac{d}{d\sigma} (\sigma \pi'(u\sigma + 1)) = \pi'(u\sigma + 1) + \sigma \pi''(u\sigma + 1)u \quad (66)
\]

So integrating by parts gives
\[
\int \pi'(u\sigma + 1) + \sigma \pi''(u\sigma + 1)u \, du \\
= \int \pi'(u\sigma + 1)\,du + \pi'(u\sigma + 1)u - \int \pi'(u\sigma + 1)\,du \\
= \pi'(u\sigma + 1)u \quad (67)
\]
Using (67) to integrate the last two expressions in (65) gives

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\bar{\eta} - 1)/\sigma}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma \pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dudv + A \right) = -\lambda \int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{2\eta u + 1}}{2\sigma^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\eta u + 1/2\sigma^2} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y \sigma + u + y \right) \right) \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) \, du
\]

\[
-\frac{1}{2} b(c(\eta^* \sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{\eta^* \lambda y e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1}}{\sigma^2 (\lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1} + y)^2} \right) - 2 \left( \frac{(\bar{\eta} - 1) \lambda y e^{2\eta - 1}}{\sigma^3 (\lambda e^{\eta - 1} + e^{1/2\sigma^2} y)^2} \right).
\]

\[
= -\lambda \int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{ye^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1}}{2\sigma^2} \left( \lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1/2\sigma^2} \left( \sigma^2 - \sigma u - 1 + \sigma y \sigma + u + y \right) \right) \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) \, du
\]

\[
-\frac{\lambda y}{2} b(c(\eta^* \sigma + 1)) \left( \left( \frac{\eta^* \lambda^* e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1}}{2\sigma^3 (\lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1} + y)^2} \right) - \left( \frac{2(\bar{\eta} - 1) e^{2\eta^* - 1}}{\sigma^3 (\lambda e^{2\eta^* - 1} + y)^2} \right) \right).
\]

(68)

Now using the definition \(\eta^*\) (that is, (62)) gives

\[
\frac{\eta^* \lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1/2\sigma^2}}{\sigma^3 (\lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1} + y)^2} = -\frac{(\sigma^2 + 1)e^{-1/2\sigma^2}}{\sigma^3 (\lambda e^{2\eta^* \sigma + 1} + y)^2} + O(\lambda^2)
\]
Substituting this expression into (68) and separating out terms of \( \lambda^2 \) or greater gives

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\bar{\eta}} \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\nu} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dudv + A \right)
\]

\[
< -\lambda \int_{0}^{\infty} b(c(u\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2} \left( \sigma(2\sigma + u) + 1 \right)}{\sigma^4 \left( \lambda e^{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2}} + 1 \right)^{3/2}} \right) \left( 1 - N(u) \right) du
\]

\[
- \frac{\lambda y}{2} b(c(\eta^*\sigma + 1)) \left( \frac{\frac{2\lambda y}{2} \left( \lambda e^{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2} + y} \right)^2}{\sigma^3 \left( \lambda e^{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2}} + y \right)^2} \right)^2 - \left( \frac{\frac{2\lambda y}{2} \left( \lambda e^{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2} + y} \right)^2}{\sigma^3 \left( \lambda e^{\frac{2\sigma u + 1}{2\sigma^2}} + y \right)^2} \right) + O(\lambda^2)
\]

\[
< 0
\]

(69)

where the last inequality follows because \( \bar{\eta} \) is bounded by (63) so \( \bar{\eta} \leq -\sigma^2 \). All that now remains is to show that this is also true when \( y \neq 1 \). Notice from (60) that \( y \) only enters the expected wage function through the function \( \pi'(\cdot) \). Now

\[
\frac{\partial \pi'(x)}{\partial y} \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = \left( \frac{\lambda e^{\frac{4\lambda y}{2\sigma^2}} - \lambda ye^{\frac{4\lambda y}{2\sigma^2} + 1}}{\sigma^2 \left( \lambda e^{\frac{4\lambda y}{2\sigma^2}} + 1 \right)^{3/2}} \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = O(\lambda^2)
\]

because, from (59), \( \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} \) is order \( \lambda \). So there exists a \( \hat{\lambda} \) such that for all \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \) where an equilibrium exists,

