Who hedges interest-rate risk?
Implications for wealth inequality*

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Abstract

We present a life-cycle model in which households can invest in short- or long-term assets to hedge against interest-rate risk. Our model matches important stylized facts. First, the share of long-term assets in households’ wealth is hump-shaped over the life-cycle. Within cohorts, it increases with wealth and earnings. Second, wealth inequality grows when interest rates fall, but only when wealth does not include the value of Social Security. Hedging demand against interest-rate risk can explain 40% of long-run changes in wealth inequality since 1960.

Keywords: Interest rates, Portfolio choices, Inequality, Social Security

JEL codes: D31, E21, G51, H55

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1 Introduction

When households invest in different assets, and those held by the rich deliver higher returns, portfolio choices contribute to trends in inequality (Fagereng et al., 2020; Hubmer et al., 2021). In particular, long-term assets delivered exceptional returns in the last five decades (Binsbergen, 2021). Because wealthier households invest more in these assets, these exceptional returns increased private wealth inequality (Greenwald et al., 2021). But why do some households invest more in long-term assets than others?

The goal of this paper is to answer this question. To do so, we present a lifecycle model that provides theoretical foundations to the cross-section of long-term asset holdings. Long-term assets are a desirable hedge for those who are reliant on the rate of return on private savings, because they generate large capital gains when rates fall. These gains compensate for the deterioration of investment opportunities. We show that there are predictable differences in the dependence of households on private savings that drives certain types of people to be more heavily invested in long-duration assets.

Households need to hedge against declining interest rates to the extent that their lifetime consumption depends on the rate of return on private savings. This is less true for three classes of households. First, older households who have shorter investment horizons, making rate decreases less meaningful in the presence of fewer periods of compounding. Second, younger households who are already implicitly invested in a long-duration asset through their own human capital. Third, low earners whose primary savings vehicle is Social Security, because the rate of return on Social Security contributions is not impacted by changes in interest rates. These predictions are consistent with the cross-sectional relationships we document between wealth, age, earnings, and households’ propensity to invest in long-term
assets in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).

Overall, 40% of the long-run variation in U.S. wealth inequality since the 1960s can be explained by these differences in portfolio choices that lead middle-aged, higher-earning households to be more heavily tilted toward longer-duration assets. In the presence of a long-run decline in interest rates, these differences drive up private wealth inequality; in the presence of a long-run rise in interest rates, the same phenomenon drives wealth inequality down.

Our primary contribution is to build a life-cycle model with uninsurable income risk, a Social Security system, bequests, differences in life expectancy, and stochastic interest rates. Households can choose how sensitive their wealth is to changes in interest rates by mixing two assets: a short- and a long-term bond. The finitely lived agents change their portfolio choices as they age; and the presence of human capital (itself a long-term asset) and Social Security give heterogeneous households different incentives to protect against interest-rate risk.

We then use an overlapping generations (OLG) version of our model to study the implications for the dynamics of wealth inequality. Heterogeneity in sensitivity to interest-rate changes drives a significant portion of historical trends in private wealth inequality because top wealth shares rise (fall) when rates fall (rise). However, we also show that, in our model, differences in households’ exposure to interest rates within an age cohort vanish when we extend the concept of wealth to include Social Security and human capital. Said another way, the hedging motive that drives households to invest in long-term assets is less pronounced for households who already implicitly hold long-term assets through human capital and those who depend primarily on Social Security, which is not exposed to interest-rate risk.

The design of Social Security magnifies these differences. Low earners have higher Social Security replacement rates than high earners, and thus do not rely as much on private savings. This reduces their need to hedge interest-rate risk by
holding long-term assets. Above and beyond the age effect, this steepens the relationship between wealth and earnings and rate sensitivity. That is why the increase in private wealth inequality is significantly attenuated by the inclusion of Social Security in the measure of wealth (Catherine et al., 2020).

It seems plausible that households approach portfolio choices in a way that is consistent with our theoretical model. Households can eliminate interest-rate risk by building a portfolio of zero-coupon assets that replicates the difference between their consumption plan and future income over their life-cycle. This removes uncertainty regarding the cost of transferring resources across time.

In reality, households do not invest in zero-coupon assets. Instead, they hedge interest-rate risk as follows. At the bottom of the earnings distribution, Social Security protects workers from interest-rate fluctuations directly because benefits are independent of rates. Lower-middle-class households complement Social Security by buying a house. In doing so, they buy a stream of future residential consumption at the current spot price. The most common financing mechanism, a fixed-rate mortgage (Moench et al., 2010), has the benefit of guaranteeing the consumption value derived from future savings (mortgage payments). Because they face very low replacement rates, higher earners rely more on private savings: retirement accounts invested in the stock market. Since stocks are a high-duration asset, they protect retirement consumption because their market value goes up when rates fall.

The differences in hedging behavior relate to observed differences in private wealth inequality, which in the U.S. fell from the 1960s to the 1980s and has steadily risen since, while real short-term rates have followed the opposite trend. Using the historical time series of real interest rates, our OLG model can explain 40% of the decline in the top 10% wealth share between 1960 and 1985 and of its subsequent rise between 1985 and 2019.

Our paper extends past literature by providing a theoretical foundation for an
important driver of portfolio-return heterogeneity. The importance of this work is highlighted by Moll (2021) who argues that explaining the portfolio choices that generate heterogeneous returns is first order. Benhabib et al. (2019), Hubmer et al. (2021) and Fagereng et al. (2021) have empirically documented that the higher returns of the wealthy are essential for explaining wealth inequality and its evolution. We provide an explanation for this heterogeneity: wealthier households are more likely to invest in long-term assets.

By doing so, we complement a recent strand of the literature that studies why wealthy households invest more in the stock market. This fact can be explained by decreasing relative risk aversion (Meeuwis, 2022), the crowding-out effect of housing (Cioffi, 2021), or the exposure of less wealthy households to counter-cyclical consumption risk (Catherine, 2021; Catherine et al., 2021). Unlike these studies, we focus our attention on the trade-off between short- and long-term assets, because stocks have not outperformed government bonds of similar duration over the last four decades (Binsbergen, 2021).

Auclert (2019) argues that falling rates redistribute wealth towards investors holding long-term assets; Greenwald et al. (2021) show that, empirically, these investors tend to be wealthier. We complement these papers by providing micro-foundations to the cross-section of households’ propensity to invest in long-term assets. Kumhof et al. (2015) and Mian et al. (2021) suggest the reverse causal relationship: wealth inequality caused interest rates to decline because the rich have higher savings rates. Even if this is the case, the driver of the decline in interest rates is not relevant to our underlying contribution: as the interest rate environment shifts, differences in portfolio choice between households mechanically lead to marked changes in private wealth inequality.

We also contribute to a longstanding literature on household portfolio choices. This literature has almost entirely studied how households allocate wealth between
the stock market portfolio and a riskfree government bond.\footnote{The canonical model for this decision is provided by Merton (1969). More recent work has examined this classic portfolio problem in the presence of labor-income risk (Benzoni et al., 2007; Catherine, 2021; Cocco et al., 2005; Viceira, 2001) and housing (Cocco, 2005).} Few of these articles examine interest-rate exposure directly. The exception is Campbell and Viceira (2001), who study a choice between a short- and a long-term zero-coupon bond. They show that the desire to hedge rate fluctuations can increase the demand for long-term bonds; however, their model does not account for the effects of the life-cycle or the substitution effects from human capital and Social Security. We show that these effects are essential to explaining the data.

\section{Stylized facts}

This section presents four stylized facts: 1) interest-rate sensitivity is hump-shaped over the life-cycle, 2) high earners hold assets with higher interest-rate sensitivity, 3) interest-rate sensitivity is increasing in wealth, and 4) the time series of wealth inequality follows the decline in interest rates.

\subsection{Measuring interest-rate sensitivity}

\textbf{Duration} To understand interest-rate sensitivity in the cross-section of households, we use data from the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances on household portfolios, income, and wealth to estimate cash-flow duration — the value-weighted timing of cash flows from wealth — for each household wealth portfolio. Duration is a useful proxy for rate sensitivity, since it is equal to the price elasticity with respect to interest rates when shocks to interest rates are permanent.

We adopt different methods to compute the cash-flow durations of assets and liabilities. For assets, we combine estimates from Greenwald et al. (2021) — who...
provide duration estimates for aggregate real estate, equity, and liquid assets — with data on Macaulay duration from Bloomberg for government debt, municipal bonds, mortgage-backed securities, foreign bonds, and corporate bonds.

The exception to this methodology is private-business and vehicle duration, which we determine using additional information provided in the SCF. The duration of private business wealth is estimated from the aggregate private business price-dividend ratio. This ratio is computed by dividing the aggregate business value provided in the SCF by the aggregate income from private businesses less wages for entrepreneurs receiving a wage from their business and less predicted wages for entrepreneurs not reporting a wage. This procedure yields an average private-business duration of 36.5 years. The duration of vehicles is determined using the age of the car, assuming constant depreciation and a maximum life of the vehicle, which we linearly interpolate between 8 years in 1989 up to 12 years in 2019.

To account for the possibility that households of different ages and wealth may hold equity and private business assets of differing duration, we adjust the aggregate duration estimates for these asset classes using valuation ratios implied by the SCF. For publicly traded equity, we compute the SCF-implied price-dividend ratio for networth deciles within the age groups of 20–40, 40–60, and 60+, and use them to adjust aggregate duration. For private businesses, we employ a similar procedure using the price-total-income ratio for networth centiles within each 20-year age group to adjust aggregate duration. Both procedures are outlined in detail in Appendix A.2.

For liabilities, we assume a fixed repayment schedule and estimate duration as

\[ \text{dur}(\text{Debt}) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \frac{e^{-ny_n}}{\sum_{n'=1}^{N} e^{-ny_{n'}}} \right) y_n, \]  

(1)

where \( N \) is the number of years remaining on the loan, provided in the SCF; and
$y_{nt}$ is the riskfree spot rate at horizon $n$ in year $t$ which we obtain from the nominal yield curve from the Fed less SSA inflation projections. In the case in which the remaining years on the loan are not given, we use data on the loan balance, current rate of interest, the original maturity of the loan, and current payments, as detailed in Appendix A.2. Under this procedure, mortgages have an average duration of 9 years, and vehicle and other loans have an average duration of approximately 2 years.

**Link between duration and interest-rate sensitivity** Cash-flow duration is only equivalent to interest-rate sensitivity when shocks to interest rates are permanent. If instead interest rates follow an AR(1) process with persistence $\varphi$, as we will assume, then rate sensitivity will be lower than duration. Motivated by the mathematical results that follow, we assume that an asset’s interest-rate elasticity is the following concave transformation of its cash-flow duration:

$$\hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Asset}, r_f) = \frac{1 - \varphi^{\text{dur(Asset)}}}{1 - \varphi}$$

(2)

This assumes that the interest-rate sensitivity of the asset is the same as the interest-rate sensitivity of a riskfree zero-coupon bond with the same duration.\textsuperscript{2}

After applying the adjustment to each asset, we compute the interest rate sensitivity of the wealth-portfolio for household $i$ as the value-weighted sum of each component elasticity:

$$\hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Wealth}_i, r_f) = \sum_j \frac{\text{Asset}_{ji}}{|\text{Wealth}_i|} \times \hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Asset}_{ji}, r_f),$$

(3)

\textsuperscript{2}This is a simplifying assumption. The rate sensitivity of an asset may not equal that of an equal-duration bond because, when interest rates follow an AR(1), the timing of the cash flows also matters for the interest-rate sensitivity.
where \( \text{Asset}_{ji} \) denotes the value of the asset or debt, \( \text{Wealth}_i \) denotes the value of all assets the household holds less debts, and \( \hat{\varepsilon}(\cdot, r_f) \) is the estimated interest-rate elasticity of that asset or debt.

**Interest-rate dynamics** We assume that the riskfree rate follows a first-order autoregression given by

\[
r_{f,t+1} = (1 - \varphi)\bar{r}_f + \varphi r_{f,t} + \sigma_r \epsilon_{r,t+1}.
\] (4)

Given this, we calibrate the stationary mean, persistence, and volatility to match moments of the real yield curve, computed by subtracting inflation projections from the SSA annual reports from the nominal yield curve from the Federal Reserve.\(^3\)

In particular, over our sample period of 1989–2019, we target 1) the slope on a regression of the 30-year real forward rate \((f_{30})\) on the current one-year real yield, 2) the average 30-year real forward rate, and 3) the unconditional volatility of the one-year real yield. These three moments provide an exactly identified system that defines each parameter in terms of data moments that can be estimated using a method of moments counterpart. The data moments we use for this procedure, their model counterparts, and the parameter values we obtain are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment condition</th>
<th>Data moment</th>
<th>Model equiv.</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{cov}(f_{30,t}, r_{ft})/\text{var}(r_{ft}) )</td>
<td>( \varphi^{30} )</td>
<td>0.2569</td>
<td>( \varphi )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{f}_{30,t} )</td>
<td>( \bar{r}_f )</td>
<td>0.0193</td>
<td>( \bar{r}_f )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{var}(r_{ft}) )</td>
<td>( \sigma_r^2/(1 - \varphi^2) )</td>
<td>0.0167</td>
<td>( \sigma_r )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\)Data on the nominal yield curve can be found [here](https://ssrn.com/abstract=4117856), who provide estimates of the zero-coupon yield curve using off-the-run Treasury coupon securities for horizons up to 30 years.
The reason we calibrate to the yield curve, as opposed to the time series of short-term real rates, is that the yield curve captures the expectations investors have over future interest rates. As such, matching the yield curve is more important for obtaining realistic asset price levels and capital gains for rate-sensitive assets.

To obtain a time series of short-term real interest rates, we use a methodology similar to that of Beeler and Campbell (2012) on the 10-year nominal Treasury bond yield and annual inflation, also described in detail in Appendix A.3. We use this methodology for two main reasons. First, by using long-term rates to back out short-term rates, we smooth much of the variation in measured short-term real rates that are potentially outside of our model. Second, this methodology allows us to extend our real rate series further into the past, allowing for a longer simulation prior to our period of interest.

2.2 Interest-rate sensitivity is hump-shaped over the life-cycle

The first stylized fact is that the rate sensitivity of household wealth portfolios is hump-shaped over the life-cycle: it is lowest for 20-year-olds, rises to a high for 40- to 45-year-olds, then steadily declines thereafter. Figure 1 decomposes this pattern clearly, showing the relative contribution of each asset to the total portfolio rate sensitivity. The difference in portfolio interest-rate sensitivities at each age is determined by the assets households choose to hold. For example, 20- to 25-year-old households have relatively low interest-rate sensitivity because the majority of their wealth (70.4%) is invested in liquid accounts (e.g., checking and savings accounts) and vehicles. Their holdings of highly rate-sensitive assets like publicly-traded stocks and home equity are substantially smaller than they will be later in the life, comprising only 17.3% of the portfolio. Leverage also has a minor role at this age.

As households approach midlife, the composition of assets changes and the
Figure 1: Interest-rate sensitivity of wealth by age

A. First earnings tercile  B. Second earnings tercile  C. Third earnings tercile

Liquid assets and fixed income  +Vehicles  +Home leverage effect  +Equity and private business  +Other debt = wealth

Note: This figure reports the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth by age and tercile of earnings. The rate sensitivity is decomposed into the contribution of six components of wealth. From bottom to top, we calculate the sensitivity of partial portfolios, adding components step-by-step. First, we report the interest-rate sensitivity of liquid assets and fixed-income assets. We then report the rate sensitivity of a larger portfolio that also include vehicles, and so forth. Thus, the interest-rate sensitivity of the partial portfolio inclusive of the first $k$ components of wealth is:

$$
\hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Portfolio}_k, r_f) = \frac{\text{Portfolio}_{k-1}}{\text{Portfolio}_k} \hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Portfolio}_{k-1}, r_f) + \frac{\text{Component}_k}{\text{Portfolio}_k} \hat{\varepsilon}(\text{Component}_k, r_f).
$$

interest-rate sensitivity of the portfolio grows. Shorter-term liquid assets and vehicles contribute roughly the same to interest-rate sensitivity as they do for the young, but now, the majority of the portfolio (48.7% for 40-year-olds) is made up of longer-term assets like equity and real estate. Moreover, leverage — in particular, mortgages and other debts — plays a more important role, increasing the rate sensitivity of the wealth portfolio by nearly 20%. The reason leverage increases the rate exposure of the household’s portfolio is because the average rate sensitivity of assets is nearly double that of debts over our sample. The net position, therefore, has a higher interest-rate sensitivity.
As middle age turns to retirement, the rate sensitivity of household portfolios begins to fall. The decline in rate exposure is driven not by the asset side of the portfolio, but rather by the disappearance of leverage, which reduces the interest-rate sensitivity of the wealth portfolio. This is consistent with the conventional narrative in saving for retirement: households with a large stock of human capital take on mortgages in early adulthood to guarantee housing consumption flows in old age. We discuss this intuition at length in Section 4.

2.3 Interest-rate sensitivity is increasing in earnings

The second stylized fact is that high-earning households hold more rate-sensitivity portfolios, on average, as seen by comparing the three panels of Figure 1. The three panels show that, for a 1 percent decline in interest rates, the top earnings tercile will see approximately 4 percent larger capital gains than those of the bottom earnings tercile. In the model presented below, earnings are the primary source of heterogeneity within a cohort, with higher-income households holding higher interest rate sensitivity portfolios. In practice, the main difference between the bottom tercile (Panel A) and the middle tercile (Panel B) is in home equity, while the difference in interest rate sensitivity among the top tercile (Panel C) is due to differences in equity holdings. Section 4 explains the causes of these differences.

2.4 Interest-rate sensitivity is increasing in wealth

The third stylized fact is that interest-rate sensitivity is generally increasing in wealth. This fact is shown in Figure 2, which decomposes the average rate sensitivity for households between ages 40 and 45 over the log of wealth scaled by the Social Security Wage Index in the survey year. For low-wealth households, the assets that contribute to interest-rate sensitivity are short-term assets like liquid...
Figure 2: Interest-rate sensitivity at ages 40–45 by level of wealth

Note: This figure decomposes the interest-rate sensitivity for households in which the head of the household is between 40 and 45. The methodology is the same as in Figure 1, except that here the x-axis is the log of wealth scaled by the Social Security Wage Index in the survey year.

accounts and vehicles, with non-mortgage debt positions playing the largest role. For middle-wealth households, real estate becomes the dominant asset, with its rate sensitivity amplified by the mortgage taken on to finance the purchase. There is a small bump for lower-middle-wealth households, which we later argue arises from the indivisibility of housing, a financial friction. As wealth increases, portfolio rate exposures increase with larger positions in highly rate-sensitive assets like publicly traded equity and private businesses.

2.5 Wealth inequality follow interest rates

The fourth and final stylized fact is that, over the last six decades, the wealth share of the top 10% of the wealth distribution has closely tracked the price of a one-year
Figure 3: Wealth inequality and estimated 10-year real forward rates

Note: This figure presents the time series of the top 10% wealth share from the World Inequality Database and $1 - \hat{f}_{10,t}$, one minus our estimated 10-year real forward rate from Equation (A.3).

bond. Figure 3 plots $1 - \hat{f}_{10,t}$, the implicit price of the 10-year forward. We use 10-year real forward rates $\hat{f}_{10}$ here because they represent expectations of where interest rates will be, and so contain information about the persistent component of the interest rate. One potential mechanism that would tie these two series together — discussed in detail in Greenwald et al. (2021) — is that the positive relationship between wealth and interest rate sensitivity led wealthier individuals to have higher capital gains from declines in interest rates.
3 Model

We model household consumption and investment decisions over a life-cycle which can be divided into two stages: working age and retirement.

3.1 Agents

Agent $i$ chooses consumption $C_i$ and portfolio allocation $\pi_i$ to maximize lifetime utility

$$V_{it} = \max_{\{C_{is}, \pi_{is}\}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{t_{\text{max}}} \beta^{s-t} \left[ (1 - m_{is}) \frac{C_{is}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + m_{is} b(W_{is}, r_{f}) \right]. \quad (5)$$

where $\beta$ is the rate of time preference, $\gamma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, $t_{\text{max}}$ is the maximum lifespan, $m_{is}$ is the age- and income-dependent mortality probability, and $b$ is the bequest motive over terminal wealth $W$ and the interest rate $r_f$.

While working-aged, the agent receives labor income $L_i$ and pays Social Security taxes $T_i$; in retirement, which begins at a given time $t_{\text{ret}}$, he or she receives benefits $B_i$. The utility maximization is therefore subject to the budget constraint for wealth

$$W_{i,t+1} = (W_{it} + L_{it} + B_{it} - T_{it} - C_{it}) R_{W,it+1}, \quad (6)$$

with gross return on savings

$$R_{W,it+1} = R_{ft} + \pi_{it} (R_{n,t+1} - R_{ft}). \quad (7)$$

In this expression, $R_{ft}$ is the return on a riskfree bond, $R_{n}$ is the return on the long-term asset, and $\pi_{it}$ the share of wealth invested in this asset.
3.2 Interest rates and wealth returns

Rates of return on assets vary over time; we thus model stochastic processes for the short- and long-term bond returns and constrain their joint dynamics using equilibrium pricing conditions. Denote log returns by lowercase $r = \log R$. The risk-free interest rate follows a first-order autoregression, as shown in equation (4). We model the long-term asset as a claim to one unit of consumption in $n$ periods. Its payoff is riskless in real terms. Its price, denoted $P_n$, satisfies the expectations hypothesis, generalized to include constant term premia. We assume that the term premium on each $n$-period bond is some constant $\mu_n$ (with $\mu_1 = 0$). As we show in Appendix B.2, these assumptions imply an explicit relation between the dynamics of long-term bond returns and short-term rate fluctuations: the log bond return equals

$$r_{n,t+1} = r_{ft} + \mu_n - \sigma_n \epsilon_{r,t+1}.$$  

(8)

We set $\mu_n = -\sigma_n^2 / 2$, so that there is no risk premium. This is because we are interested in the effect of rate fluctuations, not the additional risk compensation for holding long-term government debt. The sensitivity to rate shocks is

$$\sigma_n = \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} \sigma_r.$$  

(9)

It is straightforward to show that the rate elasticity of the long-term bond price is

$$\varepsilon(P_{nt}, r_{ft}) = -\frac{\partial \log P_{nt}}{\partial r_{ft}} = \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} = \frac{\sigma_n}{\sigma_r}.$$  

(10)

This sensitivity is increasing in maturity $n$. We see immediately the effect of unexpected changes in interest rates: if the risk-free rate unexpectedly falls, then the long-term bond has an unexpectedly high return from capital gains. The longer is
the maturity \( n \), the larger is this response. These return processes, together with the agent’s portfolio allocation \( \pi_i \), give us the return on wealth from (7).