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\bar{\eta}} \int_{(\bar{\eta}-1)/\sigma}^{\nu} b(c(u\sigma + 1))\sigma\pi'(u\sigma + 1)n(v)dudv + A \right) < 0.
\]

### E  Proof of Proposition 3

Overall welfare is defined to be

\[
(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - A (F_s(\bar{\eta}) + F_u(\bar{\eta})) = 1 - N(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) - A \left( N(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) + N(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}) \right)
\]

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Beginning with the case when \( y = 1 \) and taking the derivative w.r.t. \( \sigma \) and using the expression for \( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} \) derived in the proof of Proposition 1 gives

\[
\frac{d}{d\sigma} \left( (1 - N(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma})) - A \left( N(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) + N(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}) \right) \right)
= \left( -n(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) \left( \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} - \frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma} \right) - A \left( n(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) \left( \frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} \right) - n(\frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma}) \left( \frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} \right) \right) \right)
= \left( -n(\frac{\bar{\eta} - 1}{\sigma}) \right) \left( \frac{\bar{\eta}}{\sigma} + \frac{A}{\sigma} \right)
< 0.
\]

(70)

The last step of the proof accounts for the case when \( y \neq 1 \). In this case we have already seen that

\[ \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = o(\lambda) \]

implying (using (53)) that

\[ \frac{d\bar{\eta}}{d\sigma} = \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})}{\lambda f_u(\bar{\eta}) + y f_u(\bar{\eta})} \frac{\partial y}{\partial \sigma} = \frac{\partial \bar{\eta}}{\partial \sigma} + o(\lambda) \]

so there exists a \( \hat{\lambda} \) such that for all equilibria that feature \( \lambda < \hat{\lambda} \), (70) holds in this case as well.

F  Proof of Proposition 4

In the equilibrium without a standard, consumer surplus is

\[
\int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \ dc(\eta) = \lambda \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} b'(c(v))f_u(\eta)dv \ dc(\eta) + A \tag{71}
\]

where we have used (10). Next recall that if an equilibrium exists then the expected benefit of unskilled agents to produce must be non-negative. Applying this condition to (30) implies:

\[
\int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\bar{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v)f_u(\eta)dvd\eta \geq A. \tag{72}
\]

Now consider introducing into this equilibrium a minimum standard \( \bar{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \). Note that an equilibrium will always exists because (44) is satisfied whenever (17) is satisfied. When \( y < 1 \) in the equilibrium without a standard, because (19) and (45) are the same, introducing a minimum standard leaves \( y \) unchanged. When \( y = 1 \), from Proposition 8, in this
equilibrium the expected benefit of producing for an unskilled agent is

\[
\int_\eta^\infty b(\lambda F_s(v) + F_u(v) - \lambda) \pi'(v) f_u(\eta) \, dv \eta + \frac{b(\lambda F_s(\tilde{\eta}) + F_u(\tilde{\eta}) - \lambda) \pi(\tilde{\eta})(1 - F_u(\tilde{\eta})) - AF_u(\tilde{\eta})}{(1 - F_u(\tilde{\eta}))} \geq A + \frac{b(\lambda F_s(\tilde{\eta}) + F_u(\tilde{\eta}) - \lambda) \pi(\tilde{\eta})(1 - F_u(\tilde{\eta})) - AF_u(\tilde{\eta})}{(1 - F_u(\tilde{\eta}))} \geq 0,
\]

where the inequality follows from (72). What this implies is that if a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \) is introduced into an equilibrium without a standard that features \( y = 1 \), the resulting equilibrium features \( y = \Delta \). So \( c(\eta) \) is identical in the two equilibria.

When \( y = 1 \), consumer surplus in the equilibrium with a minimum standard is

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \, dc(\eta) = \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\eta b'(c(v)) f_s(v) c'(\eta) \, dv \eta \quad (73)
\]

where we have used (1), (32) and (33). Subtracting (71) from (73) when \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \) gives

\[
\lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\eta b'(c(v)) f_s(v) c'(\eta) \, dv \eta = -A \leq 0
\]

so introducing a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \) cannot increase consumer surplus. Obviously, introducing a standard below \( \bar{\eta} \) has no effect, so we have shown that a government cannot increase consumer surplus by introducing a standard \( \hat{\eta} \leq \bar{\eta} \).

For minimum standards \( \hat{\eta} \geq \bar{\eta} \geq \Delta \) the slope of consumer surplus is

\[
\frac{d}{d\eta} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) \, dc(\eta) = \frac{d}{d\eta} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\eta b'(c(v)) \lambda f_s(v) du \ c'(\eta) d\eta
\]

\[
= -b'(c(\hat{\eta})) \lambda f_s(\hat{\eta}) (1 - c(\hat{\eta})) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\eta b'(c(v)) \lambda f_s(v) f_u(\eta) \frac{dy}{d\eta} \, dv \, d\eta
\]

\[
- \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\infty \int_{\hat{\eta}}^\eta b''(c(v)) (1 - F_u(\tilde{\eta})) \frac{dy}{d\eta} \lambda f_s(v) (\lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta)) \, dv \, d\eta \quad (74)
\]

Notice that \( b''(\cdot) \leq 0 \) and \( \frac{dy}{d\eta} = 0 \) over the intervals where \( y = 1 \) or \( y = 0 \). When \( 0 \leq y \leq 1 \), by Lemma 1, there exists a \( \lambda \) small enough so that \( \frac{dy}{d\eta} < 0 \). These conditions jointly imply that for a small enough \( \lambda \), (74) is strictly less than zero. So \( \hat{\eta} \geq \bar{\eta} \) leads to strictly lower consumer surplus when \( \bar{\eta} \geq \Delta \), that is, \( y = 1 \) in the equilibrium without a minimum standard.

In the case when \( \bar{\eta} < \Delta \) (that is, \( y < 1 \) in the equilibrium without a minimum
standard), consumer surplus in the equilibrium with a minimum standard is
\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta)\, dc(\eta) = \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} b'(c(v)) f_{s}(v) c'(\eta)\, dv d\eta
\]
\[
+ \left(\frac{1}{1 - F_{u}(\hat{\eta})}\right) \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{x} b(c(v))\pi'(v) f_{u}(x)\, dx - A \left(\frac{F_{u}(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_{u}(\hat{\eta})}\right).
\]
(75)

Subtracting (71) from (75) when \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \) gives
\[
\left(\frac{1}{1 - F_{u}(\eta)}\right) \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{x} b(c(v))\pi'(v) f_{u}(x)\, dx - A \left(\frac{F_{u}(\eta)}{1 - F_{u}(\eta)}\right) = 0
\]
because \( y \) is the same in both equilibria and so (20) holds. So consumer surplus remains the same. Finally, we need to show that consumer surplus is decreasing in \( \hat{\eta} \), when \( y < 1 \).
\[
\frac{d}{d\eta} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta)\, dc(\eta) = - (b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta})) c'(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b'(c(\eta)) c_{\eta}(\eta)\pi(\eta) dc(\eta)
\]
\[
+ \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi_{\eta}(\eta) dc(\eta) - \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w_{\eta}(\eta) dc(\eta)
\]
\[
+ \int_{\eta}^{\infty} (b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta)) f_{u}(\eta) \frac{dy}{d\eta} d\eta
\]
\[
= - (b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta})) c'(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b'(c(\eta)) c_{\eta}(\eta)\pi(\eta) dc(\eta)
\]
\[
- \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w_{\eta}(\eta) dc(\eta) - \frac{dy}{d\eta} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta) f_{u}(\eta) d\eta
\]
\[
= - (b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta})) c'(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b'(c(\eta)) c_{\eta}(\eta)\pi(\eta) dc(\eta)
\]
\[
- \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w_{\eta}(\eta) dc(\eta) - \frac{dy}{d\eta} A F_{u}(\hat{\eta})
\]
(76)