### 3.3 Labor income

We model labor-income dynamics using the empirically realistic process estimated by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan and Song (2022). Each agent’s income \( L_i \) is the product of the aggregate wage index \( L_1 \) and an idiosyncratic component

\[
L_{2, it} = (1 - \nu_{it}) \exp \{g(t) + \zeta_{i0} + z_{it} + \epsilon_{it}\},
\]

(11)

The deterministic component \( g(t) \) is a quadratic polynomial of age; it captures common life-cycle patterns in income. The parameter \( \zeta_{i0} \) governs heterogeneous levels of earnings. The persistent component of earnings, denoted by \( z_{it} \), follows a first-order autoregression

\[
z_{it} = \rho z_{i,t-1} + \eta_{it},
\]

(12)

with innovations \( \eta_{it} \) drawn from a mixture of normal distributions

\[
\eta_{it} \sim \begin{cases} 
\mathcal{N}(\mu_{\eta1}, \sigma_{\eta1}^2) & \text{with probability } p_z, \\
\mathcal{N}(\mu_{\eta2}, \sigma_{\eta2}^2) & \text{with probability } 1 - p_z.
\end{cases}
\]

(13)

The initial cross-sectional distribution of the persistent component of earnings is given by \( z_{i0} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{z0}^2) \). The transitory component of idiosyncratic earnings \( \epsilon_{it} \) is also drawn from a mixture of normal distributions

\[
\epsilon_{it} \sim \begin{cases} 
\mathcal{N}(\mu_{\epsilon1}, \sigma_{\epsilon1}^2) & \text{with probability } p_{\epsilon}, \\
\mathcal{N}(\mu_{\epsilon2}, \sigma_{\epsilon2}^2) & \text{with probability } 1 - p_{\epsilon}.
\end{cases}
\]

(14)
These mixture processes serve to match higher-order moments of income growth. Finally, agents’ labor income is subject to risk of non-employment, yielding percentage loss

\[ \nu_{it} \sim \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p_{\nu}(t, z_{it}), \\
\min\{1, \text{Exp}(\lambda)\} & \text{with probability } p_{\nu}(t, z_{it}).
\end{cases} \]  

(15)

This variable accounts for the time span of non-employment spells: conditional on such a shock, the agent remains unemployed for a length of time determined by the exponential distribution Exp(\lambda). The non-employment state occurs with probability

\[ p_{\nu}(t, z_{it}) = \frac{e^{\xi_{it}}}{1 + e^{\xi_{it}}}, \quad \text{where } \xi_{it} = a + bt + cz_{it} + dz_{it}t, \]  

(16)
a function of age and the persistent income component \( z_i \).

### 3.4 Social Security

Agents pay Social Security payroll taxes \( T_i \) on their labor income during working life, then receive benefits \( B_i \) in retirement. We assume all workers retire at the full-retirement age \( t_{ret} \) which is the age at which they receive 100% of their scheduled benefits. The tax payments are 10.6% of all income below the Social Security wage base, which is 2.5 times the average wage:

\[ T_{it} = 0.106 \min\{L_{it}, 2.5L_{1,t}\}. \]  

(17)

\(^4\)The time span of non-employment must of course be bounded above by 1, i.e., a full year of non-employment.
Social Security retirement benefits depend on the agent’s average indexed yearly earnings (AIYE), which is an average of the highest 35 years of indexed earnings

\[
L_{it}^{\text{indexed}} = \min\{L_{it}, 2.5L_{1,t}\} \frac{L_{1,60}}{L_{1,t}}
\] (18)

up to retirement. In words, indexed earnings are the income below the wage base at a given age, adjusted for growth in the aggregate wage index \(L_1\) up to age 60. Total benefits are then a piecewise-linear function of the AIYE:

\[
B_{it} = \begin{cases} 
0.9\text{AIYE}_{i60} & \text{if } \text{AIYE}_{i60} < b_1, \\
0.9b_1 + 0.32(\text{AIYE}_{i60} - b_1) & \text{if } b_1 \leq \text{AIYE}_{i60} < b_2, \\
0.9b_1 + 0.32(b_2 - b_1) + 0.15(\text{AIYE}_{i60} - b_2) & \text{if } b_2 \leq \text{AIYE}_{i60}.
\end{cases}
\] (19)

The kinks in this benefit formula are determined by the “bend points” \(b_1\) and \(b_2\), which historically are about 21% and 125% of the wage index, respectively. The formula is progressive: as AIYE (lifetime income) increases, the marginal benefit declines. Note that AIYE is itself bounded above due to the wage base, so benefits have an upper bound. Benefits after the retirement year are held constant in real terms — that is, they are adjusted in nominal terms to account for CPI inflation. Before retirement, we keep track of average index earnings as:

\[
\text{AIYE}_{it} = \sum_{s=t_0}^{t} \min\{L_{is}, 2.5L_{1,s}\} \frac{L_{1,t}}{L_{1,s}} = L_{1,t} \sum_{s=t_0}^{t} \min\{L_{2,is}, 2.5\}.
\] (20)

### 3.5 Income taxes

Households pay taxes on income and benefits according to the income tax brackets faced by U.S. households in 2020, adjusted for changes in the aggregate wage index. Marginal tax rates are progressively increasing in idiosyncratic income \(L_{2,i}\); we
report the formula for these rates in Appendix B.1.

3.6 Bequests

Individuals bequeath to their children an inheritance from their terminal financial wealth. In modeling utility over bequests, one must consider the fact that inheritance does not necessarily constitute a one-time transfer of liquid wealth; it might instead be a long-lived flow of consumption, such as from real estate. Hence, we model the bequest motive as a function of an annuity flow \( \bar{C}_i \) which takes into account both the value of financial wealth and the time value of money. Specifically, we assume

\[
\bar{b}(W_{it}, r_{ft}) = \bar{b} \cdot \frac{\bar{C}_i^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},
\]

where \( \bar{b} \) can be interpreted as the number of years of consumption that the agent wants to bequeath, and \( \bar{C}_i \) is the coupon implicit in the annuity of \( \bar{b} \) years:

\[
W_{it} = \bar{C}_i \sum_{k=0}^{\bar{b}} P_{kt}.
\]

4 Economic intuition

To communicate the first-order intuition of our model, we first present an analytical solution to a linearized version with no idiosyncratic income risk or bequests.\(^5\)

\(^5\)See Appendix C for derivations and further discussion.
4.1 Optimal choices without labor income

Without labor income, the linearized model implies the optimal consumption policy

\[
\frac{C^*_t}{W_{it}} = (1 - \beta(1 - m_{it})) \times \exp \left\{ \left(1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}\right) (\varphi_0 + \varphi_r r_{ft}) \right\}. \tag{23}
\]

The first term represents the positive effect of impatience and mortality on consumption. The second term represents the net effect of the income and substitution effects from interest rates. Higher rates mean higher interest income, so that households can consume more today (the income effect). At the same time, higher rates mean agents get more consumption tomorrow in exchange for their savings (the substitution effect). The income effect dominates the substitution effect when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the EIS, 1/\gamma) is less than one (\gamma > 1). The sensitivity of consumption to interest rates depends on the coefficient \varphi_r, which is positive and declining in age.\footnote{We use the shorthand notation \varphi_0 and \varphi_r for \varphi_0(\{m_{ist}\}_{s \geq t}) and \varphi_r(\{m_{ist}\}_{s \geq t}), respectively. Both quantities approach zero as m_{it} \to 1: agents approaching the end of life consume everything.} Because they depend less on future rates of return, older households’ consumption reacts less to changes in interest rates.

The optimal allocation to the \(n\)-period bond is\footnote{As we verify in Appendix C.2, this solution holds true even if we separate the coefficient of relative risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Thus, the portfolio share is indeed governed by risk aversion, and not the EIS.}

\[
\pi^*_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\mu_n + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_n^2}{\sigma_n^2} \right) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}\right) \varphi_r \left( \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} \right)^{-1}. \tag{24}
\]

The first term represents the traditional risk-return tradeoff of Merton (1969). The second term is the demand from intertemporal hedging of interest-rate fluctuations, the focus of our paper. Because its value increases when rates unexpectedly decline,
the long-term bond offers protection against the deterioration of investment opportunities. The sensitivity of consumption to rate shocks declines with the investor’s horizon, so the hedging demand decreases in age toward zero with the coefficient \( \varrho_{rt} \). Therefore, absent labor income and Social Security, the rate exposure of households’ portfolios should decline over the lifecycle.

### 4.2 Adding labor income and Social Security

Now let us consider the effect of labor income and Social Security. Suppose that labor income \( L_i \), taxes \( T_i \), and benefits \( B_i \) are deterministic. The values of human capital \( H_{it} \) and Social Security wealth \( S_{it} \) are

\[
H_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{t_{ret} - t} \left[ \prod_{s=1}^{k} (1 - m_{i,t+s}) \right] P_{kt} L_{i,t+k},
\]

and

\[
S_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{t_{max}} \left[ \prod_{s=1}^{k} (1 - m_{i,t+s}) \right] P_{kt} (B_{i,t+k} - T_{i,t+k}),
\]

where \( \prod_{s=1}^{k} (1 - m_{i,t+s}) \) is the cumulative probability of surviving from \( t \) to \( t + k \) and \( P_{kt} \) is the price of a \( k \)-maturity zero-coupon bond. Define total wealth \( W_i \) as the sum of wealth \( W_i \) and these present values.

Implementing the same linearization implies the consumption rule relative to total wealth is the same as in the no-income solution: \( C_i / W_i \) equals the right-hand side of (23). Similarly, the optimal allocation to bonds out of total wealth is \( \bar{\pi}_i = \pi_i^* \) from (24). The optimal allocation out of financial wealth \( W \) then takes the form

\[
\pi_{it} = \pi_{it}^* + \left( \pi_{it}^* - \pi_{it}^H \right) \frac{H_{it}}{W_{it}} + \left( \pi_{it}^* - \pi_{it}^S \right) \frac{S_{it}}{W_{it}}.
\]

The endowments of human capital and Social Security wealth are implicit holdings...
of long-term assets, and thus substitutes for the traded $n$-period bond. The values $\pi_i^H$ and $\pi_i^S$ represent the implicit percentage of each asset invested in the $n$-period bond. The agent adjusts the allocation to wealth $\pi_i$ such that the duration of total wealth matches $\pi_i^*$. 

**Figure 4: Effect of labor income and Social Security on long-term asset share**

![Graphs showing the effect of labor income and Social Security on long-term asset share](image)

*Note:* This figure shows a representative path of total wealth components, their duration, and their effect on wealth allocations over the life-cycle. Panel A plots the average values of each component of total wealth, defined as the sum of wealth and the present values of labor income (human capital) and Social Security taxes and benefits. Panel B shows the implicit share of each component in the $n$-period bond. Panel C illustrates the incremental effect of each component on the financial-wealth allocation to the long-term bond.