where the second equality follows because
\[
\int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi_{\eta}(\eta) dc(\eta) = - \frac{dy}{d\eta} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) \frac{f_{u}(\eta)}{\lambda f_{s}(\eta) + y f_{u}(\eta)} dc(\eta)
\]
\[
= - \frac{dy}{d\eta} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) \frac{f_{u}(\eta)}{\lambda f_{s}(\eta) + y f_{u}(\eta)} (\lambda f_{s}(\eta) + y f_{u}(\eta)) d\eta
\]
\[
= - \frac{dy}{d\eta} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) f_{u}(\eta) d\eta
\]
and the last line follows from (42). Now the first term of (76) is less than or equal to zero because \( b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta}) \geq 0 \), and the second and last terms are less than or equal to
zero because
\[ \frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}} = \frac{\lambda f_s(\hat{\eta}) + yf_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} > 0 \]
from (45) and
\[ c_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) = (F_u(\eta) - 1)\frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}}. \]
So we need to show the third term of (76) is less than or equal to zero. Taking derivatives in (42) and rearranging gives
\[ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta = A f_u(\hat{\eta}) + w(\hat{\eta}) f_u(\hat{\eta}). \]
Now
\[ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) dc(\eta) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) (\lambda f_s(\eta) + y f_u(\eta)) d\eta \]
\[ = y A f_u(\hat{\eta}) + y w(\hat{\eta}) f_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) \lambda f_s(\eta) d\eta \]
\[ = \frac{y A f_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} - \left( \frac{y f_u(\hat{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})} \right) \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{x} b(c(v))\pi'(v) dv f_u(x) dx + \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) f_s(\eta) d\eta \]
where we have used Proposition 9 to substitute for \( w(\hat{\eta}) \). For small enough \( \lambda \) the last two terms converge to zero, which implies that
\[ \lim_{\lambda \to 0} \frac{d}{d\hat{\eta}} \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta) - w(\eta) dc(\eta) < 0 \]
which implies that \( \hat{\eta} > \tilde{\eta} \) leads to strictly lower consumer surplus in the case when \( \tilde{\eta} < \Delta \).

**G Proof of Proposition 5**

To prove the proposition we need to find a standard such that expect wages of skilled workers are strictly larger under this standard than they are in the equilibrium without the standard. Wages in the equilibrium without a minimum standard are, by Proposition 7,
\[ w(\eta) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) du - A \]
(78)
If a standard is introduced into this equilibrium such that \( \hat{\eta} = \tilde{\eta} \), as we saw in the proof of Proposition 4, \( c(\eta) \) and \( y \) are identical in the two equilibria. When \( y = 1 \) in the equilibrium without a minimum standard, by Proposition 8, wages when the standard is introduced are
\[ w(\eta) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) du + b(\tilde{\eta})\pi(\tilde{\eta}) = \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b(c(v))\pi'(v) du \]
(79)
because \( c(\bar{\eta}) = 0 \). Subtracting (78) from (79) shows that wages always increase by \( A \). That implies that expected wages increase by \( A(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) \). So, when \( A > 0 \), we have shown that expected wages are strictly higher when the standard is introduced. To show that wages strictly increase in all cases, we show that the derivative of the expected wage of skilled workers is positive when \( A = 0 \) and \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \), so by marginally raising the standard above \( \bar{\eta} \) expected wages can be made strictly higher in this case. Calculating the derivative of expected wages when \( A = 0 \) (using (15) and noting from Proposition 7 that when \( A = 0 \), \( y = 1 \) for all \( \hat{\eta} \)):