Figure 4 illustrates the life-cycle pattern generated by this model. Early in life, most agents have little financial wealth and a large endowment of high-duration human capital. To match their ideal total-wealth rate exposure, they hold mostly short-term bonds. As households get closer to retirement, they increase holdings of the long-term asset to offset short-term labor income and taxes, net of long-term benefits. As they progress through retirement, households reduce long-term bond holdings, in line with the declining target allocation implied by the policies above. In sum, substitution and aging effects explain the hump-shaped pattern in the data.
Figure 5: Wealth-duration relation with income and Social Security

A. No Social Security

B. With Social Security

C. Duration-Wealth relationship

Note: This figure illustrates the effect of Social Security on intra-cohort allocations to the long-term asset. Panel A plots the optimal long-term bond share as a function of the ratio of wealth $W$ to human capital $H$ when there is no Social Security. The round marker represents the ratio $W/H$ observed in the data. Panel B shows the same relation but in the presence of Social Security. In Panel C, we re-plot the points in Panels A and B in terms of wealth only.

In addition to these effects, the progressivity of Social Security implies that households with lower earnings will hold less rate-sensitive portfolios, even after controlling for wealth and income. Figure 5 illustrates this prediction. Without Social Security, wealth-income ratios and portfolio allocations within a cohort show little variation. But because Social Security yields higher replacement rates for low-earning households, it has a larger effect on their portfolios. This arises out of two compounding effects. First, fixing wealth-income ratios, low earners have more Social Security per dollar of income, which they offset by decreasing financial-wealth duration. Second, the comparatively large endowment of Social Security reduces the savings rates of low earners, reducing their wealth-income ratios. As the third panel of the figure shows, these effects combine to generate a steep positive relation between wealth and duration, just as in the data.
4.3 Targeting consumption duration

These optimal policies ultimately imply that agents choose assets to hedge interest-rate risk and finance a smooth consumption plan. When we add intertemporal income, agents simply adjust this trading strategy to target a consumption plan of the same shape — that is, with the same duration. In our framework, agents achieve this by buying and selling zero-coupon bonds with payoffs arriving at approximately the same time as the desired consumption flows.

We can illustrate this intuition most clearly in the limiting case of an infinitely risk-averse investor.\footnote{See Appendix C.4 for a derivation and more detailed technical discussion of this case.} In this case, the investor’s desire to smooth consumption over time yields a constant, deterministic policy $C_{it} = \bar{C}_i$. Let $Y_i$ denote the agent’s deterministic stream of income. Financial wealth is the present value of the excess consumption plan:

$$W_{it} = \max_{t} \sum_{k=1}^{t} P_{kt} (\bar{C}_i - Y_{i,t+k}).$$

(28)

The agent can secure the optimal consumption plan by buying $\bar{C}_i - Y_{i,t+k}$ of each $k$-period zero-coupon bond and consuming the coupons and income at maturity. The strategy is unaffected by capital gains and losses from interest-rate changes. As we prove in the Appendix, the optimal allocation $\pi_i$ replicates exactly this buy-and-hold strategy in the limit as $\gamma \to \infty$.

This result may seem abstract, but its intuition in the real world (Figure 1) is stark. Consider a young investor with little financial wealth and a large stock of human capital. For most of his working life, the agent earns more than he consumes. To smooth this income over the lifecycle, he saves at a high rate and composes a long-term portfolio. We see individuals doing this in the data. Young workers purchase housing for its steady stream of lifetime consumption, but because their...
implicit endowment of human capital is so large, they lever this position with a mortgage. The purpose of the mortgage is not only to finance the large expenditure; its interest payments also serve to offset the high stream of near-term income and defer consumption flows to retirement. Then, at retirement, agents receive constant consumption flows via housing, Social Security benefits, and income from investments made during working life (a 401(k)). After all of this duration-matching is complete, the lifecycle consumption path is relatively smooth.

4.4 Implications for wealth inequality

Recall that an individual’s financial wealth evolves according to

\[
\frac{W_{i,t+1}}{W_{it}} = \left( 1 - \frac{C_{it} - Y_{it}}{W_{it}} \right) R_{W,t+1}^i, \tag{29}
\]

where \( Y_i \) is the sum of labor income, taxes, and benefits. There are thus two channels through which the interest rate can affect inequality: consumption-wealth ratios (savings) and portfolio allocations (portfolio returns).

Without labor income and Social Security, the consumption and portfolio policies (23) and (24) are functions of age only, so that within-cohort wealth inequality is fixed at its initial condition. This is true regardless of interest-rate dynamics. Between-cohort wealth inequality, on the other hand, is affected by returns. The relative effect on savings depends on the level of the rate: older households consume more because of time discounting, but younger households consume more due to the income effect of interest rates. Low riskfree returns increase the savings rates of the young most. Portfolio returns generate inequality through differential exposure to rate shocks. Because younger households hold more wealth in the long-term bond, their wealth increases by more after an unexpected rate decline.
As we have explained, adding income creates a substitution effect even within cohorts, yielding an additional dimension to wealth-inequality dynamics. First, recall the optimal savings policy

\[ 1 - \frac{C^*_it}{W_{it}} = 1 - \left( 1 + \frac{H_{it}}{W_{it}} + \frac{S_{it}}{W_{it}} \right) \frac{cw^*_i}{w_{it}}, \]  

(30)

where \( cw^*_i \) represents the target ratio of consumption to total wealth, the right-hand-side of (23). Households with larger endowments of human capital (young households) and Social Security (low wealth-income-ratio households) save less into financial wealth. Moreover, inequality is affected by inter- and intra-cohort differences in allocations \( \pi_i \). Consider the response of inequality to an unexpected rate decline, which causes long-term bonds to appreciate. As Panel C of Figure 4 shows, middle-aged cohorts gain the most wealth. As Panel C of Figure 5 shows, high-wealth and high-income households gain the most wealth within a cohort because their financial wealth has the highest rate exposures.

5 Matching the stylized facts

5.1 Calibration

Preferences We calibrate households’ preferences to match the evolution of wealth over the life-cycle and the average interest-rate sensitivity of wealth observed in the SCF. We find that a discount factor of \( \beta = .95 \) and a bequest motive equivalent to \( \bar{b} = 10 \) years of consumption matches the growth of wealth until retirement age and its evolution afterwards. Moreover, a coefficient of relative risk aversion of \( \gamma = 6 \) matches the average rate sensitivity of wealth.

Our calibration of \( \gamma \) is consistent with studies matching the life-cycle profile of
the share of wealth invested in stocks, which typically use values between 5 and 6 (Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2007; Catherine, 2021; Lynch and Tan, 2011; Meeuwis, 2022). Based on portfolios observed in Swedish administrative data, Calvet, Campbell, Gomes and Sodini (2021) estimate an average $\gamma$ of 5.24.

**Income process** We calibrate the stochastic parameters of the labor process using estimates from Guvenen et al. (2022), which we report in appendix D.1.

**Mortality** We model mortality as a function of age and past lifetime earnings:

$$m_{it} = \min\left\{ \chi\left(\frac{\text{AIYE}_{it}}{L_{1,t}}\right) \times m(\text{age}_{it}), 1 \right\}$$

(31)

where $\chi$ is an adjustment coefficient which only depends on the average indexed earnings of the agent up to time $t$ and $m(\text{age}_{it})$ is the average mortality rate at his age which we calibrate as the average across gender from the 2017 Social Security actuarial life tables. While $\chi\left(\frac{\text{AIYE}_{it}}{L_{1,t}}\right)$ does not depend on age, the agent sees his life expectancy change as he moves up or down the wage ladder. An advantage of our method is that the agent’s life expectancy is less volatile than if it were a function of persistent income $z_{it}$. We calibrate the value of $\chi\left(\frac{\text{AIYE}_{it}}{L_{1,t}}\right)$ at each point of the numerical grid of the $\text{AIYE}_{it}/L_{1,t}$ state variable such that, given our labor-income process, we obtain the same life expectancy differential across percentiles of $\chi\left(\frac{\text{AIYE}_{it}}{L_{1,t}}\right)$ at age 40 as those reported by percentiles of earnings in Chetty et al. (2016).

### 5.2 Cross-section of interest-rate sensitivity

Figure 6 reports the evolution of wealth and its sensitivity to interest rates over the life-cycle, in the data and in the model. The left panel shows that the model matches
the evolution of wealth very well. The right panel shows that, like in the data, the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth increases over the first twenty years and declines afterwards. The increase is explained by the substitution effect of human capital and Social Security early in life. Both these assets have higher rate sensitivity than the agent’s target, thus reducing the optimal long-term asset share. Over the life-cycle, the duration of human capital declines and drops below the agent’s target, reversing the sign of the hedging demand and increasing the long-term asset share. As the weight of human capital declines with age, the magnitude of the hedging begins to fall at retirement.

During retirement, the decline in the agent’s investment horizon becomes the dominant force and reduces the need to hedge against falling interest rates. As a result, the long-term asset share falls. This decline is moderated by the bequest motive, which effectively increases the investment horizon of the agent beyond his own life expectancy.

Figure 6: Life-cycle profiles of wealth and its interest-rate sensitivity

Note: This figure reports the evolution of market wealth and its sensitivity to interest rates over the life-cycle in our benchmark calibration and in the SCF. In the data, wealth is computed per adult, including deceased spouses, and scaled by the Social Security wage index. 95% confidence intervals represent ± 1.96 standard errors, clustered by year.
Figure 7: Interest-rate sensitivity at age 40–45

Note: This figure reports the relationship between the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth and wealth (left panel) and earnings (right panel). In the data, wealth and earnings are computed per adult and scaled by the Social Security wage index. In the left panel, each bin represents a decile of earnings. In the right panel, each bin represents 5% of observations, except for the four wealthiest bins which represent 2.5% each. Simulated data report the average interest rate sensitivity per centile of wealth and earnings respectively. 95% confidence intervals represent ± 1.96 standard errors, clustered by year.

The left panel of Figure 7 reports the relationship between the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth and income between age 40 and 45. In the model, high earners invest more in the long-term asset because Social Security covers a smaller share of their retirement consumption. As shown in Figure 1, in the data, the slope is largely explained by the fact that high earners invest a larger share of their wealth in stocks, largely through pension accounts. The purpose of those accounts is to complement Social Security during retirement, which follows the logic of the model. Note that the relationship seems slightly steeper in the data than in the model. The model could generate a steeper relationship if we introduced a correlation between earnings and life expectancy.

The right panel shows that the model also produces a positive relationship between the long-term asset share and wealth within an age group. This is partly explained by the fact that wealthier households tend to be high earners and that hu-
man capital and Social Security represent smaller fractions of their total wealth, and thus have weaker substitution effects. In the data, we observe a hump around the third decile of the wealth distribution, which could also reflect the need for these households to borrow to buy houses and vehicles.

It is notably difficult for life-cycle models to match the allocation of household portfolios between stocks and short-term bonds. By contrast, our findings show that a relatively simple model can match the key cross-sectional features of the allocation of wealth between short- and long-term assets.

5.3 Wealth inequality trends

How much of the evolution of wealth inequality can our model and the historical path of interest rates explain? To answer this question, we set up an overlapping generations version of our life-cycle model. Specifically, we simulate the lives of cohorts born between 1880 and 1986 and feed the model with the historical time series of interest rates and interest-rate shocks. We provide more details on the construction of this time series in Appendix A.3. We assume that, when a household dies, its wealth is transferred to a household from a cohort that is thirty-years younger. For simplicity, we assume this transfer of wealth to be unexpected.