\[
\frac{d}{d\eta} \left( \int_{\eta}^{\infty} w(\eta)f_s(\eta) \, d\eta \right)
= \frac{d}{d\eta} \left( \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi(\eta)f_s(\eta) \, d\eta - \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b'(c(v))f_s(v)f_s(\eta) \, dv \, d\eta \right)
= -b(c(\bar{\eta}))\pi(\bar{\eta})f_s(\bar{\eta}) + \lambda b'(c(\bar{\eta}))f_s(\bar{\eta})(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta}))
= \lambda b'(c(\bar{\eta}))f_s(\bar{\eta})(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) > 0.
\]

because \( c(\bar{\eta}) = 0 \) and so \( b(c(\bar{\eta})) = 0 \).

Finally, we have to consider the case when \( \bar{\eta} < \Delta \). In this case \( y < 1 \) so an equilibrium can only exist with \( A > 0 \). As above, introduce a minimum standard such that \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \). By Proposition 9, wages when this standard is introduced (using (20)) are

\[
w(\eta) = \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v) \, dv - \left( \frac{1}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})} \right) \int_{\eta}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\infty} b(c(v))\pi'(v) \, dv \, f_u(x) \, dx + A \left( \frac{F_u(\bar{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})} \right)
= \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v) \, dv - \left( \frac{A}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})} \right) + A \left( \frac{F_u(\bar{\eta})}{1 - F_u(\bar{\eta})} \right)
= \int_{\eta}^{\bar{\eta}} b(c(v))\pi'(v) \, dv - A \quad (80)
\]

which is (78), so introducing the standard leaves skilled workers indifferent. Now consider the effect of raising the standard to \( \Delta \). Now wages are given by (79), although because \( y \) differs in the two standards, the integrand of (79) is not the same as the integrand of (80). Because the maximum difference between the two values of \( y \) is \( \lambda \), the overall difference is at least of order \( \lambda \), so the wages with a standard of \( \Delta \) exceed wages with a standard of \( \bar{\eta} \) by \( A + o(\lambda) \). Over the region \( \bar{\eta} \leq \eta \leq \Delta \) wages with a standard of \( \Delta \) exceed wages with a standard of \( \bar{\eta} \) by \( -w(\eta) - A \). So expected wages with a standard of \( \Delta \) exceed expected wages with a standard of \( \bar{\eta} \) by

\[
A(1 - F_s(\Delta)) + \int_{\eta}^{\Delta} (-w(\eta) - A) f_s(\eta) \, d\eta + o(\lambda)
= A(1 - F_s(\Delta)) - A(F_s(\Delta) - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - \int_{\eta}^{\Delta} w(\eta) f_s(\eta) \, d\eta + o(\lambda)
= A(1 - F_s(\Delta)) - A(F_s(\Delta) - F_s(\bar{\eta})) + A(F_s(\Delta) - F_s(\bar{\eta})) + o(\lambda)
= A(1 - F_s(\Delta)) + o(\lambda)
\]

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where \( w(\eta) \) is the wage function with a standard of \( \bar{\eta} \), that is, (80). So there exists a \( \lambda^* \) such that for all \( \lambda < \lambda^* \) where an equilibrium exists, expected wages are strictly larger when a standard of \( \Delta \) is introduced.

### H Proof of Proposition 6

Overall welfare is defined to be

\[
(1 - F_s(\bar{\eta})) - A (F_s(\bar{\eta}) + F_u(\bar{\eta}))
\]

Setting \( \hat{\eta} = \bar{\eta} \) and taking the derivative w.r.t. \( \hat{\eta} \) gives

\[
-f_s(\hat{\eta})) - A (f_s(\hat{\eta}) + f_u(\hat{\eta})) < 0.
\]

### I Lemmas

In an equilibrium of the economy where a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} \geq \Delta \) is imposed, define \( \Gamma \) to be the infinum of \( \hat{\eta} \) such that \( y < 1 \) (the largest value of \( \hat{\eta} \) that is smaller than or equal to any value of \( \hat{\eta} \) when \( y < 1 \)).