Our focus is on understanding the effect of changing interest rates on trends in wealth, but our model is not designed to match the level of wealth inequality. First, the wealth concentration in the top 1% of the distribution comes primarily from business income, which is omitted in our baseline model. Therefore, we focus our attention on the empirical evolution of the top 10% share within the bottom 99%. Second, within the bottom 99%, wealth inequality is not just generated by differences in earnings but also by heterogeneity in preferences and idiosyncratic returns on wealth.
For these reasons, we increase the $\sigma_\alpha$ from .472 to 1, such that the average wealth share of the top 10% over our sample period matches the top 10% share (within the bottom 99%) in the WID.

Figure 8 illustrates our results. In our historical simulation, the top 10% share falls from 53.9% in 1956 to 50% in 1984, then rises back to 54.2% in 2019. According to the WID, the top 10% (within the bottom 99%) share fell from 58.6% to 49% in 1984, then rose back to 55% in 2019. Consequently, our model can explain roughly half of the evolution in the top 10% share (within the bottom 99%) since the 1960. The top 10%, inclusive of the top 1%, fell from 70.3% in 1962 to 62.1% in 1985, then rose back to 70.7% in 2019.

Figure 8 also shows that, in the simulation, the top 10% share inclusive of Social Security has not increased since the 1989, consistent with the empirical findings of Catherine et al. (2020). From the point of view of workers, Social Security is a leveraged position in the long-term asset. First, they are required to pay contributions, which is equivalent to a short position on a medium-term bond; in exchange, they will receive pension benefits far into the future, equivalent to a long position on a very long-term bond. The consequence of this leverage is that the net present value of Social Security cash flows is highly sensitive to the yield curve.

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9We approximate this measure as (Top 10% share - Top 1% share)/(100%- Top 1% share).
6 Discussion

In this section, we discuss the quantitative implications of the model for the cross-section. We first verify that the full model captures the same economic intuition as does the linearized benchmark. The results reveal that mortality differences are not of first-order importance to the cross-section, but Social Security is. We then study the sensitivity of financial wealth, total wealth, and lifetime utility (welfare) to interest rates. While there is a great deal of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the rate sensitivity of financial wealth, there is little heterogeneity in that of total wealth or lifetime utility. Redistribution of wealth from interest-rate shocks is inconsequential for consumption and welfare.
6.1 Mechanisms

The quantitative model validates our economic intuition and allows us to study counterfactuals. Before discussing welfare implications, we analyze the importance of two novel mechanisms in our model: income-based differences in mortality rates and the presence of Social Security. Figure 9 plots quantities of interest with and without these features.

Figure 9: Effect of Social Security and differences in life expectancy

Note: This figure shows the effects of mortality differences and Social Security on life-cycle wealth accumulation and the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth in the model. In the benchmark case, mortality probabilities are constant within an age cohort and there are no Social Security taxes or benefits. Mortality differences are based on lifetime earnings (AIYE). Where relevant, wealth $W$ and income $L$ are scaled by the Social Security wage index $L_1$. 

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Morality affects the optimal interest-rate sensitivity through two channels. First, higher mortality rates reduce the value of human capital relative to financial wealth, diminishing its substitution effect. Second, higher morality reduces rate exposure because agents discount the future more. The distributional consequences of this effect are revealed by the bottom two panels of Figure 9. The income-based adjustment to mortality rates applies mostly to low-income households; the adjustment is small for households with average and high income. As a result, the optimal rate exposure falls noticeably for low earners but does not change much for other households. This means that the average life-cycle path of rate exposure, shown in the top right panel of Figure 9, tends to be lower in levels than in the benchmark without intracohort mortality differences. Perhaps surprisingly, the overall quantitative effect of mortality differences on most of the cross-section is minimal.

The effect of Social Security is more substantial. The existence of Social Security taxes and benefits leads to less accumulation of financial wealth over the life-cycle, because taxes reduce disposable income and benefits crowd out the need to save. Social Security also flattens the “hump” in rate exposure during working life but has little effect in retirement, consistent with the economic intuition discussed in Section 4. Finally, Social Security steepens the relation of rate sensitivity with wealth and income. This, too, is exactly as predicted by the analysis in Section 4.

6.2 Exposure to interest-rate shocks

So far, we have focused on explaining the interest-rate sensitivity of households’ financial wealth. We now study the rate sensitivities of two measures that are more relevant for welfare: wealth inclusive of Social Security and expected lifetime utility. We find that there is less heterogeneity in these measures (especially expected utility), suggesting that the recent rise in financial wealth inequality has not neces-
necessarily come with a rise in welfare inequality.

Recall that the rate sensitivity of financial wealth $W$ is the elasticity

$$
\varepsilon(W, r_f) = -\frac{\partial \log W}{\partial r_f}.
$$

(32)

We calculate the analogous elasticities for our other two measures. To calculate wealth inclusive of Social Security, we capitalize the expected benefits and taxes into a present value. To measure welfare, we calculate the sensitivity $\varepsilon(U, r_f)$ of a transformation of expected utility:

$$
U_{it} = \frac{((1 - \gamma)V_{it})^{1/(1-\gamma)}}{1-\gamma},
$$

(33)

where $V_{it}$ is the expected utility maximand (5). This transformation backs out a total-wealth certainty equivalent — it is the value of total wealth implied by the value function $V$ taking a power form. Because $V$ is a function of both wealth $W$ and rates $r_f$, this elasticity can be decomposed as

$$
\varepsilon(U, r_f) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left( -\frac{\partial \log((1 - \gamma)V)}{\partial r_f} + \frac{\partial \log((1 - \gamma)V)}{\partial W} \varepsilon(W, r_f) \right).
$$

(34)

When rates decline, expected utility decreases because investment opportunities are worse (the direct effect), but also increases because of capital gains in financial wealth. If $\varepsilon(U, r_f)$ is negative, as we find, then a decline in rates decreases welfare.

Figure 10 shows the average paths of these elasticities over the life-cycle. Adding Social Security wealth does not change the average elasticity very much. This is consistent with the fact that most of the hump-shaped pattern is driven by human

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\(^{10}\)The other, more mathematical reason for the transformation is that $V$ is negative, so it does not have a well-defined rate elasticity.
capital and a diminishing investment horizon. The rate sensitivity of expected utility, on the other hand, is virtually constant over the life-cycle. At all ages, households are negatively affected by lower rates as it reduces their lifetime consumption. The magnitude of this effect is slowly declining over the life-cycle as the investment horizon declines with age.

**Figure 10: Interest sensitivities over the life-cycle**

![Graph showing interest sensitivities over the life-cycle](image)

*Note:* This figure reports the interest rate sensitivity of wealth, wealth inclusive of Social Security, and expected utility over the life-cycle.

Figure 11 reports the distribution of these sensitivities within a middle-aged cohort. First, note that when the net present value of Social Security cash flows is taken into account, the wealth of the rich and of high earners is no longer more sensitive to interest rates. This explains the findings of Catherine et al. (2020) that, when Social Security is accounted for and discounted using the market yield curve, wealth inequality has not increased since 1989. While including Social Security wealth has a minimal effect on between-cohort differences (Figure 10), it has a large effect within cohorts. This is for the reasons set forth in Section 4.
Note: This figure reports the interest-rate sensitivity of wealth, excluding and including Social Security to an interest fall and the interest rate sensitivity of expected utility at age 42.

Within a cohort, expected utility is uniformly elastic to interest rates across the earnings and wealth distributions. To a large extent, this result is built into our model, as differences in portfolios mostly reflect substitution effects. Hence, in the model, household differences in the long-term asset share offset variations in the implicit weights of that asset in human capital and Social Security wealth, as predicted by equation (27).

7 Conclusion

Prior work notes that differences in returns are a key determinant in the rise in wealth inequality over the last forty years. Of particular importance to this explanation is the greater holding of long-term, highly interest-rate-sensitive assets by wealthy and high-income households, which saw greater capital gains due to the large decline in interest rates seen over the same period. This paper shows that a parsimonious life-cycle model with uninsurable income risk, a realistic Social Security system, and stochastic interest rates can generate the patterns of portfolio

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interest rate sensitivity observed in the cross section and makes concrete the relationship between the rise in wealth inequality and the decline in interest rates.

These results also pave the way for future research. The model above misses along some key dimensions, namely underestimating the interest rate sensitivity of the middle class, much of which is due to the long duration of home equity. Alternative models may be able to capture this by focusing on the indivisibility of housing or explicitly modeling the consumption of housing services, both of which are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, future work may seek to embed the trade-off households face between investing in long- and short-term assets and how this interacts with the policy environment, to better understand monetary and fiscal policies and their implications for inequality.

References


A.1 Survey of Consumer Finances

Data on household portfolios come from the Survey of Consumer finances. We construct networth as:

\[
\text{networth}_d = \text{cash}_\text{dep} + \text{equity} + \text{fixed}_\text{inc} + \text{real}_\text{estate} \\
+ \text{bus} + \text{vehic} - \text{mortgage}_\text{dbt} - \text{vehic}_\text{dbt} - \text{other}_\text{dbt},
\]

where each of the constituent variables are defined as:

- \text{cash}_\text{dep}: value of cash deposits defined as liquid accounts (liq) which are the sum of all checking, savings, and money market accounts, call accounts at brokerages, and prepaid cards, added to certificates of deposit (cds).

- \text{equity}: value of all financial assets invested in stock, which include directly held stock, stock mutual funds, and the portion of any combination mutual funds, annuities, trusts, IRA/Keogh accounts, and other retirement accounts invested in stock.

- \text{fixed}_\text{inc}: value of all other remaining financial assets (\text{fixed}_\text{inc} = \text{fin} - \text{cash}_\text{dep} - \text{equity}). The largest component of this asset category is bonds held outright, in mutual funds, and in retirement accounts.

- \text{real}_\text{estate}: value of the primary residence (\text{houses}) plus the value of other residential real estate (\text{oresre}) and net equity in nonresidential real estate (\text{nnresre}).

- \text{bus}: reported market value of private business interest.

- \text{vehic}: prevailing retail value for all vehicles owned by household.
mortgage_dbt: housing debt from mortgages, home equity loans, and home equity lines of credit (mrthel) plus debt for other residential property (resdbt).

vehic_dbt: debt from vehicle loans (veh_inst)

other_dbt: other debt, including other lines of credit plus credit card balance (ccbal) plus installment loans less education loans and vehicle loans (other_dbt = othloc + ccbal + install − edn_inst − veh_inst).

In addition to portfolio data, we also use data on household wage income (wageinc) which we combine with data the number of people in the household and the Social Security wage index to create a per capita wage measure which is comparable over time.