**Lemma 1** In an equilibrium of the economy where a minimum standard \( \hat{\eta} \geq \Gamma \) is imposed and the equilibrium features \( 0 < y < 1 \), then there exists a \( \lambda^* > 0 \) such that for all \( \lambda < \lambda^* \):

\[
\lambda b'(c(\hat{\eta}))(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) f_s(\hat{\eta}) - w(\hat{\eta}) - A < 0 \quad (81)
\]

and

\[
\frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}} < 0.
\]

**Proof.** Notice that if \( A = 0 \), then \( y = 1 \) for all \( \hat{\eta} \) because it is impossible for unskilled expected wages to equal zero implying that \( A > 0 \). Then the first condition follows from the fact that the first term in (81) and \( w(\hat{\eta}) \) are order \( \lambda \). When \( 0 < y < 1 \), expected unskilled wages are always zero, so taking the derivative of expected the expected wage w.r.t. \( \hat{\eta} \) gives

\[
-Af_u(\hat{\eta}) + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta)f_u(\eta)d\eta - w(\hat{\eta})f_u(\hat{\eta}) = 0. \quad (82)
\]

Now,

\[
w_{\hat{\eta}}(\eta) = \lambda b'(c(\hat{\eta}))f_s(\hat{\eta}) - \lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\eta} b''(c(v))(F_u(u) - 1) f_s(\eta) \frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}} dv
\]

\[
+ b'(c(\eta))(F_u(\eta) - 1) \pi(\eta)\frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}} + b(c(\eta))\pi_u(\eta)\frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}}
\]
Substituting gives

\[- \left( b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - \lambda b'(c(\hat{\eta}))(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) \frac{f_s(\hat{\eta})}{f_u(\hat{\eta})} + A \right) f_u(\hat{\eta})
\]

\[+ \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b'(c(\eta))(F_u(\eta) - 1)\pi(\eta)f_u(\eta)\frac{dy}{d\eta} \ d\eta + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi_y(\eta)f_u(\eta)\frac{dy}{d\eta} \ d\eta
\]

\[-\lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} b''(c(v))(F_u(u) - 1)f_s(v)f_u(\eta)\frac{dy}{d\eta} \ dv \ d\eta = 0
\]

implying

\[\left( b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - \lambda b'(c(\hat{\eta}))(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) \frac{f_s(\hat{\eta})}{f_u(\hat{\eta})} + A \right) f_u(\hat{\eta}) =
\]

\[\left( \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b'(c(\eta))(F_u(u) - 1)\pi(\eta)f_u(\eta) \ d\eta + \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} b(c(\eta))\pi_y(\eta)f_u(\eta) \ d\eta
\]

\[-\lambda \int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} b''(c(v))(F_u(u) - 1)f_s(v)f_u(\eta) \ dv \ d\eta \right) \frac{dy}{d\eta}
\]

so we have

\[
\frac{dy}{d\hat{\eta}} = (83)
\]

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \left( b(c(\hat{\eta}))\pi(\hat{\eta}) - \lambda b'(c(\hat{\eta}))(1 - F_u(\hat{\eta})) \frac{f_s(\hat{\eta})}{f_u(\hat{\eta})} + A \right) f_u(\hat{\eta})
\]

\[
\int_{\hat{\eta}}^{\infty} \left( b(c(\eta))\pi_y(\eta) - b'(c(\eta))(1 - F_u(u))\pi(\eta) + \lambda \int_{\eta}^{\hat{\eta}} b''(c(v))(1 - F_u(u))f_s(v) \ dv \right) f_u(\eta) \ d\eta
\]

The denominator is negative because all the terms in the integrands are negative because \(b''(c(v)) \leq 0\) and \(\pi_y(\eta) < 0\). The numerator converges to \(A\) for \(\lambda\) small enough. Thus for small enough \(\lambda\), (83) is negative. 

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