A.2 Duration component calculations

A.2.1 Duration of equity

The duration of equity is obtained using yearly estimates for the duration of the aggregate stock market from Greenwald et al. (2021). We then apply a mean preserving adjustment to the aggregate duration value by networth decile and age group using price-dividend ratios from asset holding data in the SCF. The dividends used in the PD ratios are taxable “Ordinary Dividends” reported in IRS form 1040 line 3b, which includes all dividend income from individually held stocks and mutual funds and is given in the raw SCF as X5710. We call the assets corresponding to these dividends tf_equity, which we construct from the sum of SCF extract variables as

\[ tf_{equity} = stock + stmutf + comutf + omutf + gbmutf + tfbmutf + obmutf. \]

The major difference between the tequity variable and the tf_equity variable is the inclusion of bond mutual funds, in particular, government bond mutual funds (gbmutf), tax-free bond mutual funds (tfbmutf), other bond mutual funds (obmutf), and a portion of combined mutual funds (comutf).\footnote{The presence of bond mutual funds in the variables used to construct our adjustment could bias our estimates if bond holdings make up a large portion of tf_equity and differ systematically by age group and decile. However, this is not the case in the data, as the stock portion accounts for the vast majority of tf_equity and remains stable across age groups and networth deciles.} This is because, for the purpose of Form 1040, income from bond mutual funds are taxed as dividends.
To understand how duration varies in the cross-section of equity holders, we split the respondents into the age groups of 20-40, 40-60, and 60+ and compute networth deciles within each group. We then sum the value of \( tf_{equity} \) and dividends within each networth-age group and divide the total asset value by the total dividend value to obtain each group’s price-dividend ratio. We then create a mean-preserving adjustment multiplier by dividing these price-dividend ratios by the aggregate price dividend ratio in the SCF. This implies that the Macaulay duration of equity for each household is given by

\[
dur(Equity_{dat}) = \frac{PD_{Ratio_{da}}}{PD_{Ratio}} \times dur(Equity_t) \tag{A.1}
\]

where \( d \) represents the within age group networth decile, \( a \) represents the age group, and \( t \) represents the survey year.

Note that this adjustment is only applied to the portion of equity reported on Form 1040, namely, directly held stocks (stock), stock mutual funds (stmutf), other mutual funds (omutf), and a portion of combined mutual funds (comutf). To the other elements of equity whose income is not reported on Form 1040, such as portions of retirement accounts allocated to stock, we apply the duration of the aggregate stock market in that survey year.\(^\text{12}\)

### A.2.2 Duration of fixed income

Data on the Macaulay duration of government bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgage-backed securities come from Bloomberg where the series used are:

- U.S. gov/credit: LUGCTRUU
- U.S. Treasury: LUATTRUU
- Government-related: LD08TRUU
- U.S. aggregate: LBUSTRUU
- Municipal bond: LMBTTR
- Corporate: LUACTRUU

\(^{12}\)This follows from a literature in behavioral economics that suggests people opt in the default option for their defined contribution pension plans, usually the market portfolio (Madrian and Shea, 2001).
For holdings of U.S. government bonds \((\text{govt} + \text{gbmutf} + \text{savbnd})\), we use the market-value weighted average Macaulay duration of the U.S. gov/credit, U.S. Treasury, and government-related bond categories. For holdings of tax-free and municipal bonds \((\text{notxbnd} + \text{tbfmutf})\), mortgage-backed securities \((\text{mortbnd})\), corporate bonds \((\text{corpbnd})\), and foreign bonds \((\text{forbnd})\), we use the Macaulay duration of municipal bonds, corporate bonds, U.S. MBS, and the global aggregate, respectively. For all other fixed income assets, we assign a cash flow duration of 4.

A.2.3 Duration of real estate

The duration of real estate is obtained using the annual estimates of the duration of aggregate real estate from Greenwald et al. (2021) Appendix E.2.4. These estimates are applied uniformly to all individuals in the SCF by survey year.

A.2.4 Duration of private business wealth

The duration of private business wealth is computed for each household as the value of household businesses, \(\text{bus}\), divided by the annual cashflows \(\text{cashflows}\) from those equity holdings. However, the annual cashflows \(\text{cashflows}\) from those equity holdings are not reported in the SCF, the major issue being that that cashflows from private businesses partially contain implicit or explicit labor income for the entrepreneur. As such, we must estimate or difference out this labor income, which we do in four ways depending in the household’s role in the business and what is reported.

1. For households whose main respondent has an active management role in either of the household’s potential actively managed businesses, reports being self employed, and reports not receiving a salary, we estimate their predicted wage.
   - The predicted wage is estimated via ordinary least squares on all SCF respondents \(j\) where the households wage income is the dependent variable, and the independent variables are a third degree polynomial in age interacted with dummies for each Race \(\times\) Education \(\times\) Gender group.

2. For households whose main respondent has an active management role in either of the household’s potential actively managed businesses and reports being self employed and receiving
a salary or reports being employed by someone else, we subtract the maximum of their predicted wage and reported wage from \textit{busofarminc}.

3. We repeat steps 1) and 2) for spouses who have an active management role in either of the household’s potential actively managed businesses.

4. All other households with positive private business wealth who don’t meet the criteria for a wage subtraction are given cashflows equal to \textit{busofarminc}.

We then aggregate \textit{bus} and the estimated annual cashflows and divided them to obtain our proxy for duration.

Next, to allow our aggregate estimates of private business duration to vary over the wealth distribution, we follow a similar procedure as we did with publicly traded equity. First, we split the population into age groups of 20-40, 40-60, and 60+ and compute networth centiles within each age group. We then sum the business wealth (\textit{bus}) and total income from businesses (\textit{busofarminc}) within each centile-age group to obtain a price-total income ratio. Provided that cashflows from equity are proportional to labor income, this provides a proxy for duration within each networth centile-age group. These price-total income ratios are then divided by the aggregate price-total income ratio ratio to obtain a mean preserving adjustment which is applied to the annual aggregate private business duration estimates. This is given by

\begin{equation}
\text{dur(Private business}_{cat}) = \frac{\text{Price-total income ratio}_{cat}}{\text{Price-total income ratio}} \times \text{dur(Private business}_{t})
\end{equation} (A.2)

### A.2.5 Duration of vehicles

The \textit{vehic} category in the SCF contains detailed information on up to 4 automobiles, up to 2 non-automobile vehicles, and an aggregation of additional automobiles and non-automobile vehicles owned by the household. For the primary automobiles of the house, we attribute an expected lifetime of 8 years for 1989 and 12 years for 2019, linearly interpolating in intermediate years. We calculate the time left on an automobile’s life as the model year plus the expected age minus the survey year. We assume a fixed depreciation rate to 0 over the cars remaining years, and calculate the duration using (1). We attribute a duration of one to vehicles whose age exceeds their expected lifetime.

For the aggregation of additional automobiles owned, we attribute a duration equal to the average of the duration of the first four automobiles owned by the household. For all non-automobile vehicles owned by the household, we ascribe a duration of 6 years.
A.2.6 Duration of debts

For the debt categories, mortgage\textunderscore dt, vehic\textunderscore dt, and other\textunderscore dt, we break each up into their component loans as described in the SCF extract and calculate the duration of each loan separately. For each loan, we assume a fixed payment schedule, and thus its duration can be calculated using (1), where $N$ is the number of years remaining of the vehicles expected lifetime and $y_{nt}$ is the riskfree spot rate at horizon $n$ in year $t$.

Under our fixed payment assumption, the only metric we need for each loan is its time remaining. Since different loan component variables contain different amounts of information in the raw SCF, we calculate the time remaining differently depending on the available information for each component loan group: primary component loans, aggregated additional loans, and lines of credit. The primary component loans of each debt category contain information on loan origination, balance, payments, and interest rates. For these loans, we calculate the number of years remaining on the loan payments using the reported origination year, length of loan at origination, and survey year. For respondents with a positive loan balance who have missing responses for loan length or a negative calculated time remaining, we impute time remaining with balance ($B$), initial amount ($L$), interest rate ($R$), and year of origination ($p$) using the equation

$$T = \frac{\ln(R^p - \frac{B}{R}) - \ln(1 - \frac{B}{R})}{\ln(R)} - p.$$ 

The aggregated additional loans group contains loan variables that capture an aggregation of loans that the respondents hold in addition to the primary ones in each debt category. These loans include data on only loan balance and payments ($X$). Using the average interest rates for primary loans in the same debt category, we calculate time remaining as

$$T = -\frac{\ln(1 - \frac{B(R - 1)}{X})}{\ln(R)}.$$ 

The third group of component loans is the lines of credit. The line of credit variables contain information on loan balance, typical payments, and interest rates. With these data points, we calculate time remaining according to the same formula used for the aggregated additional loans group. Finally, there is an aggregated additional lines of credit variable, which we assign a duration equal to the average of the duration of the other lines of credit.

We replace the duration of loans with a predicted time remaining under one year with a duration
of one and give the median duration to respondents with a positive loan amount but insufficient
information to calculate time remaining on the loan.

A.3 Time series of riskfree rates

To obtain a time series of the short-term real interest rate, we use a methodology similar to that of
Beeler and Campbell (2012). Using the yield on the 10-year nominal Treasury bond $y_{10}$ and annual
inflation rate $\pi$ from Global Financial Data, we estimate the annual regression

\[ y_{10,t} - \pi_{t,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_{10,t} + \beta_2 \pi_{t-1,t} + \epsilon_{t+1} \tag{A.3} \]

on the post-war period. The fitted values are then taken as our estimate of the expected riskfree rate
10-years from time $t$, $\hat{f}_{10,t}$. From this, equation (4) yields the time-$t$ riskfree rate:

\[ r_{ft} = \varphi^{-10}(\hat{f}_{10,t} - (1 - \varphi^{10})\bar{r}_f). \tag{A.4} \]

Figure A.1: Time series of riskfree rates, Post-war sample

Note: This figure presents the time series of short-term riskfree rates as estimated by Equation (A.3)
and transformed by Equation (A.4).
As discussed above, we use this methodology for two main reasons. First, by using long-term rates to back out short-term rates, we smooth much of the short-term variation in measured short-term real rates that are potentially outside of our model. Second, this methodology allows us to extend our real rate series further into the past, allowing for a longer simulation prior to our period of interest. This procedure yields a time series of annual realizations of real rates \( \{ r_{ft} \} \) and shocks \( \{ \epsilon_{rt} \} \) from 1789 to 2020. The post-war time series of these rates are shown in Figure A.1.

\section*{B \quad Model appendix}

\subsection*{B.1 \quad Details on income tax rates}

Section 3.5 discusses the taxes paid on labor income and Social Security benefits. In the model, households face the following marginal tax rates:

\[
\text{Marginal Tax Rate}_{it} = \begin{cases} 
0.10 & \text{if } L_{2, it} < 0.18, \\
0.12 & \text{if } 0.18 \leq L_{2, it} < 0.72, \\
0.22 & \text{if } 0.72 \leq L_{2, it} < 1.54, \\
0.24 & \text{if } 1.54 \leq L_{2, it} < 2.94, \\
0.32 & \text{if } 2.94 \leq L_{2, it} < 3.73, \\
0.35 & \text{if } 3.73 \leq L_{2, it} < 9.32, \\
0.37 & \text{if } L_{2, it} > 9.32.
\end{cases}
\] (B.1)

The breakpoints in this formula are the limits of the 2020 tax brackets divided by the wage index.

\subsection*{B.2 \quad Derivation of long-term bond returns}

This section explains how the riskfree rate dynamics (4) and yields (??) imply the \( n \)-period bond returns (8). First, note that (4) iterates backward to the expression

\[
r_{f,t+j} = (1 - \varphi^j)r_f + \varphi^j r_{ft} + \sum_{k=1}^{j} \varphi^{j-k} \sigma r_{r,t+k},
\] (B.2)
a fact we will use below. Since it has no intermediate cash flows, the bond’s return from $t$ to $t+1$ is

$$R_{n,t+1} = \frac{P_{n-1,t+1}}{P_{nt}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.3)$$

subject to the terminal condition $P_{0t} = 1$. Notice that the return becomes riskless when $n = 1$, so $R_1 = R_f$. Substituting the riskfree rates (B.2) into the yield expression (??) and evaluating expectations implies

$$y_{nt} = \bar{r}_f + \frac{1}{n} \left( 1 - \varphi^n \right) \left( r_{ft} - \bar{r}_f \right) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mu_j.$$  

Taking logs of (B.3) and substituting in this yield then implies the log return

$$r_{n,t+1} = ny_{nt} - (n-1)y_{n-1,t+1}$$

$$= \bar{r}_f + \frac{1 - \varphi^n}{1 - \varphi} \left( r_{ft} - \bar{r}_f \right) - \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} \left( r_{f,t+1} - \bar{r}_f \right) + \mu_n$$

$$= \bar{r}_f + \frac{1 - \varphi^n}{1 - \varphi} \left( r_{ft} - \bar{r}_f \right) - \frac{\varphi - \varphi^n}{1 - \varphi} \left( r_{ft} - \bar{r}_f \right) - \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} \sigma_r \epsilon_{r,t+1} + \mu_n$$

$$= r_{ft} + \mu_n - \frac{1 - \varphi^{n-1}}{1 - \varphi} \sigma_r \epsilon_{r,t+1},$$

the stated expression (8).

### B.3 Derivation of private-business valuation and duration

Let $E_n$ represent the value of business income $n$ periods into the future (the dividend strip with maturity $n$). By analogy to the zero-coupon bonds, assume that the dividend yield on this strip equals

$$y_{nt}^{(D)} = -\frac{1}{n} \log \frac{E_{nt}}{D_t} = y_{nt} + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \tilde{\mu}_j D, \hspace{1cm}$$

where we will set $\tilde{\mu}_j D$ to get a constant risk premium. Note the boundary condition $E_{0t} = D_t$ (we verify below that this holds in our solution). By definition, the return on this claim is

$$R_{n,t+1}^{(D)} = \frac{E_{n-1,t+1}}{E_{nt}},$$

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so the log return

\[ r_{n,t+1}^{(D)} = ny_{nt}^{(D)} - (n - 1)y_{n-1,t+1}^{(D)} + \log \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} \]

\[ = r_{ft} + \mu_n - \sigma_n \epsilon_{r,t+1} + \hat{\mu}_n D + g_D + \sigma_D \epsilon_{D,t+1}. \]

To target a maturity-invariant risk premium \( \mu_E \), including adjustments for Jensen’s inequality, we need to set

\[ \hat{\mu}_n D = \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D - \left( \mu_n + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_n \right) \bigg|_{= 0}. \]

Combining these results, we have the strip value

\[ E_{nt} = E(n, D_t, r_{ft}) = P_{nt} D_t \exp \left\{ -n \left( \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}. \]

Then the total value of private business equity is

\[ E_t = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} E_{nt}. \]

The duration of this claim is simply

\[ \text{dur}(E_t) = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n E_{nt}}{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} E_{nt}} = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n P_{nt} \exp \left\{ -n \left( \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}}{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} P_{nt} \exp \left\{ -n \left( \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}}, \]

a function of \( r_{ft} \). To get a sense of this duration value, let \( r_{ft} \) equal \( \bar{r}_f \) and ignore the Jensen’s inequality term, so that \( P_n \approx \exp\{-n\bar{r}_f\} \). Then we have

\[ \overline{E}_{nt} = E_t \exp \left\{ -n \left( \bar{r}_f + \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}, \]

implying

\[ \overline{E}_t = D_t \frac{\exp \left\{ - \left( \bar{r}_f + \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}}{1 - \exp \left\{ - \left( \bar{r}_f + \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}}. \]

It follows that the duration is approximately

\[ \text{dur}(E_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \exp \left\{ - \left( \bar{r}_f + \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D \right) \right\}} \approx \frac{1}{\bar{r}_f + \mu_D - g_D - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_D}. \]

The denominator is a risk-adjusted “r minus g” term.
C Derivation of the linearized model

This section lays out the details of the linearization and analytical solutions presented in Section 4. The approach follows that of Campbell and Viceira (2001), except that we add finite lives and, ultimately, intertemporal income. To fully understand the economics, we first solve for policies in the general case of recursive utility (i.e., disentangling risk aversion and the EIS), then reduce to the time-additive case in the main text. For the remainder of this appendix section, we will suppress indices and state approximate (i.e., linearized) equalities as exact.

C.1 Linearized conditions

Suppose that there is no intertemporal income, so the budget constraint (6) simplifies to

\[ W_{t+1} = (W_t - C_t) R_{W,t+1}. \]

The first-order condition for a recursive-utility agent takes the familiar form

\[ 1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta_t^\psi \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\theta/\psi} R_{W,t+1}^{\theta-1} R_{j,t+1} \right], \]

where \( \beta_t = \beta(1 - m_t) \) is mortality-adjusted patience, \( \psi \) is the EIS, \( \theta = (1 - \gamma)/(1 - 1/\psi) \), and \( R_j \in \{ R_f, R_n, R_W \} \). The analytical solution follows from linearizing this budget constraint and first-order condition.

Let lowercase letters denote logs and the \( \Delta \) operator denote first-differences. Scaling the budget constraint by financial wealth \( W_t \) and log-linearizing implies

\[ \Delta w_{t+1} = \kappa_w(m_t) + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\rho_c(m_t)} \right) (c_t - w_t) + r_{w,t+1}, \]

where \( \rho_c(m_t) = \beta(1 - m_t) \) and \( \kappa_w(m_t) = \log \rho_c(m_t) + (1 - \rho_c(m_t)) \log (1 - \rho_c(m_t))/\rho_c(m_t) \).\(^{13}\)

(Notice that, as \( m_t \to 1, c_t \to w_t \); agents who will die almost surely consume everything.) We can

\(^{13}\text{In infinite-horizon models like that of Campbell and Viceira (2001), one typically chooses } \rho_c = 1 - \exp \{ \mathbb{E}[c_t - w_t] \}, \text{ which reduces to } \rho_c = \beta \text{ for EIS of 1. Here, to capture the effect of aging, we linearize instead around the unit-EIS solution, which is exact in our model.} \)
also get the linearized approximation to the log wealth return

\[ r_{w,t+1} = r_{ft} + \pi_t(r_{n,t+1} - r_{ft}) + \pi_t(1 - \pi_t)\text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1}). \]

This expression is a discretization of the exact continuous-time law of motion. Finally, log-linearize the Euler equation up to a second order:

\[ 0 = \theta \log \beta_t + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ -\frac{\theta}{\psi} \Delta c_{t+1} + (\theta - 1)r_{w,t+1} + r_{j,t+1} \right] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t \left( -\frac{\theta}{\psi} \Delta c_{t+1} + (\theta - 1)r_{w,t+1} + r_{j,t+1} \right). \]

Substituting in \( r_j = r_n \) implies the risk premium on the long-term bond

\[ \mathbb{E}_t[r_{n,t+1} - r_{f,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1}) = \frac{\theta}{\psi} \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, \Delta c_{t+1}) + (1 - \theta) \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, r_{w,t+1}). \] (C.1)

Using the decomposition

\[ \Delta c_{t+1} = (c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) - (c_t - w_t) + \Delta w_{t+1} \]

and the expression for \( \Delta w_{t+1} \) from the linearized budget constraint, we can rewrite

\[ \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, \Delta c_{t+1}) = \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) + \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, r_{w,t+1}). \]

Combining this with the fact that

\[ \text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, r_{w,t+1}) = \pi_t \text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1}) \]

and \( \theta/\psi + 1 - \theta = \gamma \) implies the solution

\[ \pi_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[r_{n,t+1} - r_{f,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1})}{\text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1})} - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right)(1 - \psi)^{-1} \frac{\text{cov}_t(r_{n,t+1}, c_{t+1} - w_{t+1})}{\text{var}_t(r_{n,t+1})} \] (C.2)

As explained in the main text, the first term is the myopic risk-return portfolio; the second is intertemporal hedging of rate risk.

Another fact that will become useful is that the first-order condition for wealth returns (\( r_j = r_w \))
simplifies to

\[ E_t[\Delta c_{t+1}] = \psi \log \beta_t + \psi E_t[r_{w,t+1}] + \frac{1}{2} \psi \var_t(\Delta c_{t+1} - \psi r_{w,t+1}). \]

Using the same decomposition of \( \Delta c \) as above, the variance term can be rewritten

\[ \var_t(\Delta c_{t+1} - \psi r_{w,t+1}) = \var_t(c_{t+1} - w_{t+1} + (1 - \psi)r_{w,t+1}) \]
\[ = \var_t(c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) + (1 - \psi)^2 \pi_t^2 \var_t(r_{n,t+1}) \]
\[ + (1 - \psi)\pi_t\cov_t(r_{w,t+1}, c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}). \]

We will use these expressions to solve for the equilibrium consumption-wealth ratio.

## C.2 Optimal policies in the linearized model

We will now solve for the optimal consumption and portfolio choices using the conditions derived above. Conjecture that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio takes the form

\[ c_t - w_t = \log(1 - \beta(1 - m_t)) + (1 - \psi)(\varrho_{0t} + \varrho_{rt}r_{ft}), \]

for some functions \( \varrho_{0t} = \varrho_0(\{m_s\}_{s \geq t}) \) and \( \varrho_{rt} = \varrho_r(\{m_s\}_{s \geq t}) \) of the future mortality probabilities. Increasing utility implies the boundary conditions \( \lim_{m \to 1} (1 - \psi)\varrho_0(m) = 0 \) and \( \lim_{m \to 1} \varrho_r(m) = 0 \). This conjecture implies that

\[ (1 - \psi)^{-1}\cov_t(r_{n,t+1}, c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) = \varrho_{rt}\cov_t(r_{n,t+1}, r_{f,t+1}) \]
\[ = -\varrho_{rt}\sigma_n\sigma_r, \]

and therefore that, as claimed,

\[ \pi_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\mu_n}{\sigma_n^2} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\sigma_r^2}{\sigma_n^2} \right) + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \varrho_{rt} \frac{\sigma_r}{\sigma_n} \]
\[ = a_0 + a_r \varrho_{rt}. \]
To solve for \( \varrho_0 \) and \( \varrho_r \), notice that this solution for \( \pi \) implies

\[
E_t[r_{w,t+1}] = r_{ft} + \pi_t \mu_n + \pi_t (1 - \pi_t) \sigma_n^2
\]

\[
= r_{ft} + (a_0 \mu_n + (a_0 - a_0^2) \sigma_n^2) + (a_r \mu_n + (a_r - 2a_0 a_r) \sigma_n^2) \varrho_r - a_r^2 \sigma_n^2 \varrho_r^2
\]

\[
= r_{ft} + d_0 + d_1 \varrho_r - d_2 \varrho_r^2.
\]

It also implies

\[
\text{var}_t (c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) = (1 - \psi)^2 \varrho_r^2 \sigma_r^2,
\]

\[
(1 - \psi)^2 \pi_t^2 \text{var}_t (r_{n,t+1}) = (1 - \psi)^2 (a_0^2 + 2a_0 a_r \varrho_r + a_r^2 \varrho_r^2) \sigma_n^2,
\]

\[
(1 - \psi) \pi_t \text{cov}_t (r_{n,t+1}, c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}) = (1 - \psi)^2 (a_0 + a_r \varrho_r) (-\varrho_r \sigma_n \sigma_r).
\]

Therefore, using the algebra from the previous section, we have

\[
\text{var}_t (\Delta c_{t+1} - \psi r_{w,t+1}) = (1 - \psi)^2 (g_0 + g_1 \varrho_r + g_2 \varrho_r^2)
\]

for constants \( g_j \). Finally, we have

\[
E_t[\Delta c_{t+1}] = E_t[c_{t+1} - w_{t+1}] - \rho_c(m_t)^{-1}(c_t - w_t) + \kappa_w(m_t) + E_t[r_{w,t+1}]
\]

\[= (1 - \psi)(\varrho_0 + \varrho_r + ((1 - \varrho)\bar{f} + \varrho r_{ft}))
\]

\[- \rho_c(m_t)^{-1}(1 - \psi)(\varrho_0 + \varrho_r r_{ft}) + \kappa_w(m_t) + E_t[r_{w,t+1}].
\]

Substituting all these facts into the Euler equation for wealth returns, then collecting coefficients on \( r_{ft} \), implies the difference equation

\[
\varphi \varrho_{r,t+1} = \rho_c(m_t)^{-1} \varrho_r - 1.
\]
Now iterate forward and use the boundary condition \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \rho_{rt} = 0 \):

\[
\rho_{rt} = \rho_c(m_t)(\varphi \rho_{r,t+1} + 1)
\]

\[
= \rho_c(m_t) + \varphi \rho_c(m_t) \rho_c(m_{t+1}) + \varphi^2 \rho_c(m_t) \rho_c(m_{t+1}) \rho_c(m_{t+2}) + \ldots
\]

\[
= \beta(1 - m_t) \left( 1 + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \varphi^j \beta^j \prod_{k=1}^{j} (1 - m_{t+k}) \right)
\]

The higher is the mortality probability, the less relevant are fluctuations in the interest rate to consumption and portfolio choices. For reference, note that, for infinitely lived agents \((m_t = 0\) for all \(t\)), this converges to \(\rho_r = \rho_c/(1 - \varphi \rho_c)\), the result from Campbell and Viceira (2001).

Collecting the remaining constant terms implies a difference equation for \(\rho_{0t}\), which we can similarly iterate forward with terminal condition \((1 - \psi)\rho_0 \to 0\) to arrive at a solution. This verifies the conjecture.

### C.3 Adding labor income and Social Security

We now introduce a deterministic stream of labor income \(L\) and, in turn, Social Security taxes \(T\) and benefits \(B\). The present value of labor income (human capital) \(H\) and Social Security wealth \(S\) are as stated in the main text.

As we did with the wealth return above, let us linearize the returns on human capital and Social Security wealth using a continuous-time approximation. Let \(\rho_{\text{surv}}(t,j) = \prod_{s=1}^{j} (1 - m_{t,s})\) denote the cumulative probability of surviving from \(t\) to \(t + j\). For human capital, the log return is approximately

\[
r_{H,t+1} = r_{ft} + \mu_{Ht} + \left( \sum_{j=0}^{t_{\text{ret}}-t} \omega_{jt}^{H} \left( \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_n} \right) \right) (r_{n,t+1} - r_{f,t+1})
\]

where

\[
\omega_{jt}^{H} = \frac{\rho_{\text{surv}}(t,j)P_{jt}L_{t+j}}{\sum_{j'=0}^{t_{\text{ret}}-t} \rho_{\text{surv}}(t,j')P_{jt}L_{t+j'}} = \frac{\rho_{\text{surv}}(t,j)P_{jt}L_{t+j}}{H_{t}}
\]

is the value weight of the \(j\)th labor-payment, and therefore \(\pi^{H}\) is a value-weighted rate-sensitivity adjustment. More specifically, a share \(\pi^{H}\) of the total value of human capital is an implicit holding.
of $n$-period bonds; this share is a value-weighted average of the cross-price elasticities

$$\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_n} = -\frac{\partial \log P_{jt}}{\partial r_{ft}} = \frac{\partial \log P_{jt}}{\partial \log P_{mt}};$$

and hence constitutes an adjustment for the duration of the income stream relative to the traded $n$-period bond. Identical logic leads us to conclude that the log return on Social Security is

$$r_{S,t+1} = r_{ft} + \mu_{St} + \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \omega^S_{jt} \left( \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_n} \right) \right) (r_{n,t+1} - r_{f,t+1}),$$

where the value weights take the form

$$\omega^S_{jt} = \omega^B_{jt} - \omega^T_{jt} = \frac{p_{surv}(t_j) P_{jt}(B_{t+j} - T_{t+j})}{S_t},$$

the difference between the benefits claim and the tax liability.

Now, as in the main text, define total wealth as

$$W_t = W_t + (L_t + H_t) + (B_t - T_t + S_t).$$

(Recall that $H$ and $S$ do not include their contemporaneous “dividends,” so we must add them back in this expression.) Grossing up at the rates of return on these assets implies

$$\bar{W}_{t+1} = (W_t + L_t + B_t - T_t - C_t)R_{W,t+1} + H_t R_{H,t+1} + S_t R_{S,t+1}.$$  (C.4)

Multiplying and dividing by $W_t - C_t$, we have the dynamic budget constraint

$$\bar{W}_{t+1} = (\bar{W}_t - C_t)R_{\bar{W},t+1}.$$

where the return on total wealth

$$R_{\bar{W},t+1} = \left( \frac{W_t + L_t + B_t - T_t - C_t}{W_t - C_t} \right) R_{W,t+1} + \left( \frac{H_t}{W_t - C_t} \right) R_{H,t+1} + \left( \frac{S_t}{W_t - C_t} \right) R_{S,t+1}$$

$$= \alpha_W R_{W,t+1} + \alpha_H R_{H,t+1} + \alpha_S R_{S,t+1},$$

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and the return on financial wealth $R_W$ is as it was in the original problem.

Using the same linearization technique as before, the log total-wealth return can be approximated as

$$r_{\pi,t+1} = r_{ft} + \tilde{\mu}_t + \bar{\pi}_t(r_{n,t+1} - r_{ft}) + \frac{1}{2}\bar{\pi}_t(1 - \bar{\pi}_t)\sigma_n^2,$$

where

$$\bar{\mu}_t = \alpha_H \mu_H + \alpha_S \mu_S$$

is a value-weighted drift term from the intertemporal endowments, and

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \alpha_W \pi_t + \alpha_H \pi_H^t + \alpha_S \pi_S^t \quad (C.5)$$

is the value-weighted average of positions in the long-term bond — that is, the percentage of total wealth invested in the bond. Other than the presence of $\bar{\mu}_t$, this budget constraint is identical in form to that from the problem with no labor income or Social Security. Following the same steps from before, we conclude that

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \pi_t^*,$$

where $\pi_t^*$ is the optimal solution without intertemporal income. Substituting this into C.5 and rearranging, we see that the optimal allocation to the asset from financial wealth is

$$\pi_t = \pi_t^* + \left(\frac{H_t}{W_t + L_t + B_t - T_t - C_t}\right)(\pi_t^* - \pi_H^t) + \left(\frac{S_t}{W_t + L_t + B_t - T_t - C_t}\right)(\pi_t^* - \pi_S^t).$$

In the main text, we slightly simplify notation by redefining wealth to include the contemporaneous income and consumption flows (thus far, we have assumed that it excludes these components). Doing this gives us the final expression (27).

### C.4 Optimal consumption plan in the limit

This section derives the optimal consumption-investment strategy in the limit as risk aversion approaches infinity and the EIS approaches zero. To do so, it is easiest to begin with the first-order condition of a power-utility investor:

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta(1 - m_t) \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} R_{j,t+1} \right]. \quad (C.6)$$
Conjecture that the optimal consumption policy is some deterministic constant $C_t = \bar{C}$. Substituting this conjecture into the first-order condition implies the recursion

$$\bar{C}_t = (\beta(1-m_t)E_t[R_{j,t+1}])^{-1/\gamma} \bar{C}_{t+1}. \quad \text{(C.7)}$$

Now taking the limit as $\gamma \to \infty$ implies that $\bar{C}_t = \bar{C}_{t+1} = \bar{C}$ — that is, consumption is indeed deterministic and in fact time-invariant.

The present value of optimal consumption must equal total wealth, so we have

$$\bar{W}_t = \bar{C} \sum_{j=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} P_{jt}, \quad \text{(C.8)}$$

where $t_{\text{max}}$ is the first year in which $m_t = 1$. This expression pins down the value of $\bar{C}$. Because the optimal consumption plan is deterministic and constant, the agent finances it by purchasing $\bar{C}$ of each zero-coupon bond and consuming the coupons.

We wish to relate the optimal portfolio strategy financing this consumption plan to the optimal policy $\bar{\pi}$ derived above. First, using the same linearization technique as above, notice that the wealth return under this consumption policy equals

$$r_{w,t+1} = r_{ft} + \left( \sum_{j=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} \sum_{j'=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} P_{jt} P_{j't} \left( \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_{r'}} \right) \right) (r_{n,t+1} - r_{ft}) \quad \text{(C.9)}$$

As with human capital and Social Security wealth, $\bar{\pi}$ represents an implicit holding of $n$-period bonds from the annuity financing consumption. Now let us compare this implicit holding $\bar{\pi}$ to the optimal holding $\pi^*$. In the limit, the general expression for optimal consumption (23) implies the (negative) elasticity

$$\frac{\partial \log(C/W_t)}{\partial r_{ft}} = \varrho_{rt}. \quad \text{(C.10)}$$

Calculating this same left-hand-side derivative from (C.8) and equating these, we have

$$\varrho_{rt} = \sum_{j=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} \frac{P_{jt}}{\sum_{j'=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} P_{j't}} \left( \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_r} \right).$$

Note that this satisfies the terminal condition $W_{t_{\text{max}}} = \bar{C}$, since $P_0 = 1$. 

14Note that this satisfies the terminal condition $W_{t_{\text{max}}} = \bar{C}$, since $P_0 = 1$. 

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Substituting this into the expression for the optimal portfolio \( \tilde{\pi} = \pi^* \) in (24), then taking \( \gamma \to \infty \), we have

\[
\tilde{\pi}_t = \bar{q}_t \frac{\sigma_{\tau}}{\sigma_n} = \sum_{j=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} \frac{P_{jt}}{\sum_{j'=0}^{t_{\text{max}}-t} P_{j't}} \left( \sigma_j / \sigma_n \right).
\]

This optimal policy is exactly identical to the expression \( \tilde{\pi} \) from (C.9), as claimed.

## D Numerical appendix

**Table D.1: Calibration of labor income process**

Parameter estimates for Section 3.3 come from Specifications (5) in Guvenen et al. (2022). Parameters can be found in Table IV of the published version and Table D.III of the Online Appendix. We also combine the \( z \) and \( \alpha \) processes, which results in the \( \sigma_{z,0} \) parameter listed below. We do this to avoid adding an additional state variable to the model, a decision that has little effect on the results as the \( z \) process is extremely persistent. Finally, note the deterministic life-cycle component is given by \( g(\text{Age}) = b_{0,g} + b_{1,g} \text{Age} + b_{2,g} \text{Age}^2 / 10 + b_{3,g} \text{Age}^3 / 100 \) where \( b_{0,g} \) is specified to make mean earnings equal to Social Security Wage Index.

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<th>Parameter</th>
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